I think questioning the Alabama bar analogy is useful within the context of this post. Whose attire is a belief in the value of giving primacy skepticism, critical thinking, etc.? According to Eliezer’s performance in the OP, it’s not the attire of either Alabama bar patrons or “muslim terrorist suicide bombers” -and both of those may signal more generally, the losers of the American Civil War and non-white brown people. In short, I think there may be a gentrification of critical thinking: it’s reserved for an in-group, perhaps in particular northeastern anglo-saxon and ashkenazi jewish male intellectuals, or an even more narrow archetypal definition that might be reducible to zero actual people. I’m interested in the degree to which our behavior might be governed by aligning with and contesting these archetypes. Including which beliefs as attire to wear (it’s perhaps an archetype alignment for Steven Hawkings and Richard Dawkins to claim to be skeptical about religion. It would probably not be an archetype alignment for Oprah to publicly wear such belief attire, even if in fact she was a crypto-skeptic).
This post may meander a bit but I think Eliezer’s post (and some of the criticisms of it) are thought provoking and may be getting us closer to a more real world, real time model of how bias and belief is operating in the world we live in.
I know if I were in an Alabama bar, and the conversation turned to how “terrorists hate our freedoms”, I’d certainly phrase things such that they didn’t contradict what everyone in the room was yelling about.
Bonus points if I were clever enough to disagree with them in a way that seemed like I was agreeing with them.
Either way, I’d be wearing a belief I most certainly did not actually believe and did not in any way believe I believed, and I would do so entirely for my own preservation.
One reason is because dog-whistles can work: I have from time to time had the experience of expressing my opinion about a subject in a way that causes the minority who agree with me to recognize me as a potential ally without triggering reprisal from the majority who disagree with me.
Another reason is to preserve some credibility in case of a future discussion where I’m more willing to deal with the consequences of public opposition. Rather than having to say (for example) “Well, yes, I know I said policy X was a good idea, but I didn’t really mean it; I was lying then, but you should totally believe me now because I’m totally telling the truth” I can instead say (for example) “I said that policy X is an efficient way of achieving goals Y and Z, which it absolutely is. But I don’t endorse maximizing Y and Z at the cost of W, which policy X fails to address at all.”
Yet another reason is to use plausible deniability as a way of equivocating, when I’m not sure whether to come out in opposition or not. That is, I can disagree while maintaining a safe path of retreat, such that if the degree of reprisal I get for disagreeing turns out to be more than I feel like suffering, I can claim to have been misunderstood and thereby (hopefully) avert further reprisals.
One reason is because dog-whistles can work: I have from time to time had the experience of expressing my opinion about a subject in a way that causes the minority who agree with me to recognize me as a potential ally without triggering reprisal from the majority who disagree with me.
It’s being more honest with yourself and your own beliefs, though it certainly isn’t more honest with your fellow bar patrons.
If you have a thing against lying (and I do), it’s the lesser of two evils.
The inspiration was from professor Robert Thornton of Lehigh University, who came up with a creative way to write student “recommendations” that, if read literally, said quite directly that hiring this particular student was a very, very bad idea. If read figuratively, however, they sounded like glowing reviews, and indeed if you were expecting a good review you would think it were an absolutely wonderful review.
This was necessary because as a professor he was obligated to give students recommendations for their employers, but negative reviews have resulted in serious lawsuits in the past. Unwilling to compromise his morals, he got very creative with the English language instead of lying.
In that case, the reviews weren’t meant for the student to ever see, but that is often unavoidable. He certainly did hope that the student’s potential employer was capable of reading between the lines and comprehending the message.
He called his system L.I.A.R., if you want to search for it. They are pretty funny, and really do sound like positively glowing reviews until you look at exactly what they are actually saying.
I think questioning the Alabama bar analogy is useful within the context of this post. Whose attire is a belief in the value of giving primacy skepticism, critical thinking, etc.? According to Eliezer’s performance in the OP, it’s not the attire of either Alabama bar patrons or “muslim terrorist suicide bombers” -and both of those may signal more generally, the losers of the American Civil War and non-white brown people. In short, I think there may be a gentrification of critical thinking: it’s reserved for an in-group, perhaps in particular northeastern anglo-saxon and ashkenazi jewish male intellectuals, or an even more narrow archetypal definition that might be reducible to zero actual people. I’m interested in the degree to which our behavior might be governed by aligning with and contesting these archetypes. Including which beliefs as attire to wear (it’s perhaps an archetype alignment for Steven Hawkings and Richard Dawkins to claim to be skeptical about religion. It would probably not be an archetype alignment for Oprah to publicly wear such belief attire, even if in fact she was a crypto-skeptic).
This post may meander a bit but I think Eliezer’s post (and some of the criticisms of it) are thought provoking and may be getting us closer to a more real world, real time model of how bias and belief is operating in the world we live in.
I know if I were in an Alabama bar, and the conversation turned to how “terrorists hate our freedoms”, I’d certainly phrase things such that they didn’t contradict what everyone in the room was yelling about.
Bonus points if I were clever enough to disagree with them in a way that seemed like I was agreeing with them.
Either way, I’d be wearing a belief I most certainly did not actually believe and did not in any way believe I believed, and I would do so entirely for my own preservation.
If you don’t transmit your disagreement, why bother expressing it? Outwardly agreeing with them would accomplish the same thing with less effort.
One reason is because dog-whistles can work: I have from time to time had the experience of expressing my opinion about a subject in a way that causes the minority who agree with me to recognize me as a potential ally without triggering reprisal from the majority who disagree with me.
Another reason is to preserve some credibility in case of a future discussion where I’m more willing to deal with the consequences of public opposition. Rather than having to say (for example) “Well, yes, I know I said policy X was a good idea, but I didn’t really mean it; I was lying then, but you should totally believe me now because I’m totally telling the truth” I can instead say (for example) “I said that policy X is an efficient way of achieving goals Y and Z, which it absolutely is. But I don’t endorse maximizing Y and Z at the cost of W, which policy X fails to address at all.”
Yet another reason is to use plausible deniability as a way of equivocating, when I’m not sure whether to come out in opposition or not. That is, I can disagree while maintaining a safe path of retreat, such that if the degree of reprisal I get for disagreeing turns out to be more than I feel like suffering, I can claim to have been misunderstood and thereby (hopefully) avert further reprisals.
That already goes by the name “politician-speak”.
Good points.
It’s being more honest with yourself and your own beliefs, though it certainly isn’t more honest with your fellow bar patrons.
If you have a thing against lying (and I do), it’s the lesser of two evils.
The inspiration was from professor Robert Thornton of Lehigh University, who came up with a creative way to write student “recommendations” that, if read literally, said quite directly that hiring this particular student was a very, very bad idea. If read figuratively, however, they sounded like glowing reviews, and indeed if you were expecting a good review you would think it were an absolutely wonderful review.
This was necessary because as a professor he was obligated to give students recommendations for their employers, but negative reviews have resulted in serious lawsuits in the past. Unwilling to compromise his morals, he got very creative with the English language instead of lying.
In that case, the reviews weren’t meant for the student to ever see, but that is often unavoidable. He certainly did hope that the student’s potential employer was capable of reading between the lines and comprehending the message.
He called his system L.I.A.R., if you want to search for it. They are pretty funny, and really do sound like positively glowing reviews until you look at exactly what they are actually saying.
Seems to exist mainly as a book: http://www.amazon.com/Lexicon-Intentionally-Ambiguous-Recommendations-L-I/dp/1402201397/
Some brief samples available at http://www.avdf.com/feb96/humour_liar.html
Dead link :(.
Archived version.
Thank you. I tried using http://archive.fo/ , but no luck.
I’ll add https://web.archive.org/ to bookmarks too.