Eliezer is suggesting that the Quineans are “not doing anything interesting with [their] not-wrongness” after being aware of the field for all of an hour and a half?!
Makes perfect sense to me. Someone comes up to me and says “This person is a brilliant mathematician! She just showed me a proof that there’s no highest prime, and proved Pythagoras’ theorem!” my response would be that that’s still no evidence that she’s made any worthwhile contribution to mathematics. She may have, but there’s little reason to believe it from the original statement.
Seems to me less like that and more like, “this Euclid fellow was brilliant”, followed by a list of things that Euclid proved before anybody else proved. Timing matters here. It’s no coincidence that before Quine came along, the clever Eliezers were not taking Quinean naturalism for granted.
For another analogy, if someone came along and told you, “this Hugh Everett fellow was brilliant! Here, read this paper in which he argues that the wave function never collapses”, would you say, “well, Eliezer already went through that a few years ago; there’s still no evidence that Everett made any worthwhile contribution”?
I did not come to this conclusion on the basis of having read the claim somewhere. Rather, it’s what I gather from having read philosophy from both before and after Quine. If clever men were coming up with Quinean insight left and right before Quine appeared, then we should see a large number of philosophers pre-Quine who make Quine redundant. I don’t recall encountering any of these philosophers whose existence would virtually be assured if I were wrong. But suppose that I am simply ignorant. We still have Quine’s reputation to content with, the wide acknowledgment by major philosophers that he was highly influential. If I were wrong, he should have been lost in a sea of bright young men who anticipated his key insights.
“If clever men were coming up with Quinean insight left and right before Quine appeared, then we should see a large number of philosophers pre-Quine who make Quine redundant.”
Assuming also that those ‘clever men’ were going into philosophy rather than dismissing it as Eliezer has.
Eliezer may say that he dismisses philosophy, but he has nevertheless published a great deal which takes issue with some philosophy, agrees with other philosophy, and most importantly, he has provided a great deal of argumentation in favor of these conclusions which some philosophers agree with and other philosophers disagree with. Whether he believes it or not, Eliezer is doing philosophy, and a lot of it.
So, where are these clever men pre-Qune who dismissed philosophy and then proceeded, as Eliezer has done, to produce reams of it?
There are a few, e.g. E.T. Jaynes, Alfred North Whitehead (“Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophic thought has done its best, the wonder remains. ”), and Richard Feynman (over and over and over again.)
More generally, though, those ‘clever men’ have tended to ignore philosophy and charge ahead with whatever they’re doing; it’s just that Eliezer’s work has tended to impinge more on philosophy than, say, themodynamics experiments or calculus proofs.
ETA: This didn’t actually address what Constant meant; my apologies.
Well, you did answer the question I asked, so it’s my fault that I didn’t word the question right. It’s practically a philosophical tradition to bury philosophy and then do philosophy on the grave of philosophy. For example the positivists sought to bury metaphysics. The king is dead, long live the king. So, sure, there are many examples of that.
The issue I was interested in was not this, but was whether it is probable that Eliezer independently reproduced Quine’s philosophy. I did not think it was likely. Certain of our ideas really do arise spontaneously among the clever generation after generation, but other ideas do not but are discovered rarely, at which point the ideas may be widely disseminated. I don’t number Quine’s ideas as among those that arise spontaneously, but among those that are rarely discovered and then may be widely disseminated. My evidence for this was Quine’s seeming originality. In response, it was argued that until Quine, the discoverers went on to do something else, which is why it wasn’t until Quine that the ideas were brought to the attention of philosophers. I argued in response that at least some fraction should, like Eliezer, have written about it, and then I asked, so where are these pre-Quine Quines who wrote about it? Only, I worded the question badly, and instead asked, where are the philosophers who dismissed philosophy. Of which there are, of course, many.
It’s hard to trace those causal lines, but here’s one data point: Dennett’s ideas have spread rather widely, and Dennett is an enthusiastic Quinean naturalist, and indeed was a student of Quine. Here’s Dennett:
...Quine’s book, ‘From a Logical Point of View’, which I read in despair in the math library late at night that freshman year, because I was taking a very difficult course in logic. And the next morning I’d read the whole book and I decided to transfer to Harvard to work with him.
Also: Stich, who might be called the ‘founder’ of experimental philosophy, was also an enthusiastic student of Quine’s. And experimental philosophy is the kind of philosophy getting all the major press in the last 10 years, it seems to me.
“still no evidence” is very much different to claims that certain properties do not exist in a given body of work. Absence of evidence (after an hour’s looking, if that) is not evidence of absence.
“Absence of evidence (after an hour’s looking, if that) is not evidence of absence.”
Actually it is. Weak evidence, but evidence nonetheless.
More to the point, if someone makes a claim that a work belonging to reference class X has a property Y, and then presents no evidence that it has that property, and you’ve previously investigated many other members of class X and found them all to have the property not-Y, it’s reasonable to assume that the new work has not-Yness until given evidence otherwise.
If someone comes along and says “this unqualified person on the internet has found a proof that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is wrong! I know all other unqualified people on the internet who’ve said that have been wrong, but I’m going to claim this one is correct, without giving you any evidence for that”, you’d be absolutely reasonable just to say “they’re wrong” without bothering to check.
It appears that Eliezer has come to the conclusion, based on the academic philosophy he’s read, that the reference class “academic philosophers” and the reference class “random nut on the internet” have several properties in common. He may or may not be correct in this conclusion (I’ve read little academic philosophy and wouldn’t want to judge) but his reactions given that premise seem perfectly sensible to me.
I think it’s absurd to equate the claim “Certain philosophers can have ideas useful to LessWrong” with “this unqualified person on the internet has found a proof that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is wrong”, and the fact that you’re framing it as such indicates that you are highly motivated in your argumentation.
As for the hypothetical premise that “the reference class “academic philosophers” and the reference class “random nut on the internet” have several properties in common”, I invite you to look to the top right of this website for the endorsement (of and by) the Future of Humanity institute that does, you guessed it, academic philosophy. Also refer to the numerous occurrences throughout this website of top contributors citing the FHI as a valid outlet for efficient donations towards existential risk mitigation. Is LessWrong suggesting we donate to people with the credibility of ‘random nuts on the internet’? Or is there perhaps some inconsistency which is what the people all over this thread are pointing out?
I actually have no great feelings about the argument either way. I’m using that as an example of a case where given a sufficiently strong prior you would accept Eliezer’s reasoning. I’m also suggesting that Eliezer appears to have that sufficiently strong prior.
Please note that I made no claims about my own thoughts on academic philosophy, and specifically stated that I don’t share that hypothetical premise. But from Eliezer’s own statements, it appears that he does have that pre-existing view of philosophers. And given that he has already formed that view he is being perfectly reasonable in not bothering to change that view without sufficiently strong evidence.
So what you’re actually saying is that given an arbitrary premise held arbitrarily strongly, one can rationally reject an arbitrary amount of evidence. I guess this is true, if trivially so.
What I think you’ve missed is that the premise is not shielded from discussion and can be itself judged, especially on this website which rejects theism for the exact reason of starting from an arbitrary premise.
Yes, I am saying that. However, I’m also saying that from what Eliezer has said, I don’t think his view of academic philosophy is an arbitrary one, but one formed from reading a reasonable amount of philosophy. Nor do I think the amount of evidence that’s been presented is arbitrary—it certainly doesn’t, by itself, convince me that this group of people have much to say, and I’m starting out from a neutral position, not a negative one.
Eliezer is suggesting that the Quineans are “not doing anything interesting with [their] not-wrongness” after being aware of the field for all of an hour and a half?!
Makes perfect sense to me. Someone comes up to me and says “This person is a brilliant mathematician! She just showed me a proof that there’s no highest prime, and proved Pythagoras’ theorem!” my response would be that that’s still no evidence that she’s made any worthwhile contribution to mathematics. She may have, but there’s little reason to believe it from the original statement.
Seems to me less like that and more like, “this Euclid fellow was brilliant”, followed by a list of things that Euclid proved before anybody else proved. Timing matters here. It’s no coincidence that before Quine came along, the clever Eliezers were not taking Quinean naturalism for granted.
For another analogy, if someone came along and told you, “this Hugh Everett fellow was brilliant! Here, read this paper in which he argues that the wave function never collapses”, would you say, “well, Eliezer already went through that a few years ago; there’s still no evidence that Everett made any worthwhile contribution”?
“before Quine came along, the clever Eliezers were not taking Quinean naturalism for granted.”
Citation needed.
I did not come to this conclusion on the basis of having read the claim somewhere. Rather, it’s what I gather from having read philosophy from both before and after Quine. If clever men were coming up with Quinean insight left and right before Quine appeared, then we should see a large number of philosophers pre-Quine who make Quine redundant. I don’t recall encountering any of these philosophers whose existence would virtually be assured if I were wrong. But suppose that I am simply ignorant. We still have Quine’s reputation to content with, the wide acknowledgment by major philosophers that he was highly influential. If I were wrong, he should have been lost in a sea of bright young men who anticipated his key insights.
“If clever men were coming up with Quinean insight left and right before Quine appeared, then we should see a large number of philosophers pre-Quine who make Quine redundant.”
Assuming also that those ‘clever men’ were going into philosophy rather than dismissing it as Eliezer has.
Eliezer may say that he dismisses philosophy, but he has nevertheless published a great deal which takes issue with some philosophy, agrees with other philosophy, and most importantly, he has provided a great deal of argumentation in favor of these conclusions which some philosophers agree with and other philosophers disagree with. Whether he believes it or not, Eliezer is doing philosophy, and a lot of it.
So, where are these clever men pre-Qune who dismissed philosophy and then proceeded, as Eliezer has done, to produce reams of it?
There are a few, e.g. E.T. Jaynes, Alfred North Whitehead (“Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophic thought has done its best, the wonder remains. ”), and Richard Feynman (over and over and over again.)
More generally, though, those ‘clever men’ have tended to ignore philosophy and charge ahead with whatever they’re doing; it’s just that Eliezer’s work has tended to impinge more on philosophy than, say, themodynamics experiments or calculus proofs.
ETA: This didn’t actually address what Constant meant; my apologies.
Well, you did answer the question I asked, so it’s my fault that I didn’t word the question right. It’s practically a philosophical tradition to bury philosophy and then do philosophy on the grave of philosophy. For example the positivists sought to bury metaphysics. The king is dead, long live the king. So, sure, there are many examples of that.
The issue I was interested in was not this, but was whether it is probable that Eliezer independently reproduced Quine’s philosophy. I did not think it was likely. Certain of our ideas really do arise spontaneously among the clever generation after generation, but other ideas do not but are discovered rarely, at which point the ideas may be widely disseminated. I don’t number Quine’s ideas as among those that arise spontaneously, but among those that are rarely discovered and then may be widely disseminated. My evidence for this was Quine’s seeming originality. In response, it was argued that until Quine, the discoverers went on to do something else, which is why it wasn’t until Quine that the ideas were brought to the attention of philosophers. I argued in response that at least some fraction should, like Eliezer, have written about it, and then I asked, so where are these pre-Quine Quines who wrote about it? Only, I worded the question badly, and instead asked, where are the philosophers who dismissed philosophy. Of which there are, of course, many.
It’s hard to trace those causal lines, but here’s one data point: Dennett’s ideas have spread rather widely, and Dennett is an enthusiastic Quinean naturalist, and indeed was a student of Quine. Here’s Dennett:
Also: Stich, who might be called the ‘founder’ of experimental philosophy, was also an enthusiastic student of Quine’s. And experimental philosophy is the kind of philosophy getting all the major press in the last 10 years, it seems to me.
“still no evidence” is very much different to claims that certain properties do not exist in a given body of work. Absence of evidence (after an hour’s looking, if that) is not evidence of absence.
“Absence of evidence (after an hour’s looking, if that) is not evidence of absence.” Actually it is. Weak evidence, but evidence nonetheless.
More to the point, if someone makes a claim that a work belonging to reference class X has a property Y, and then presents no evidence that it has that property, and you’ve previously investigated many other members of class X and found them all to have the property not-Y, it’s reasonable to assume that the new work has not-Yness until given evidence otherwise.
If someone comes along and says “this unqualified person on the internet has found a proof that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is wrong! I know all other unqualified people on the internet who’ve said that have been wrong, but I’m going to claim this one is correct, without giving you any evidence for that”, you’d be absolutely reasonable just to say “they’re wrong” without bothering to check.
It appears that Eliezer has come to the conclusion, based on the academic philosophy he’s read, that the reference class “academic philosophers” and the reference class “random nut on the internet” have several properties in common. He may or may not be correct in this conclusion (I’ve read little academic philosophy and wouldn’t want to judge) but his reactions given that premise seem perfectly sensible to me.
I think it’s absurd to equate the claim “Certain philosophers can have ideas useful to LessWrong” with “this unqualified person on the internet has found a proof that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is wrong”, and the fact that you’re framing it as such indicates that you are highly motivated in your argumentation.
As for the hypothetical premise that “the reference class “academic philosophers” and the reference class “random nut on the internet” have several properties in common”, I invite you to look to the top right of this website for the endorsement (of and by) the Future of Humanity institute that does, you guessed it, academic philosophy. Also refer to the numerous occurrences throughout this website of top contributors citing the FHI as a valid outlet for efficient donations towards existential risk mitigation. Is LessWrong suggesting we donate to people with the credibility of ‘random nuts on the internet’? Or is there perhaps some inconsistency which is what the people all over this thread are pointing out?
I actually have no great feelings about the argument either way. I’m using that as an example of a case where given a sufficiently strong prior you would accept Eliezer’s reasoning. I’m also suggesting that Eliezer appears to have that sufficiently strong prior.
Please note that I made no claims about my own thoughts on academic philosophy, and specifically stated that I don’t share that hypothetical premise. But from Eliezer’s own statements, it appears that he does have that pre-existing view of philosophers. And given that he has already formed that view he is being perfectly reasonable in not bothering to change that view without sufficiently strong evidence.
So what you’re actually saying is that given an arbitrary premise held arbitrarily strongly, one can rationally reject an arbitrary amount of evidence. I guess this is true, if trivially so.
What I think you’ve missed is that the premise is not shielded from discussion and can be itself judged, especially on this website which rejects theism for the exact reason of starting from an arbitrary premise.
(I haven’t downvoted you by the way)
Yes, I am saying that. However, I’m also saying that from what Eliezer has said, I don’t think his view of academic philosophy is an arbitrary one, but one formed from reading a reasonable amount of philosophy. Nor do I think the amount of evidence that’s been presented is arbitrary—it certainly doesn’t, by itself, convince me that this group of people have much to say, and I’m starting out from a neutral position, not a negative one.