This might be a problem for applied/normative ethics but I don’t think it’s a problem for decision theory proper, any more than normal trade is a problem for decision theory proper because you have to make tradeoffs. In my opinion the problems for decision theory proper only show up as higher-order considerations, e.g. negotiating over what should count as negotiation or negotiation in good faith as opposed to blackmail &c., and even those problems are relatively object-level compared to problems like determining what does or doesn’t count as diachronic inconsistency, what does or doesn’t count as an agent, et cetera. Acausal-negotiation-like problems don’t strike me as very fundamental or theoretically interesting.
This might be a problem for applied/normative ethics but I don’t think it’s a problem for decision theory proper, any more than normal trade is a problem for decision theory proper because you have to make tradeoffs. In my opinion the problems for decision theory proper only show up as higher-order considerations, e.g. negotiating over what should count as negotiation or negotiation in good faith as opposed to blackmail &c., and even those problems are relatively object-level compared to problems like determining what does or doesn’t count as diachronic inconsistency, what does or doesn’t count as an agent, et cetera. Acausal-negotiation-like problems don’t strike me as very fundamental or theoretically interesting.