Yes, I agree with the main point of this post. There is a false dichotomy in the argument basing the conclusion only on the options CDT or EDT, when in fact both are wrong.
On another note, there is a variation of Newcombe’s problem analogous to the XOR blackmail problem. The usual statement of the game conditions don’t say anything about who gets to play the game, and if everyone gets to play then you should obviously one-box.
Suppose you know instead that Omega was miserly and almost all of the people who one-box don’t get offered the opportunity to play—let’s say every two-boxer gets to play but only 0.01% of one-boxers. Should you still choose to 1-box if presented with the opportunity of playing?
There is a false dichotomy in the argument basing the conclusion only on the options CDT or EDT, when in fact both are wrong.
I wouldn’t say there’s a false dichotomy: the argument works fine if you also have credence in e.g. FDT. It just says that altruistic, morally motivated agents should favor EDT over CDT. (However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, 2 premises of the argument don’t hold up.)
Suppose you know instead that Omega was miserly and almost all of the people who one-box don’t get offered the opportunity to play—let’s say every two-boxer gets to play but only 0.01% of one-boxers. Should you still choose to 1-box if presented with the opportunity of playing?
Interesting. No, because a 0.01% probability of winning $1,000,000 gives me an expected $100, whereas two-boxing gives me $1,000.
Yes, I agree with the main point of this post. There is a false dichotomy in the argument basing the conclusion only on the options CDT or EDT, when in fact both are wrong.
On another note, there is a variation of Newcombe’s problem analogous to the XOR blackmail problem. The usual statement of the game conditions don’t say anything about who gets to play the game, and if everyone gets to play then you should obviously one-box.
Suppose you know instead that Omega was miserly and almost all of the people who one-box don’t get offered the opportunity to play—let’s say every two-boxer gets to play but only 0.01% of one-boxers. Should you still choose to 1-box if presented with the opportunity of playing?
Thanks for the comment!
I wouldn’t say there’s a false dichotomy: the argument works fine if you also have credence in e.g. FDT. It just says that altruistic, morally motivated agents should favor EDT over CDT. (However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, 2 premises of the argument don’t hold up.)
Interesting. No, because a 0.01% probability of winning $1,000,000 gives me an expected $100, whereas two-boxing gives me $1,000.