There is a false dichotomy in the argument basing the conclusion only on the options CDT or EDT, when in fact both are wrong.
I wouldn’t say there’s a false dichotomy: the argument works fine if you also have credence in e.g. FDT. It just says that altruistic, morally motivated agents should favor EDT over CDT. (However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, 2 premises of the argument don’t hold up.)
Suppose you know instead that Omega was miserly and almost all of the people who one-box don’t get offered the opportunity to play—let’s say every two-boxer gets to play but only 0.01% of one-boxers. Should you still choose to 1-box if presented with the opportunity of playing?
Interesting. No, because a 0.01% probability of winning $1,000,000 gives me an expected $100, whereas two-boxing gives me $1,000.
Thanks for the comment!
I wouldn’t say there’s a false dichotomy: the argument works fine if you also have credence in e.g. FDT. It just says that altruistic, morally motivated agents should favor EDT over CDT. (However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, 2 premises of the argument don’t hold up.)
Interesting. No, because a 0.01% probability of winning $1,000,000 gives me an expected $100, whereas two-boxing gives me $1,000.