transitive. To make (something abstract) more concrete or real; to regard or treat (an idea, concept, etc.) as if having material existence.
Here’s an attempt at a definition for my usage:
To make a perception, feeling, belief, or conception more real, solid, or salient, by any means.
The map is not the territory. Furthermore, our attempts at apprehension of the territory are refracted through our ontological stack. The perception of patterns occurs on our end, regardless of the correctness of that perception. Perceptions are substantially flexible and subject to influence culturally and socially.
The definition from the OED describes one of the grossest forms of reification but there are gradations and subtleties. In general the tendency is for the grandest and grossest reifications to rely on constructing a pattern from the territory as ontologically or metaphysically real. Plato’s theory of forms is the epitome of this kind of reification. Other obvious examples are God, heaven/hell, and karma/rebirth.
One form of reification that’s relatively malleable for most people is perception of visual patterns. If you look at a square grid, you can also tilt your head and perceive the 45 degree subgrid overlaid, or other subgrids at smaller angles. We can choose to reify latent possible perceptions of the same object. I don’t believe it’s appropriate to say that any of these are the “true” perception,indeed they’re all viable and consistent perceptions, which may naturally flit back and forth anyway, and which can be made more salient with some play of intention and attention.
I would say here that a view can exaggerate certain features or properties of perceptions, or just make them more salient etc.
One marvelous kind of reification is the standard “because I said so”, said by a parent to a child. Certainly because one said it is no more evidence about the truth of the claim, but this move brings more oomph to the emotional/relational dynamic, carrying (or at least emphasizing) real power. This is actually a barer kind of reification: it carries no justification, it simply makes a command more real, as in, carrying more emotional weight. It’s easy enough to see justifications like “because God said so” in the same light.
A lot of political discourse involving the negotiation between views amounts to a volley of reifications, with no settlement or coordination around the terms on the basis of which they can construct correct reifications.
To be clear: none of this is to say that reification per se is wrong, though many wrong moves I think do stem from inappropriate reification. Any view has to make some kinds of reifications in order to make features salient to point out real distinctions.
“Reification”
I regularly use the concept of reification, and often get back confusion as to what I mean, even from friends who are rather literate
The OED entry for ‘reify’:
Here’s an attempt at a definition for my usage:
The map is not the territory. Furthermore, our attempts at apprehension of the territory are refracted through our ontological stack. The perception of patterns occurs on our end, regardless of the correctness of that perception. Perceptions are substantially flexible and subject to influence culturally and socially.
The definition from the OED describes one of the grossest forms of reification but there are gradations and subtleties. In general the tendency is for the grandest and grossest reifications to rely on constructing a pattern from the territory as ontologically or metaphysically real. Plato’s theory of forms is the epitome of this kind of reification. Other obvious examples are God, heaven/hell, and karma/rebirth.
One form of reification that’s relatively malleable for most people is perception of visual patterns. If you look at a square grid, you can also tilt your head and perceive the 45 degree subgrid overlaid, or other subgrids at smaller angles. We can choose to reify latent possible perceptions of the same object. I don’t believe it’s appropriate to say that any of these are the “true” perception, indeed they’re all viable and consistent perceptions, which may naturally flit back and forth anyway, and which can be made more salient with some play of intention and attention.
I would say here that a view can exaggerate certain features or properties of perceptions, or just make them more salient etc.
One marvelous kind of reification is the standard “because I said so”, said by a parent to a child. Certainly because one said it is no more evidence about the truth of the claim, but this move brings more oomph to the emotional/relational dynamic, carrying (or at least emphasizing) real power. This is actually a barer kind of reification: it carries no justification, it simply makes a command more real, as in, carrying more emotional weight. It’s easy enough to see justifications like “because God said so” in the same light.
A lot of political discourse involving the negotiation between views amounts to a volley of reifications, with no settlement or coordination around the terms on the basis of which they can construct correct reifications.
To be clear: none of this is to say that reification per se is wrong, though many wrong moves I think do stem from inappropriate reification. Any view has to make some kinds of reifications in order to make features salient to point out real distinctions.