I think you might be confusing two things: the arrow of time, and the hard problem of consciousness.
The arrow of time refers to the fact that there as a difference between the past and the future. This is straightforward, and has to do with the fact that entropy increases over time (2nd law of thermodynamics). This also explains lots of things like why your brain has an easier time remembering the past than predicting the future. In theory if we lived in a universe where entropy was at a maximum (and all laws of physics were reversible) there would be no obvious difference between the past and the future.
The hard problem of consciousness asks: why do humans perceive time as a series of moments (or more fundamentally, why do humans perceive anything at all)? Because perception is inherently subjective, this question is beyond the scope of scientific inquiry. This accounts for the hardness of the hard problem of consciousness. Of course the fact that perception is subjective and hence fundamentally beyond the reach of science doesn’t stop philosophers from speculating about it.
Around here at Less Wrong, the theories you are most likely to come across is “time is an illusion” or “perception is what an algorithm feels like from the inside”. Of course both of these theories might be unsatisfying to you, since like all human beings you undoubtedly experience time as a series of moments, not as a timeless whole.
Unfortunately, the competing theories (e.g. “time is created when conscious beings cause quantum waveform collapse”) are all pretty bad, since they depend on the existence on some non-physical “consciousness substance”. These theories are collectively called dualism and were espoused by such greats as Rene Descartes but are now generally out of vogue. The main problem with these theories is that the “consciousness substance” would itself be subject to metaphysical laws, and then we would again be stuck asking “but what about those laws causes consciousness to arise?” leaving us in some sort of endless regress. Talking about non-physical substances that can never be measured is also considered a big no-no under Occam’s Razor.
There is a way out of this particular trap, often taken by Buddhist and Existentialist philosophers. Namely, any time you ask them to explain consciousness, they shake their head and grumble “Existence is existence! It cannot be explained! It can only be experienced!” While this neatly avoids the argument (by refusing to engage in it), it can certainly be frustrating if you want to understand what consciousness is.
Namely, any time you ask them to explain consciousness, they shake their head and grumble “Existence is existence! It cannot be explained! It can only be experienced!” While this neatly avoids the argument (by refusing to engage in it), it can certainly be frustrating if you want to understand what consciousness is.
I think this is a bit of an exaggeration of the position. It’s not that no explanation can be given, only that it won’t explain what you’re hoping it will because the thing you were hoping to have explained is not the same as the reality you have reified into a thing. One traditional approach is to give up categories and focus on practice and experience (e.g. Zen), but there’s also traditions that go hard on explaining the inner workings of the mind and providing detailed models of it (e.g. Gelug).
The hard problem of consciousness asks: why do humans perceive time as a series of moments (or more fundamentally, why do humans perceive anything at all)
Solving the hard problem might be necessary for explaining why people have a quale of passing-time, but is not sufficient—you dont have to have that particular quale.
Unfortunately, the competing theories (e.g. “time is created when conscious beings cause quantum waveform collapse”) are all pretty bad,
Around here at Less Wrong, the theories you are most likely to come across is “time is an illusion”
There are no good theories of time as an illusion, either. Not least because you have to solve the hard problem as part of them.
some non-physical “consciousness substance”. These theories are collectively called dualism
No, collapse theories don’t have to be dualistic.
Because perception is inherently subjective, this question is beyond the scope of scientific inquiry. This accounts for the hardness of the hard problem of consciousness.
If anything is inherently subjective , or beyond the scope of science, then strong physicalism is false.
Solving the hard problem might be necessary for explaining why people have a quale of passing-time, but is not sufficient—you dont have to have that particular quale.
Yes.
There are no good theories of time as an illusion, either. Not least because you have to solve the hard problem as part of them.
I would rate timeless MWI (along with the additional assertion that anything isomorphic to a mind is conscious) as a “good” theory in the following sense: It is internally consistent and adequately describes the perceptions of conscious individuals at any given moment at time. That is to say at any given moment in time, there is no logical argument or evidence I am aware of which strongly contradicts this theory. Its primary weakness is (as I mentioned) that it seems to do a poor job explaining why humans experience time as a series of moments (at not say as a single moment only or a unified whole across all possible world lines).
No, collapse theories don’t have to be dualistic.
Agreed, but I think you will find that in practice most advocates of collapse theory are dualists.
If anything is inherently subjective , or beyond the scope of science, then strong physicalism is false.
: It is internally consistent and adequately describes the perceptions of conscious individuals at any given moment at time
Timeless single world theories fail to explain where the subjective flow of time comes from. Timeless many world theories are in an even worse position.
If there is no passing-time, then any physical state adequate to support consciousness will be conscious, wherever it is in the timeless ensemble ..
there would be no question of being conscious “now” or “at a time” because, by (your) hypothesis, there is no time!
So a timeless single world theory would predict that you are simultaneously conscious for every moment ofy your life, that you have static 4D consciousness. And Timeless many world theory would , even less realistically, imply that you consciously experience yourself as some 5D branching structure!
there is no logical argument or evidence I am aware of which strongly contradicts this theory
....
Its primary weakness is (as I mentioned) that it seems to do a poor job explaining why humans experience time as a series of moments
The thing you have called the primary weakness is the evidence against it!!
Perhaps you are assuming that mere qualia or subjective impressions do not count as evidence, properly speaking...
Agreed, but I think you will find that in practice most advocates of collapse theory are dualists.
Most lay advocates, outside the physics community, are, sure.
then strong physicalism is false
Then we are arguing about the price..about *how false. If there is a non physical thingy that causes subjectivity , maybe there is one that causes passingness.
It would only say that you are such a 4d or 5d construct. It remains more nebolous to say what it feels like on the inside.
If you had a biological organism and then did a brain scan of their brains waited 1000 years and then downloaded the brain scan to a new biological brain then computationaly there would probably be a 1000 year gap in the experience. If there is non-computational aspect to conciousness one could think that there are separate consioucness experiencing the same computational state for the while the state is in “stasis”.
Given typical fysics the computational states of the 3d slices of the 4d and 5d objects would be synchornised enough to give “all at once” experiences.
I think you might be confusing two things: the arrow of time, and the hard problem of consciousness.
The arrow of time refers to the fact that there as a difference between the past and the future. This is straightforward, and has to do with the fact that entropy increases over time (2nd law of thermodynamics). This also explains lots of things like why your brain has an easier time remembering the past than predicting the future. In theory if we lived in a universe where entropy was at a maximum (and all laws of physics were reversible) there would be no obvious difference between the past and the future.
The hard problem of consciousness asks: why do humans perceive time as a series of moments (or more fundamentally, why do humans perceive anything at all)? Because perception is inherently subjective, this question is beyond the scope of scientific inquiry. This accounts for the hardness of the hard problem of consciousness. Of course the fact that perception is subjective and hence fundamentally beyond the reach of science doesn’t stop philosophers from speculating about it.
Around here at Less Wrong, the theories you are most likely to come across is “time is an illusion” or “perception is what an algorithm feels like from the inside”. Of course both of these theories might be unsatisfying to you, since like all human beings you undoubtedly experience time as a series of moments, not as a timeless whole.
Unfortunately, the competing theories (e.g. “time is created when conscious beings cause quantum waveform collapse”) are all pretty bad, since they depend on the existence on some non-physical “consciousness substance”. These theories are collectively called dualism and were espoused by such greats as Rene Descartes but are now generally out of vogue. The main problem with these theories is that the “consciousness substance” would itself be subject to metaphysical laws, and then we would again be stuck asking “but what about those laws causes consciousness to arise?” leaving us in some sort of endless regress. Talking about non-physical substances that can never be measured is also considered a big no-no under Occam’s Razor.
There is a way out of this particular trap, often taken by Buddhist and Existentialist philosophers. Namely, any time you ask them to explain consciousness, they shake their head and grumble “Existence is existence! It cannot be explained! It can only be experienced!” While this neatly avoids the argument (by refusing to engage in it), it can certainly be frustrating if you want to understand what consciousness is.
I think this is a bit of an exaggeration of the position. It’s not that no explanation can be given, only that it won’t explain what you’re hoping it will because the thing you were hoping to have explained is not the same as the reality you have reified into a thing. One traditional approach is to give up categories and focus on practice and experience (e.g. Zen), but there’s also traditions that go hard on explaining the inner workings of the mind and providing detailed models of it (e.g. Gelug).
I was definitely thinking more of Zen, but “claims have been exaggerated for rhetorical effect” is also a fair characterization of what I said.
Solving the hard problem might be necessary for explaining why people have a quale of passing-time, but is not sufficient—you dont have to have that particular quale.
There are no good theories of time as an illusion, either. Not least because you have to solve the hard problem as part of them.
No, collapse theories don’t have to be dualistic.
If anything is inherently subjective , or beyond the scope of science, then strong physicalism is false.
Yes.
I would rate timeless MWI (along with the additional assertion that anything isomorphic to a mind is conscious) as a “good” theory in the following sense: It is internally consistent and adequately describes the perceptions of conscious individuals at any given moment at time. That is to say at any given moment in time, there is no logical argument or evidence I am aware of which strongly contradicts this theory. Its primary weakness is (as I mentioned) that it seems to do a poor job explaining why humans experience time as a series of moments (at not say as a single moment only or a unified whole across all possible world lines).
Agreed, but I think you will find that in practice most advocates of collapse theory are dualists.
then strong physicalism is false.
Timeless single world theories fail to explain where the subjective flow of time comes from. Timeless many world theories are in an even worse position.
If there is no passing-time, then any physical state adequate to support consciousness will be conscious, wherever it is in the timeless ensemble .. there would be no question of being conscious “now” or “at a time” because, by (your) hypothesis, there is no time!
So a timeless single world theory would predict that you are simultaneously conscious for every moment ofy your life, that you have static 4D consciousness. And Timeless many world theory would , even less realistically, imply that you consciously experience yourself as some 5D branching structure!
....
The thing you have called the primary weakness is the evidence against it!!
Perhaps you are assuming that mere qualia or subjective impressions do not count as evidence, properly speaking...
Most lay advocates, outside the physics community, are, sure.
Then we are arguing about the price..about *how false. If there is a non physical thingy that causes subjectivity , maybe there is one that causes passingness.
It would only say that you are such a 4d or 5d construct. It remains more nebolous to say what it feels like on the inside.
If you had a biological organism and then did a brain scan of their brains waited 1000 years and then downloaded the brain scan to a new biological brain then computationaly there would probably be a 1000 year gap in the experience. If there is non-computational aspect to conciousness one could think that there are separate consioucness experiencing the same computational state for the while the state is in “stasis”.
Given typical fysics the computational states of the 3d slices of the 4d and 5d objects would be synchornised enough to give “all at once” experiences.