True belief is so easily obtained that you can arrive at it by lucky guesses.
Justification is difficult.
Certain justification—certainty is about justification, not accuracy—is harder still, and may be impossible.
Whether you can have information that X is true depends on whether “information” means belief, justification, knowledge or something else.
Skeptics about knowledge tend to see truth as peerfect justification. Non-sceptics tend to see truth as an out-of-the-mind correspondence with thte world.
Certainty is usually not considered necessary for justification. Some very few people do, but there are plenty of skeptics who are making the stronger claim that we don’t have significant justification, not simply that we don’t have certainty
Half the people in a room believe, for no particular reason, that extraterrestrial life exists. The other half disbelieve it. Some of them will be right, but none of them know, because they have no systematic justifaction for their beliefs.
In your opinion, does this apply even if people never encounter extraterrestial life and have no evidence for it, if there happens to be extraterrestial life?
Does the above question make sense to you? It doesn’t make sense to me.
In your opinion, does this apply even if people never encounter extraterrestial life and have no evidence for it, if there happens to be extraterrestial life?
That is the realist (and, I think, common sense) attitude: that beliefs are rendered true by correspondence to chunks of reality.
True belief is so easily obtained that you can arrive at it by lucky guesses. Justification is difficult. Certain justification—certainty is about justification, not accuracy—is harder still, and may be impossible. Whether you can have information that X is true depends on whether “information” means belief, justification, knowledge or something else. Skeptics about knowledge tend to see truth as peerfect justification. Non-sceptics tend to see truth as an out-of-the-mind correspondence with thte world.
Certainty is usually not considered necessary for justification. Some very few people do, but there are plenty of skeptics who are making the stronger claim that we don’t have significant justification, not simply that we don’t have certainty
Please expand. Give us an example.
Half the people in a room believe, for no particular reason, that extraterrestrial life exists. The other half disbelieve it. Some of them will be right, but none of them know, because they have no systematic justifaction for their beliefs.
In your opinion, does this apply even if people never encounter extraterrestial life and have no evidence for it, if there happens to be extraterrestial life?
Does the above question make sense to you? It doesn’t make sense to me.
That is the realist (and, I think, common sense) attitude: that beliefs are rendered true by correspondence to chunks of reality.
Yes. I don’t assume truth has to be in the head.
If science is falsifiable and therefore uncertain is any of it true? If not then I assume JTB must judge “scientific knowledge” to be an oxymoron.
If some scientific knowledge is true does that mean that the theory will not be revised, extended or corrected in the next 1,000 years?
Does truth apply to science? If not should “true” be included in our definition of knowledge?
The JTB per se does not say justificaiton must be certain