The truth is that people aren’t anything like coherent enough to refuse cryonics for a reason like that.
I agree with almost all of what you say about no grand narrative and mostly just conformity, but I’m not willing to entirely dismiss this explanation as even a small part of the puzzle. It doesn’t seem much different than the theories that poor people with few life prospects have higher temporal discount rates and are more likely to engage in risky/criminal behavior because they have less to protect. People aren’t coherent enough to think “Well, stealing this watch has a small probability of landing me in prison, but my life now isn’t so satisfying, so I suppose it’s worth the risk, and I suppose it’s worth risking a lot later for a small gain now since I currently have so little”, but there’s some inner process that gives more or less that result.
If even the few people who get past the weirdness factor flinch away from the thought of actually being alive more, I expect that would make a significant difference.
I’m going to try a test question that might differentiate between “cryonics sounds weird” and “I don’t like life enough to want to live even more” on my blog. Obviously no one from here post on that since you already know where it’s going.
If you want people to sign up for cryonics, the method with by far the strongest conversion ratio is to train them from scratch in advanced sanity techniques.
Alternate hypotheses: your followers are mostly technophile singularitarians, and technophile singularitarians are attracted to cryonics independently of rationalist training. Your followers believe there may be a positive singularity, which means the future has a reason to be much better than the present and avoid the unpleasantness Darwin describes in the article. Your followers are part of maybe the one community on earth, outside the cryonics community itself, where the highest-status figures are signed up for cryonics and people are often asked to justify why they have not done so. Your followers are part of a community where signing up for cryonics signals community affiliation. Your followers have actually heard the arguments in favor of cryonics and seen intelligent people take them seriously, which is more than 99.9% of people can say.
Judging by the experiment with the secretly identical question, I seem to have been wrong. Everyone says they would jump at the chance to be reincarnated, so lack of desire to live longer apparently doesn’t play as significant a role in cryonics refusal as I thought.
One of the reasons why I’d accept the angel’s offer but I haven’t signed up for cryonics is that in the former case I’d expect a much larger fraction of my friends to be alive when I’m resurrected.
I answered yes to your hypothetical, but I am not currently signed up for cryonics and have no short- or medium-term plans to do so.
My reasons for the difference:
In your hypothetical, I’ve received a divine revelation that there’s no afterlife, and that reincarnation would be successful. In real life, I have a low estimate of the likelihood of cryonics leading to a successful revival and a low-but-nonzero estimate of the likelihood of an afterlife.
In your hypothetical, there’s no advance cost for the reincarnation option. For cryonics, the advance cost is substantial. My demand curve for life span is downward-sloping with respect to cost.
In your hypothetical, I’m on my deathbed. In real life, I’m 99.86% confident of living at least one more year and 50% confident of living at least another 50 years (based on Social Security life expectancy tables), before adjusting for my current health status and family history of longevity (both of which incline my life expectancy upwards relative to the tables), and before adjusting for expected technological improvements. This affects my decision concerning cryonics in two respects:
a. Hyperbolic discounting.
b. Declining marginal utility of lifespan.
c. A substantial (in my estimation) chance that even without cryonics I’ll live long enough to benefit from the discovery of medical improvements that will make me immortal barring accidents, substantially reducing the expected benefit from cryonics.
In your hypothetical, I’m presented with a choice and it’s an equal effort to pick either one. To sign up for cryonics, I’d need to overcome substantial mental activation costs to research options and sign up for a plan. My instinct is to procrastinate.
Of course, none of this invalidates your hypothetical as a test of the hypothesis that people don’t sign up for cryonics because they don’t actually want to live longer.
I signed up as a result of reading Eliezer’s writings. I don’t think the first two points of your “alternate hypotheses” are really alternatives for me, since I only fall into either of those camps as a result of reading Eliezer.
I was about to comment there saying “I think I know what this is about, and if so he definitely means a younger healthy body rather than an 80-year-old one on the point of death”—but I thought I’d check here, and I’ll respect your preference for no cross-contamination. You might want to do that bit of disambiguation yourself.
Your LJ readers are probably not an entirely representative sample of people who aren’t signed up for cryonics, though perhaps they are of {people who aren’t signed up for cryonics but might be persuaded}.
I agree with almost all of what you say about no grand narrative and mostly just conformity, but I’m not willing to entirely dismiss this explanation as even a small part of the puzzle. It doesn’t seem much different than the theories that poor people with few life prospects have higher temporal discount rates and are more likely to engage in risky/criminal behavior because they have less to protect. People aren’t coherent enough to think “Well, stealing this watch has a small probability of landing me in prison, but my life now isn’t so satisfying, so I suppose it’s worth the risk, and I suppose it’s worth risking a lot later for a small gain now since I currently have so little”, but there’s some inner process that gives more or less that result.
If even the few people who get past the weirdness factor flinch away from the thought of actually being alive more, I expect that would make a significant difference.
I’m going to try a test question that might differentiate between “cryonics sounds weird” and “I don’t like life enough to want to live even more” on my blog. Obviously no one from here post on that since you already know where it’s going.
Alternate hypotheses: your followers are mostly technophile singularitarians, and technophile singularitarians are attracted to cryonics independently of rationalist training. Your followers believe there may be a positive singularity, which means the future has a reason to be much better than the present and avoid the unpleasantness Darwin describes in the article. Your followers are part of maybe the one community on earth, outside the cryonics community itself, where the highest-status figures are signed up for cryonics and people are often asked to justify why they have not done so. Your followers are part of a community where signing up for cryonics signals community affiliation. Your followers have actually heard the arguments in favor of cryonics and seen intelligent people take them seriously, which is more than 99.9% of people can say.
Judging by the experiment with the secretly identical question, I seem to have been wrong. Everyone says they would jump at the chance to be reincarnated, so lack of desire to live longer apparently doesn’t play as significant a role in cryonics refusal as I thought.
Your readers are still part of a contrarian cluster. (Hell, ciphergoth commented!) But I don’t dispute the result.
One of the reasons why I’d accept the angel’s offer but I haven’t signed up for cryonics is that in the former case I’d expect a much larger fraction of my friends to be alive when I’m resurrected.
So far, have you ever gone a thousand years without making new friends?
I answered yes to your hypothetical, but I am not currently signed up for cryonics and have no short- or medium-term plans to do so.
My reasons for the difference:
In your hypothetical, I’ve received a divine revelation that there’s no afterlife, and that reincarnation would be successful. In real life, I have a low estimate of the likelihood of cryonics leading to a successful revival and a low-but-nonzero estimate of the likelihood of an afterlife.
In your hypothetical, there’s no advance cost for the reincarnation option. For cryonics, the advance cost is substantial. My demand curve for life span is downward-sloping with respect to cost.
In your hypothetical, I’m on my deathbed. In real life, I’m 99.86% confident of living at least one more year and 50% confident of living at least another 50 years (based on Social Security life expectancy tables), before adjusting for my current health status and family history of longevity (both of which incline my life expectancy upwards relative to the tables), and before adjusting for expected technological improvements. This affects my decision concerning cryonics in two respects: a. Hyperbolic discounting. b. Declining marginal utility of lifespan. c. A substantial (in my estimation) chance that even without cryonics I’ll live long enough to benefit from the discovery of medical improvements that will make me immortal barring accidents, substantially reducing the expected benefit from cryonics.
In your hypothetical, I’m presented with a choice and it’s an equal effort to pick either one. To sign up for cryonics, I’d need to overcome substantial mental activation costs to research options and sign up for a plan. My instinct is to procrastinate.
Of course, none of this invalidates your hypothetical as a test of the hypothesis that people don’t sign up for cryonics because they don’t actually want to live longer.
I signed up as a result of reading Eliezer’s writings. I don’t think the first two points of your “alternate hypotheses” are really alternatives for me, since I only fall into either of those camps as a result of reading Eliezer.
I was about to comment there saying “I think I know what this is about, and if so he definitely means a younger healthy body rather than an 80-year-old one on the point of death”—but I thought I’d check here, and I’ll respect your preference for no cross-contamination. You might want to do that bit of disambiguation yourself.
Your LJ readers are probably not an entirely representative sample of people who aren’t signed up for cryonics, though perhaps they are of {people who aren’t signed up for cryonics but might be persuaded}.
Saw this after your post—guessed it was cryonics but didn’t spill the beans.
Same here.
Followers?