I don’t understand where you acquired this view of economists. I am an economist and I assure you economists don’t ascribe to the “measured GDP is everything” view you attribute to them.
This absurdity reveals itself when you see economists scratching their heads, thinking how we can get people to spend more than they want to, in order to help the economy. Unpack those terms: they want people to hurt themselves, in order to hurt less.
This is not an accurate portrayal of what Keynesians believe. The Keynesian theory of depressions and recessions is that excessive pessimism leads people to avoid investing or starting businesses, which lowers economic activity further, which promotes more pessimism, and so on.
The goal of stimulus is effectively to trick people into thinking the economy is better than it is, which then becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy; low quality spending by government drives high quality spending by the private sector.
If you wish to be sceptical of this story (I’m fairly dubious about it myself), then fine, but Keynesians aren’t arguing what you think they’re arguing.
If you wish to be sceptical of this story (I’m fairly dubious about it myself), then fine, but Keynesians aren’t arguing what you think they’re arguing.
No, that’s precisely what I assumed they’re arguing, and I believe my points were completely responsive. I will address the position you describe in the context of the criticism in my rant.
The Keynesian theory of depressions and recessions is that excessive pessimism leads people to avoid investing or starting businesses, which lowers economic activity further, which promotes more pessimism, and so on.
The goal of stimulus is effectively to trick people into thinking the economy is better than it is, which then becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy;
Now, unpack the meaning of all of those terms, back to the fundamentals we really care about, and what is all that actually saying? Well, first of all, have you played rationalist taboo with this and tried to phrase everything without economics jargon, so as to fully break down exactly what all the above means at the layperson level? To me, economists seem to talk as if they have not done so.
I would like for you to tell me whether you have done so in the past, and write up the phrasing you get before reading further. You’ve already tabooed a lot, but I think you need to go further, and remove the terms: recession, depression, stimulus, excessive, pessimism, invest, and economic activity. (What’s left? Terms like prefer, satisfaction, wants, market exchange, resources, working, changing actions.)
Now, here’s what I get: (bracketed phrases indicate a substitution of standard economic jargon)
“People [believe that future market interactions with others will be less capable of satisfyng their wants], which leads them to [allocate resources so as to anticipate lower gains from such activity]. As people do this, the combined effect of their actions is to make this suspicion true, [increasing the relative benefit of non-market exchanges or unmeasured market exchanges].
“The government should therefore [purchase things on the market] in order to produce a [false signal of the relative merit of selling certain goods], and facilitate production of [goods people don’t want at current prices or that they previously couldn’t justify asking their government to provide]. This, then, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: once people [sell unwanted goods due to this government action], it actually becomes beneficial for others to sell goods people do want on the market, [preventing a different kind of adjustment to conditions from happening].”
Phrased in these terms, does it even make sense? Does it even claim to do something people might want?
People [believe that future market interactions with others will be less capable of satisfyng their wants]
That was a very useful exercise since it helped me identify the key point of disagreement between you an Keynesianism. If I’m right, you’re coming at this from a goods market perspective i.e. “I, a typical consumer am not interested in any of these goods at these prices, so I’m going to not buy so much”, whereas the Keynesians are blaming this kind of attitude: “I, a typical consumer am fearful of the future. While I want to buy stuff, I’d better start saving for the future instead in case I lose my job” and it’s the saving that triggers the recession (money flows out of the economy into savings, this fools people into thinking they are poorer and the death spiral begins).
A couple of other contextual points:
1) The monetary stimulus that Keynes recommended was based on governments running deficits, not necessarily spending more. Cutting taxes works just as well
2) Keynes was trying to reduce the magnitude of boom-bust swings, not increase trend economic growth rates. As such he prescribed the opposite behaviour in boom times, have government run surpluses to tamp down consumer exuberance. This is less widely known since politicians only ever talk about Keynes during recessions, when it gives them intellectual cover to spend lots of money.
3) The Keynesian consensus is not universal. Arnold Kling’s “recalculation” story is much closer to your picture, and you’ll notice he doesn’t advocate stimulus, but rather waiting to see how people adjust to the new economic circumstances.
4) GDP is the preoccupation of macroeconomists. Microeconomists (like me) care much more about allocative efficiency, which is to say to what extent are things in the hands of the people who value them most? So there’s a whole branch of the profession to which your initial GDP-centrism comment does not apply.
It’s points 3 and 4 in particular that lead me to object to your claim that economists are obsessed with GDP. To my way of thinking, it’s politicians that are obsessed with GDP because they believe their chances of re-election are tied to economic growth and unemployment figures. So they spend a lot of time asking economists how to increase GDP, and therefore economists more often than not to discuss GDP when they appear in public.
That was a very useful exercise since it helped me identify the key point of disagreement between you an Keynesianism. If I’m right, you’re coming at this from a goods market perspective i.e. “I, a typical consumer am not interested in any of these goods at these prices, so I’m going to not buy so much”, whereas the Keynesians are blaming this kind of attitude: “I, a typical consumer am fearful of the future. While I want to buy stuff, I’d better start saving for the future instead in case I lose my job” and it’s the saving that triggers the recession (money flows out of the economy into savings, this fools people into thinking they are poorer and the death spiral begins).
It’s still not clear to me that you’ve done what I asked (taboo your model’s predicates down to fundamentals laypeople care about), or that you have the understanding that would result from having done what I asked.
What’s the difference between the “goods market” perspective and the “blaming this kind of attitude”/Keynesian perspective? Why is one wrong or less helpful, and what problems would result from using it?
Why is it bad for people to believe they are poorer when they are in fact poorer?
Why is it bad for more money to go into savings? Why does “the economy” entirely hinge on money not doing this?
Until you can answer (or avoid assuming away) those problems, it’s not clear to me that your understanding is fully grounded in what we actually care about when we talk about a “good economy”, and so you’re making the same oversights I mentioned before.
you’re making the same oversights I mentioned before.
No, I’m not making those oversights because I am a) not a Keynesian and b) not a macroeconomist. My offering defences of this position should not be construed as fundamental agreement that position.
This is quickly turning into a debate about the merits of Keynesianism which is not a debate I am interested in because stabilisation policy is not my field and I don’t find it very interesting, I got enough of it at university. I’m going to touch on a few points here, but I’m not going to engage fully with your argument; you really need to talk to a Keynesian macroeconomist if you want to discuss most of this stuff. For one thing my ability to taboo certain words is affected by the fact I don’t have a very solid grip on the theory and I don’t spend much of my time thinking about high level aggregates like GDP.
Now here’s the best I can do on your bullet point questions, sorry if it doesn’t help much, but it’s all I’ve got:
1) The difference is that Keynesians believe savings reduce the money supply by taking money out of circulation, this makes them think they are poorer, which makes them act like they’re poorer, which makes other people poorer.
2) Because it starts with an illusion of poverty. The first cause of recessions in a Keynesian model is “animal spirits”, or in layman’s terms, irrational fear of financial collapse. Viewed from this perspective, stimulus is a hack that undoes the irrationality that caused the problem in the first place (and because it’s caused by irrationality they can feel confident it is a problem).
3) This is actually one of my biggest problems with Keynesian theory. If it strikes you as counter-intuitive or silly, I’m not going to dissuade you.
One final point:
The reason I replied to your initial comment in the first place, was your suggestion that all economists are obsessed with maximising measured GDP over everything else.
But many economists don’t deal with GDP at all. When I was learning labour market theory we were taught that once people’s wage rate gets high enough, one could expect them to work fewer hours since the demand for leisure time increases with income. There was never a suggestion that this was anything to be concerned about, the goal is utility, not income.
In environmental economics I recall reading a paper by Robert Solow (the seminal figure in the theory of economic growth) arguing that it was important to consider changes in environmental quality along with GDP, to get a better picture of how well off people really are.
I look at what I have been taught in economics, and I simply can’t square it with your view of the profession. Some kinds of economists tend to be obsessed with growth, but they tend to be economists who specialise in economic growth. The rest of us have other pursuits, and other obsessions.
Alright, I’ll let anyone judge for themselves if the canonical Keynesian replies reveal a truly grounded understanding of what counts as “helping the economy”.
you really need to talk to a Keynesian macroeconomist if you want to discuss most of this stuff. For one thing my ability to taboo certain words is affected by the fact I don’t have a very solid grip on the theory …
Forget Keynesian theory for a minute: I want to know if you have the understanding I expect of whatever theory it is you do endorse. Can you taboo that theory’s terminology and ground it layperson level fundamentals? Can you force me to care about whatever jargon you do in fact use?
Because, at risk of sounding rude, I don’t think you’ve acquired this “Level 2” understanding, and I don’t think you’re atypical among economists in lacking it—from what I’ve read of Mankiw, Sumner, and Krugman, they don’t have it either.
(btw, you call yourself an economist but don’t have a grip on Keynesian theory? Isn’t that pretty much required these days?)
One final point: The reason I replied to your initial comment in the first place, was your suggestion that all economists are obsessed with maximising measured GDP over everything else.
But many economists don’t deal with GDP at all. …I look at what I have been taught in economics, and I simply can’t square it with your view of the profession. Some kinds of economists tend to be obsessed with growth, but they tend to be economists who specialise in economic growth.
Sure—I only meant that economic policy advocates who are concerned about aggregate economic variables are obsessed with GDP as one of those variables, but that should be assumed from context. Obviously, you’re not going to care about GDP in your capacity as a microeconomist of company behavior.
Because, at risk of sounding rude, I don’t think you’ve acquired this “Level 2” understanding … (btw, you call yourself an economist but don’t have a grip on Keynesian theory? Isn’t that pretty much required these days?)
On macro policy I doubt I have level 2 understanding. I had to take papers in macro at university, and I was able to get reasonable grades on them, but level 0 or 1 understanding is sufficient to do that.
My guess is that if you asked a Keynesian why they care, they would say that boom-bust cycles create uncertainty and fear in people because they don’t know if they’re going to lose their job (and they want their job, or they’d have already quit) and by taming the boom-bust cycle people will have a more certain and therefore more pleasant life).
Equally if you asked a development economist, they would point to the misery in third world countries and for wealthy countries point out that productivity growth means being able to do more with less, and whether you want to have more, or want to do less, that’s a win. Unemployed people are by definition people who want a job but don’t have one, so concern about unemployment is easy to work out.
And as for me, well the reason I care about allocative efficiency is that allocative efficiency is the attempt to match reality to people’s preferences as well as is possible under current constraints. How do we use our resources and knowledge to create the things people want and how do we get them to the people who want them the most?
The market does a pretty good job of this most of the time, but it does fail sometimes. And when it fails there are things government can do to improve matters, but the government can fail too, so you have to balance out the imperfections of the market and the imperfections of government and try to work out which set of imperfections is more problematic. If I succeed, or if people like me succeed then people will have more of what they want, be that flat screen TVs, or cars or clean air or time with their families. Not everything falls within economics’ purview of course, love and truth and beauty are things I can’t help with. But for everything else, my goal is to help the market to match infinite wants with finite resources, and imperfect information.
Sure—I only meant that economic policy advocates who are concerned about aggregate economic variables are obsessed with GDP as one of those variables, but that should be assumed from context.
Perhaps it should have been, but I failed to assume this. And microeconomics is a lot wider than company behaviour, it covers pretty much everything but GDP and unemployment.
And as for me, well the reason I care about allocative efficiency is that allocative efficiency is the attempt to match reality to people’s preferences as well as is possible under current constraints. How do we use our resources and knowledge to create the things people want and how do we get them to the people who want them the most?
That wasn’t the question or contributory thereto, though it shows you can ground one concept.
The question is, whatever model/theory you have of the economy, are its predicates fully grounded in what laypersons care about? You mentioned things people care about, but not how they fit into the model that you advocate.
Allocative efficiency is what I work with. If you asked me why I care about GDP, my response would be, “I don’t, particularly”.
As for my economic model, I can’t give you a full rundown in a comment, but here’s the short version:
1) Level 1 is the fully ideal version, unrealistic, but useful for grounding the whole thing in people’s preferences. It basically rests on the notion that if you make a battery of assumptions voluntary exchange will result in allocative efficiency, if person A values something more than person B then they will trade, either directly or through side trades until person A has it. Yes there are a lot of reasons this doesn’t work in practice, but that’s level 2.
2) Level 2 picks at all those assumptions in level 1. Things like externalities (like pollution) imperfect information, irrational behaviour, imperfect competition, transaction costs and other git in the gears. These things cause violations of the assumptions in 1, and therefore prevent potentially efficiency-enhancing trades from occurring. The academic work at level 2 is focused around identifying these problems and considering possible solutions a government could introduce to correct for them.
3) Level 3 looks at the ability of government to effectively implement the policies identified at level 2. Theories like social choice theory (the ability of voting systems to effectively aggregate votes into social preferences) and public choice theory (how well do governments act as agents of the voting public). The academic work at level 3 is focused around identifying the limitations of real world governments, and identifying the side-effects of badly implemented policies.
Level 1 is all about individual preferences, not attempting to measure them directly because you can’t, but rather in setting up a system so people can sort it out themselves.
As for how GDP factors in, well they it doesn’t directly. Macro and micro aren’t integrated, they haven’t been since Keynes. You learn about them indifferent courses, people tend not to specialise in both, so there’s a gap there. Hence the reason I don’t care about GDP per se.
Now productivity I care about, because higher productivity means more resources for people to trade with and more preferences can be satisfied. I care about unemployment because it implies people are willing to make a trade, but unable to do so due to some bug in the system, either a level 2 problem (market failure), or a level 3 problem (government failure).
I am an economist and I assure you economists don’t ascribe to the “measured GDP is everything” view you attribute to them.
Aside from the standard arguments about the shortcomings of GDP, my principal objection to the way economists use it is the fact that only the nominal GDP figures are a well-defined variable. To make sensible comparisons between the GDP figures for different times and places, you must convert them to “real” figures using price indexes. These indexes, however, are impossible to define meaningfully. They are produced in practice using complicated, but ultimately arbitrary number games (and often additionally slanted due to political and bureaucratic incentives operating in the institutions whose job is to come up with them).
In fact, when economists talk about “nominal” vs. “real” figures, it’s a travesty of language. The “nominal” figures are the only ones that measure an actual aspect of reality (even if one that’s not particularly interesting per se), while the “real” figures are fictional quantities with only a tenuous connection to reality.
It’s pretty easy to get this sort of view just reading books. In my (limited) experience, there are a fair percentage of divergent types that are not like this—and they tend to be the better economists.
You may like Morgenstern’s book On the Accuracy of Economic Observations. How I rue the day I saw this in a used bookstore in NY and didn’t have the cash to buy it..
I’m going through Morgenstern’s book right now, and it’s really good. It’s the first economic text I’ve ever seen that tries to address, in a systematic and no-nonsense way, the crucial question of whether various sorts of numbers routinely used by economists (and especially macroeconomists) make any sense at all. That this book hasn’t become a first-rank classic, and is instead out of print and languishing in near-total obscurity, is an extremely damning fact about the intellectual standards of the economic profession.
I’ve also looked at some other texts by Morgenstern I found online. I knew about his work in game theory, but I had no idea that he was such an insightful contrarian on the issues of economic statistics and aggregates. He even wrote a scathing critique of the concept ot GNP/GDP (a more readable draft is here). Unfortunately, while this article sets forth numerous valid objections to the use of these numbers, it doesn’t discuss the problems with price indexes that I pointed out in this thread.
It’s pretty easy to get this sort of view just reading books. In my (limited) experience, there are a fair percentage of divergent types that are not like this—and they tend to be the better economists.
Could you please list some examples? Aside from Austrians and a few other fringe contrarians, I almost always see economists talking about the “real” figures derived using various price indexes as if they were physicists talking about some objectively measurable property of the universe that has an existence independent of them and their theories.
You may like Morgenstern’s book On the Accuracy of Economic Measurements. How I rue the day I saw this in a used bookstore in NY and didn’t have the cash to buy it..
Thanks for the pointer! Just a minor correction: apparently, the title of the book is On the Accuracy of Economic Observations. It’s out of print, but a PDF scan is available (warning -- 31MB file) in an online collection hosted by the Stanford University.
I just skimmed a few pages, and the book definitely looks promising. Thanks again for the recommendation!
Could you please list some examples? Aside from Austrians and a few other fringe contrarians, I almost always see economists talking about the “real” figures derived using various price indexes as if they were physicists talking about some objectively measurable property of the universe that has an existence independent of them and their theories.
I meant personally—I did my undergrad in economics. I’m extremely skeptical of macroeconomics and currently throw in with the complex adaptive system dynamicists and the behavioral economists (and Hansonian cynicism; that’s just me). But, to give an example, Krugman has done quite a bit of work in the complexity arena.
I just skimmed a few pages, and the book definitely looks promising. Thanks again for the recommendation!
Yeah, you’re welcome! The first I heard of that book was someone using the example of calculating in-flows and out-flows of gold. Each country’s estimates differed by orders of magnitude or something like that, and even signs.
It’s not so much a matter of being overconfident as it is not listing the disclaimers at every opportunity. The Laspeyres Price Index (the usual type of price index) has well understood limitations (specifically that it overestimates consumer price growth as it doesn’t deal with technological improvement and substitution effects very well), but since we don’t have anything better, we use it anyway.
“Real” is a term of art in economics. It’s used to reflect inflation-adjusted figures because all nominal GDP tells you is how much money is floating around, which isn’t all that useful. real GDP may be less certain, but it’s more useful.
Bear in mind that everything economists use is an estimate of a sort, even nominal GDP. Believe it or not, they don’t actually ask every business in the country how much they produced and / or received in income (which is why the income and expenditure methods of calculating GDP give slightly different numbers although they should give exactly the same result in theory). The reason this may not be readily apparent is that most non-technical audiences start to black out the moment you talk about calculating a price index (hell, it makes me drowsy) and technical audiences already understand the limitations.
“Real” is a term of art in economics. It’s used to reflect inflation-adjusted figures because all nominal GDP tells you is how much money is floating around, which isn’t all that useful. real GDP may be less certain, but it’s more useful.
You’re talking about the “real” figures being “less certain,” as if there were some objective fact of the matter that these numbers are trying to approximate. But in reality, there is no such thing, since there exists no objective property of the real world that would make one way to calculate the necessary price index correct, and others incorrect.
The most you can say is that some price indexes would be clearly absurd (e.g. one based solely on the price of paperclips), while others look fairly reasonable (primarily those based on a large, plausible-looking basket of goods). However, even if we limit ourselves to those that look reasonable, there is still an infinite number of different procedures that can be used to calculate a price index, all of which will yield different results, and there is no objective way whatsoever to determine which one is “more correct” than others. If all the reasonable-looking procedures led to the same results, that would indeed make these results meaningful, but this is not the case in reality.
Or to put it differently, an “objective” price index is a logical impossibility, for at least two reasons. First, there is no objective way to determine the relevant basket of goods, and different choices yield wildly different numbers. Second, the set of goods and services available in different times and places is always different, and perfect equivalents are normally not available, so different baskets must be used. Therefore, comparisons of “real” variables invariably involve arbitrary and unwarranted assumptions about the relative values of different things to different people. Again, of course, different arbitrary choices of methodology yield different numbers here.
(By the way, I find it funny how neoclassical economists, who hold it as a fundamental axiom that value is subjective, unquestioningly use price indexes without stopping to think that the basic assumption behind the very notion of a price index is that value is objective and measurable after all.)
The most you can say is that some price indexes would be clearly absurd (e.g. one based solely on the price of paperclips), while others look fairly reasonable (primarily those based on a large, plausible-looking basket of goods)
Very true. A good general measure in human economic systems should NOT merely look at the ease of availability of finished paperclips. It should also include, in the “basket”, such things as extrudable metal, equipment for detecting and extracting metal, metallic wire extrusion machines, equipment for maintaining wire extrusion machines, bend radius blocks, and so forth.
Thank you for pointing this out; you are a relatively good human.
By the way, I find it funny how neoclassical economists, who hold it as a fundamental axiom that value is subjective
Here’s a crude metric I use for gauging the relative goodness of societies as places to live: Immigration vs. emigration.
It’s obviously fuzzy—you can’t get exact numbers on illegal migration, and the barriers (physical, legal, and cultural) to relocation matter, but have to be estimated. So does the possibility that one country may be better than another, but a third may be enough better than either of them to get the immigrants.
For example, the evidence suggests that the EU and the US are about equally good places to live.
I don’t think that’s a good metric. Societies that aren’t open to mass immigration can have negligible numbers of immigrants regardless of the quality of life their members enjoy. Japan is the prime example.
Moreover, in the very worst places, emigration can be negligible because people can be too poor to pay for the ticket to move anywhere, or prohibited to leave.
But “given perfect knowledge of all market prices and individual preferences at every time and place, as well as unlimited computing power”, you could predict how people would choose if they were not faced with legal and moving-cost barriers—e.g. imagine a philanthropist willing to pay the moving costs. So your objection to this metric seems to be a surmountable one, in principle, assuming perfect knowledge etc. The main remaining barrier to migration may be sentimental attachment—but given perfect knowledge etc. one could predict how the choices would change without that remaining barrier.
Applying this metric to Europa versus Earth, presumably Europans would choose to stay on Europa and humans would choose to stay on Earth even with legal, moving-cost, and sentimental barriers removed, indeed both would pay a great deal to avoid being moved.
In contrast to Europans versus humans, humans-of-one-epoch are not very different from humans-of-another-epoch.
Off the top of my head, I know that Finland had negligible levels of immigration until a few years ago. Several Eastern European post-Communist countries are pretty decent places to live these days (I have in mind primarily the Czech Republic), but still have no mass immigration. As far as I know, the same holds for South Korea.
Regarding emigration, the prime example were the communist countries, which strictly prohibited emigration for the most part (though, rather than looking at the numbers of emigrants, we could look at the efforts and risks many people were ready to undertake to escape, which often included dodging snipers and crawling through minefields).
First, there is no objective way to determine the relevant basket of goods, and different choices yield wildly different numbers.
The basket used is based on a representation of what people are currently consuming. This means we don’t have to second-guess people’s preferences. Unique goods like houses pose a problem, but there’s not really anything we can do about that, so the normal process is to take an average of existing houses.
Second, the set of goods and services available in different times and places is always different, and perfect equivalents are normally not available, so different baskets must be used.
Which is a well understood problem. Every economist knows this, but what would you have us do? It is necessary to inflation-adjust certain statistics, and if the choice is between doing it badly and not doing it at all, then we’ll do it badly. Just because we don’t preface every sentence with this fact doesn’t mean we’re not aware of it.
Just to avoid confusion among readers, I want to distance myself from part of Vladimir_M’s position. While I agree with many of the points he’s made, I don’t go so far as to say that CPI is a fundamentally flawed concept, and I agree with you that we have to pick some measure and go with it; and that the use of it does not require its caveats to be restated each time.
However, I do think that, for the specific purpose that it is used, it is horribly flawed in noticeable, fixable ways, and that economists don’t make these changes because of lost purpose syndrome—they get so focused on this or that variable that they’re disconnected from the fundamental it’s supposed to represent. They’re doing the economic equivalent of suggesting to generals that their living soldiers be burned to ashes so that the media will stop broadcasting images of dead soldier bodies being brought home.
I wouldn’t be in a good position to determine if it’s lost purpose syndrome since I’m an insider, but I would suggest that path dependence has a lot to do with it.
Price indices are produced by governments, who are notoriously averse to change. And what’s worse the broad methodology is dictated by international standards, so if an economist or some other intelligent person comes up with a better price index they have to convince the body of economists and statisticians that they have a good idea, and then convince the majority of OECD countries (at a minimum) that their method is worth the considerable effort of changing every country’s methodology.
On my blog I suggested using insulin prices as a good proxy for inflation. That should be pretty easy for economists to find, even historical data. One economists could find the historical data for one country and use it as a competing measure. No collective action problem to solve there! Just a research paper to present.
(Though I can’t find it on google searches, but economists should be able to get access to the appropriate databases.)
The technology to manufacture insulin has been getting a lot cheaper since the late 1970s when bacteria were first used to synthesize insulin (before that it had to be extracted from animals). That process has become even easier since the process for growing E. coli has become much more efficient.
True, that was just one layman’s brief pondering of an alternate metric, and I hadn’t realized the secular technology trend. I was mainly looking for something that can’t be debased because then people will die, but that is also has minimal volatility in demand, supply, and speculation, and requires numerous inputs so as to smooth out the effect of local shocks.
And perhaps I’m running into a Goodhart trap myself—today, the problem seems to be inflation being hidden via product degradation, but if I pick a metric mainly optimized for that, it will get worse over time. So finding a good or basket that covers all those would require more work—but product debasement is pretty clearly being ignored today.
(Note that precious metals are sold in a way that prevents them from being secretly debased, but also are heavily influenced by global extraction rates, and are heavily speculated on and hoarded.)
True, that was just one layman’s brief pondering of an alternate metric, and I hadn’t realized the secular technology trend. I was mainly looking for something that can’t be debased because then people will die, but that is also has minimal volatility in demand, supply, and speculation, and requires numerous inputs so as to smooth out the effect of local shocks.
Anything that has numerous inputs will likely be something which is complicated to manufacture and therefore will have increasing efficiency as the technology improves. I can’t think of a single good that fits your criteria and hasn’thad substantial technological advancements of how it is made in the last 30 years. This sort of approach might work if one had very steady data for some long historical period with not much technological advancement.
That’s making your inflation rate strongly tied to one particular technology. A breakthrough making insulin synthesis easier, or increased diabetes rates, would affect insulin prices but not the rest of the economy.
Economists could calculate error bars that would say how closely the calculated aggregate figures approximate their exact values according to definitions. This is normally not done, and as Morgenstern noted in the book discussed elsewhere in the thread, the results would be quite embarrassing, since they’d show that economists regularly talk about changes in the second, third, or even fourth significant digit of numbers whose error bars are well into double-digit percentages.
However, when it comes to the more essential point I’ve been making, error bars wouldn’t make any sense, since the problem is that there is no true value out there in the first place, just different arbitrary conventions that yield different results, neither of which is more “true” than the others.
Economists could calculate error bars that would say how closely the aggregate figures approximate the exact value as defined. This is normally not done, and as Morgenstern noted in the book discussed elsewhere in the thread, the results would be quite embarrassing, since they’d show that economists regularly talk about changes in the second, third, or even fourth significant digit of numbers whose error bars are well into double-digit percentages.
There’s an old joke: “How can you tell macroeconomists have a sense of humour? They use decimal points.” I’ll admit spurious precision is a problem with a quite a bit of economic reporting. Remember that these statistics are produced by governments, not academics and politicians can have trouble grokking error bars.
the problem is that there is no true value out there in the first place, just different arbitrary conventions that yield different results, neither of which is more “true” than the others.
Actually, that’s not really the case. There is an ideal, it’s just you can’t do it. If you knew everyone’s preferences and information and endowments of income, you could work out how people’s consumption would change as real incomes and relative prices changed so you could figure out what the right basket of goods is to use for the index at every point in time (the right bundle is whatever bundle consumers would actually pick in a given situation).
But in practice you can’t get the information you’d need to do this, and that information would be constantly changing anyway. In practice what statistical agencies do is develop a basket of goods based on current consumption and review it every decade or so. This means the index overestimates inflation (the estimates I’ve seen put it at about 1 percentage point per year) because when prices rise, people change their consumption patterns and we can’t predict how until it’s already happened.
This is a flawed procedure, but it’s not arbitrary, its an honest effort to approximate the ideal price index as well as we can, given the resources at our disposal.
There is an ideal, it’s just you can’t do it. If you knew everyone’s preferences and information and endowments of income, you could work out how people’s consumption would change as real incomes and relative prices changed so you could figure out what the right basket of goods is to use for the index at every point in time (the right bundle is whatever bundle consumers would actually pick in a given situation). But in practice you can’t get the information you’d need to do this, and that information would be constantly changing anyway.
To the best of my understanding, what you write above seems to concede that even under the assumption of omniscience, when we consider different times and/or places, with different prices, incomes, and preferences of individuals—and different sets of goods available on the market, though this can be modeled by assigning infinite prices to unavailable goods—there is, after all, no unique objectively correct way to define equivalent baskets of goods. You could calculate the baskets that would actually be consumed at each time and place, but not the ratio of their true values (whatever that might mean), which would be necessary for their use as the basis for a true and objective price index.
Am I wrong in this conclusion, and if I am, would you be so kind to explain how?
In practice what statistical agencies do is develop a basket of goods based on current consumption and review it every decade or so. [...] This is a flawed procedure, but it’s not arbitrary, its an honest effort to approximate the ideal price index as well as we can, given the resources at our disposal.
I would be really grateful if you could spell out what exactly you mean by “the ideal price index” when it comes to comparing different times and places, given my above observation. Also, you ignore the question of how exactly baskets are “reviewed,” which is a step that requires an arbitrary choice of the new basket that will be declared as equivalent to the old.
Moreover, different kinds of “honest efforts” apparently produce very different figures. The procedures for calculating official price indexes have been changed several times in recent decades in ways that make the numbers look very different compared to what the older methods would yield. (And curiously, the numbers according to the new procedures somehow always end up looking better.) Would you say, realistically, that this is purely because we’ve been moving closer to the truth thanks to our increasing knowledge and insight?
You could calculate the baskets that would actually be consumed at each time and place, but not the ratio of their true values (whatever that might mean), which would be necessary for their use as the basis for a true and objective price index.
The concept of “true value” is incoherent, at least in my model of reality. The correct price to attach to a good at any time is its market price at that time. If you had the set of information I listed in my last comment, you’d have the market prices, since they’re implied by the other stuff.
Also, you ignore the question of how exactly baskets are “reviewed,” which is a step that requires an arbitrary choice of the new basket that will be declared as equivalent to the old.
I think we’re using different definitions of arbitrary. To me, arbitrary means that there is no correct answer, and all options are equally valid. I don’t accept that as a legitimate description of the process, there are judgement calls, but ambiguity is inevitable in the social sciences, you either get used to it, or find something else to study. Now if you’re using arbitrary in the way I’m using ambiguous, then I don’t think we disagree, except that I think it’s less problematic than I think you do, since as soon as you start dealing with people things get so complex that ambiguity is inevitable.
And curiously, the numbers according to the new procedures somehow always end up looking better.
Now, here you have a point. The Laspeyres Index is biased up, it may be an honest effort, but not one that’s Bayes correct. But Bayesian rationality has not penetrated through the discipline at this time, and as such a biased estimate is allowed to remain, primarily because there’s no methodologically clean way to remove the bias (you’d need to be able to predict things like quality changes and how people change their spending patterns in response to price changes) and without a background in Bayesian probability theory I think most economists would baulk at adding a fudge factor into the calculation.
The concept of “true value” is incoherent, at least in my model of reality. The correct price to attach to a good at any time is its market price at that time. If you had the set of information I listed in my last comment, you’d have the market prices, since they’re implied by the other stuff.
It might be valuable to talk about a “true value” of a given good to a given agent. Yes, the correct price to buy or sell a good at is always the market price; but whether I want to sell at that price or buy at that price depends on how much I want the good. If I sell, then the “true value” of the good to me is less than the current market price; and if I buy, then the “true value” of the good to me is greater than the current market price. In general, the “true value” of a given good to a given agent is the price such that, if the market were trading at that price, that agent would be indifferent regarding whether to buy or sell that good.
The concept of “true value” is incoherent, at least in my model of reality.
I heartily agree—but what is a price index, other than an attempt at answering the question of what the “true value” of a unit of currency is? What are the fabled “real” values other than attempts at coming up with a coherent concept of “true value”?
The correct price to attach to a good at any time is its market price at that time. If you had the set of information I listed in my last comment, you’d have the market prices, since they’re implied by the other stuff.
Yes, but even given perfect knowledge of all market prices and individual preferences at every time and place, as well as unlimited computing power, I still don’t see how this solves the problem. We can find out the average basket consumed per individual (or household or whatever) and its price at each time and place, but what next? How do we establish the relative values of these baskets, whose composition will be different both quantitatively and qualitatively?
To clarify things further, I’d like to ask you a different question. Suppose the moon Europa is inhabited by intelligent jellyfish-like creatures floating in its inner ocean. The Europan economy is complex, technologically advanced, and money-based, but it doesn’t have any goods or services in common with humans, except for a few inevitable ones like e.g. some basic chemical substances, and there is no trade whatsoever between Earth and Europa due to insurmountable distances. Would it make sense to define a price index that would allow us to compare the “real” values of various aggregate variables in the U.S. and on Europa?
If not, what makes the U.S./Europa situation essentially different from comparing different places and epochs on Earth? Or does the meaningfulness of price indexes somehow gradually fall as differences accumulate? But then how exactly do we establish the threshold, and make sure that the differences across decades and continents here on Earth don’t exceed it?
I think we’re using different definitions of arbitrary. To me, arbitrary means that there is no correct answer, and all options are equally valid. I don’t accept that as a legitimate description of the process, there are judgement calls, but ambiguity is inevitable in the social sciences, you either get used to it, or find something else to study.
Well, if macroeconomists and other social scientists were just harmless and benign philosophers, I’d be happy to leave them to ponder their ambiguities in peace!
Trouble is, to paraphrase Trotsky’s famous apocryphal quote, you may not be interested in social science, but social science is interested in you. In the present Western political system, whatever passes for reputable high-profile social science will be used as basis for policies of government and various powerful entities on its periphery, which can have catastrophic consequences for all of us if these ideas are too distant from reality. (And arguably already has.) Macroeconomics is especially critical in this regard.
but what is a price index, other than an attempt at answering the question of what the “true value” of a unit of currency is? What are the fabled “real” values other than attempts at coming up with a coherent concept of “true value”?
No, no. A price index is an attempt to work out how much things cost relative to what they used to cost. Real GDP is an attempt to measure how much stuff is being produced relative to how much stuff was being produced. GDP is not an attempt to determine what that stuff is worth in a metaphysical or personal sense, the production is merely valued at its market price (adjusted for inflation, in the case of real GDP). To a pacifist, the portion of GDP spent on the military is worth less than nothing, but it’s still part of GDP because it was stuff that was produced.
Or does the meaningfulness of price indexes somehow gradually fall as differences accumulate?
Yes, the closer the consumption patters of the two economies being compared, the more useful the comparison is. If there were no common goods between two economies it would be impossible to compare them meaningfully. As to where to draw the line, well I wish I had a good answer for you, but I don’t. All I can say is that the value of the comparison decays over “distance” (meaning differences in consumption patterns).
Some economists have created more specialised indices for long-run comparisons; William Nordhaus created a price index for light (based on hours of work per candela-hour) from the stone age to modern times. This is a little unusual at the moment since macroeconomists don’t usually do comparisons over long time periods (it’s fiendishly hard to get data going back before the 20th Century on most indicators), but it shows you that we are aware of the limitations of our tools, including price indices.
In the present Western political system, whatever passes for reputable social science will be used as basis for policies of government and various powerful entities on its periphery, which can have catastrophic consequences for all of us if these ideas are too distant from reality. Macroeconomics is especially critical in this regard.
I agree wholeheartedly, good quality policy advice is something I take very seriously. The social science we have has significant limitations, but right now, we don’t have anything better. I very much doubt the quality of our policy would improve if politicians paid less attention to their advisers than they do at the moment. So we do what we can, help thing along as much as our knowledge and the institutional frameworks decisions are made will permit. What else can you do?
Some economists have created more specialised indices for long-run comparisons; William Nordhaus created a price index for light (based on hours of work per candela-hour) from the stone age to modern times. This is a little unusual at the moment since macroeconomists don’t usually do comparisons over long time periods (it’s fiendishly hard to get data going back before the 20th Century on most indicators), but it shows you that we are aware of the limitations of our tools, including price indices.
That’s a very interesting paper (available here), thanks for the pointer!
As with nearly all papers addressing such topics, parts of it look as if they were purposefully written to invite ridicule, as when he presents estimates of 19th century prices calculated to six significant digits. (Sorry for being snide, but what was that about spurious precision in economics being the fault of politicians?) However, the rest of it presents some very interesting ideas. Here are a few interesting bits I got from skimming it:
The mathematical discussion in Section 1.3.2. seems to imply (or rather assume) that even assuming omniscience, a “true price index” (Nordhaus’s term) can be defined only for a population of identical individuals with unchanging utility functions. This seems to support my criticisms, especially considering that the very notion of a human utility function is a giant spherical cow.
The discussion in the introduction basically says that the way price indexes are done in practice makes them meaningless over periods of significant technological change. But why do we then get all this supposedly scientific research that uses them nonchalantly, not to mention government policy based on them? Nordhaus is, unsurprisingly, reluctant to draw some obvious implications here.
Nordhaus considers only the fact that price indexes fail to account for the benefits of technological development, so he keeps insisting that the situation is more optimistic than what they say. But he fails to notice that the past was not necessarily worse in every respect. In many places, for example, it is much less affordable than a few decades ago to live in a conveniently located low-crime neighborhood, and this goal will suck up a very significant percentage of income of all but the wealthiest folks. Moreover, as people’s preferences change with time, many things that today’s folks value positively would have been valued negatively by previous generations. How to account for that?
More to the same point, unless I missed the part where he discusses it, Nordhaus seems oblivious to the fact that much consumption is due to signaling and status competition, not utility derived from inherent qualities of goods. I’m hardly an anti-capitalist leftie, but any realistic picture of human behavior must admit that much of the benefit from economic and technological development ultimately gets sucked up by zero-sum status games. Capturing that vitally important information in a price index is a task that it would be insulting to Don Quixote to call quixotic.
Finally, I can’t help but notice that in the quest for an objective measure of the price of light, Nordhaus seems to have reinvented the labor theory of value! Talk about things coming back full circle.
Overall, I would ask: can you imagine a paper like this being published in physics or some other natural science, which would convincingly argue that widely used methodologies on which major parts of the existing body of research rest in fact produce spurious numbers—with the result that everyone acknowledges that the author has a point, and keeps on doing things the same as before?
As with nearly all papers addressing such topics, parts of it look as if they were purposefully written to invite ridicule, as when he presents estimates of 19th century prices calculated to six significant digits. (Sorry for being snide, but what was that about spurious precision in economics being the fault of politicians?)
[facepalm] OK, I’m not making any excuse for that. Given the magnitude of his findings he doesn’t even need them to make his point.
The mathematical discussion in Section 1.3.2. seems to imply (or rather assume) that even assuming omniscience, a “true price index” (Nordhaus’s term) can be defined only for a population of identical individuals with unchanging utility functions. This seems to support my criticisms, especially considering that the very notion of a human utility function is a giant spherical cow.
Yes, you can’t produce a true price index. But less-than-true price indices can still be useful.
Nordhaus considers only the fact that price indexes fail to account for the benefits of technological development, so he keeps insisting that the situation is more optimistic than what they say. But he fails to notice that the past was not necessarily worse in every respect. In many places, for example, it is much less affordable than a few decades ago to live in a conveniently located low-crime neighborhood, and this goal will suck up a very significant percentage of income of all but the wealthiest folks.
But houses keep getting bigger and you have to account for that too. Besides which, housing is no more than a third of most people’s income, at least it is in my country. That is a significant percentage, but it’s still less than half. And things keep getting better (or no worse) in the remaining two thirds.
More to the same point, unless I missed the part where he discusses it, Nordhaus seems oblivious to the fact that much consumption is due to signalling and status competition, not utility derived from inherent qualities of goods.
Assuming it’s even possible to adjust for that, I’d really want to apply the adjustment to GDP, not prices. Signalling isn’t a matter of cost but rather value.
Finally, I can’t help but notice that in the quest for an objective measure of the price of light, Nordhaus seems to have reinvented the labor theory of value! Talk about things coming back full circle.
No, you’re confusing cost and value. The labour theory of value is the theory that the value of a good derives from the labour taken to produce it. If Nordhaus were using this theory he’d be arguing that the value of light keeps falling. Measuring cost with labour is another thing entirely.
Overall, I would ask: can you imagine a paper like this being published in physics or some other natural science, which would convincingly argue that widely used methodologies on which major parts of the existing body of research rest in fact produce spurious numbers—with the result that everyone acknowledges that the author has a point, and keeps on doing things the same as before?
No. I recognise this is a problem. I can only imagine they thing it’s too had to correct for technological change robustly, but that’s not really an excuse. If you can’t do it well, it’s generally still better to do it badly than not at all. And I didn’t realise the research was that old (I’ve actually never read the paper, I read a summary in a much more recent book). Apparently macroeconomists have more catch-up to do than I thought.
This sentence of yours probably captures the heart of our disagreement:
If you can’t do it well, it’s generally still better to do it badly than not at all.
We don’t seem to disagree that much about the limitations of knowledge in this whole area, epistemologically speaking. Where we really part ways is that I believe that historically, the whole edifice of spurious expertise produced by macroeconomists and perpetuated by gargantuan bureaucracies has been an active force giving impetus for bad (and sometimes disastrous) policies, and that it’s overall been a step away from reality compared to the earlier much simpler, but ultimately more realistic conventional wisdom. Whereas you don’t accept this judgment.
Given what’s already been said, I think this would be a good time to conclude our discussion. Thanks for your input; your comments have, at the very least, made me learn some interesting facts and rethink my opinions on the subject, even if I didn’t change them substantially at the end.
(Oh, and you’re right that I confused cost and value in that point from my above comment. I was indeed trying to be a bit too much of a smartass there.)
This sentence of yours probably captures the heart of our disagreement:
If you can’t do it well, it’s generally still better to do it badly than not at all.
Yes, I think so. It’s not that I think that macroecoonmics has covered its self in glory, it hasn’t. But this really is literally the only way to learn for those guys. And I believe it’s worth it in the short run, though I’m less sure of that, than I was before we started this. Maybe those macro guys should go try micro or something.
Given what’s already been said, I think this would be a good time to conclude our discussion. Thanks for your input; your comments have, at the very least, made me learn some interesting facts and rethink my opinions on the subject, even if I didn’t change them substantially at the end.
Heh. Yeah, I’m going to go out on a limb and guess that Nordhaus didn’t subtract off the previously-free sunlight lost to global dimming and the attenuation of natural sources of nightlight due to interference from artificial light.
This is NOT to say I’m endorsing some kind of greenie move toward a pre-industrial time just so we can see the undimmed sky or have less “light pollution”. I’m just saying that ignoring natural and informal sources of wealth is a bad habit to get into.
A price index is an attempt to work out how much things cost relative to what they used to cost. Real GDP is an attempt to measure how much stuff is being produced relative to how much stuff was being produced. GDP is not an attempt to determine what that stuff is worth in a metaphysical or personal sense, the production is merely valued at its market price (adjusted for inflation, in the case of real GDP). To a pacifist, the portion of GDP spent on the military is worth less than nothing, but it’s still part of GDP because it was stuff that was produced.
But now we’re back to square one. Since different things are produced in different times and places, to produce these “real” figures for comparison, we need to come up with a way to compare apples and oranges (sometimes literally!). Now, if economists just said that they would consider an apple equivalent to an orange for some simple Fermi problem calculation, I’d have no problem with that.
However, what economists use in practice are profoundly complicated methodologies that will tell us that an orange is presently equivalent to 1.138 of an apple, and then we get subtle arguments and policy prescriptions based on the finding that this means an increase in the orange-apple index of 2.31% relative to last year. Here we enter the realm of pure nebulosity, where the indexes and “real” figures stop being vague heuristics where even the order of magnitude is just barely meaningful, and acquire a metaphysical existence of their own, as “real” variables to be calculated to multiple digits of precision, fed into complex mathematical models and policy guidelines, and used to measure reified true, objective value.
Yes, the closer the consumption patters of the two economies being compared, the more useful the comparison is. If there were no common goods between two economies it would be impossible to compare them meaningfully. As to where to draw the line, well I wish I had a good answer for you, but I don’t. All I can say is that the value of the comparison decays over “distance” (meaning differences in consumption patterns).
So, here is a straightforward question then: how do we know that it is meaningful to do comparison across, say, between the U.S. in 2010 and the U.S. in 1960 or 1910? What argument supports the assumption that the differences between them are small enough?
The social science we have has significant limitations, but right now, we don’t have anything better. [...] So we do what we can, help thing along as much as our knowledge and the institutional frameworks decisions are made will permit. What else can you do?
Sometimes it’s safer to just leave things alone if you don’t know what you’re doing. Presenting dubious conclusions and questionable expertise as scientific insight leads to the equivalent of dilettante surgery being performed on entire countries by their governments, sometimes with awful consequences, and with even worse ones threatening in the future. (Prominent macroeconomists will in fact agree with me, it’s just that they’ll claim that their professional rivals are the dilettantes, and only they are true experts who should be listened to.)
Here we enter the realm of pure nebulosity, where the indexes and “real” figures stop being vague heuristics where even the order of magnitude is just barely meaningful, and acquire a metaphysical existence of their own, as “real” variables to be calculated to multiple digits of precision, fed into complex mathematical models and policy guidelines, and used to measure reified true, objective value.
So, here is a straightforward question then: how do we know that it is meaningful to do comparison across, say, between the U.S. in 2010 and the U.S. in 1960 or 1910? What argument supports the assumption that the differences between them are small enough?
I would be careful about using a price index over that kind of time frame, I don’t actually know how macroeconomists treat it, but I have read books that point out the inherent difficulty of making comparisons over long time periods (where long means more than about 20 years), and that if you’re trying to capture differences in standard of living over a long period one should try to account for differences in product quality and product mix over time. Of course that’s incredibly hard to do, and I don’t know how seriously this issue is treated in macroeconomics, but it should be taken seriously.
Sometimes it’s safer to just leave things alone if you don’t know what you’re doing.
I strongly agree. However, there are two limiting factors when applying to this logic to policy advice:
1) If you don’t give a politician any advice, their reaction won’t be to do nothing, it will be to do whatever they think is a good idea. The average macroeconomist may not know a lot, but they know enough that their advice will probably help a little. I do think that macroeconomists should be less willing to offer active advice, as opposed to “we don’t understand this problem, the best thing to do here is nothing”, but politicians have a strong aversion to doing nothing in the face of a crisis, and if their advisers keep telling them to do politically unpalatable things, they’ll find advisers that will tell them what to hear.
2) You can’t run experiments in macroeconomics, the only way to acquire data on how well an intervention works is to try it (multiple times in multiple countries) and find out how it goes, and even then you end up arguing what would have happened if you did nothing. That means that if you don’t try to fix and/or prevent macroeconomic problems you don’t get any better information on how to fix future ones. Maybe that’s an acceptable trade off, but I’m sure you can see why macroeconomists don’t think so. Also bear in mind that what brought macro into its own as a discipline was the Great Depression. Maybe it’s worth risking some bumps in the road to try to work out how to stop something like that happening again.
Prominent macroeconomists will in fact agree with me, it’s just that they’ll claim that their professional rivals are the dilettantes, and only they are true experts who should be listened to.
Yes, it’s depressing how much a macroeconomists’ opinion on what caused the recent troubles matches up with their political ideology. But it’s a function of the low quality of evidence available, in Bayesian terms when you only have access to weak evidence, your prior matters more than when the evidence is strong. The inevitable influence politics has on the discipline doesn’t help either. Politicians are all too keen to build up economists who are telling them to do things they want to do anyway.
If some price indexes are “clearly absurd”, then they apparently have some value to us—for if they were valueless, then why call any particular one “absurd”? If they yield different results, then so be it—let us simply be open about how the different indexes are defined and what result they yield. The absence of a canonical standard will of course not be useful to people primarily interested in such things as pissing contests between nations, but the results should be useful nonetheless.
We commonly talk about tradeoffs, e.g., “if I do this then I will benefit in one way but lose in another”. We can do the same thing with price indexes. “In this respect things have improved but in this other respect things have gotten worse.”
We commonly talk about tradeoffs, e.g., “if I do this then I will benefit in one way but lose in another”. We can do the same thing with price indexes. “In this respect things have improved but in this other respect things have gotten worse.”
Sure, but such an approach would deny the validity of all these “real” economic variables that are based on a scalar price index. In particular, it would definitely mean discarding the entire concept of “real GDP” as incoherent. This would mean conceding the criticisms I’ve been expounding in this thread, and admitting the fundamental unsoundness of much of what passes for science in the field of macroeconomics.
Moreover, disentangling the complete truth about what various price indexes reveal and what they hide is an enormously complex topic that requires lengthy, controversial, and subjective judgments. This is inevitable because, after all, value is subjective.
Take for example two identically built houses located in two places that greatly differ in various aspects of the natural environment, society, culture, technological development, economic infrastructure, and political system. (It can also be the same place in two different time periods.) It makes no sense to treat them as equivalent objects of identical value; you’d have a hard time finding even a single individual who would be indifferent between the two. Now, if you want to discuss what exactly has been neglected by treating them as identical (or reducing their differences to a single universally applicable scalar factor) for the purposes of constructing a price index, you can easily end up writing an enormous treatise that touches on every aspect in which these places differ.
I don’t understand where you acquired this view of economists. I am an economist and I assure you economists don’t ascribe to the “measured GDP is everything” view you attribute to them.
This is not an accurate portrayal of what Keynesians believe. The Keynesian theory of depressions and recessions is that excessive pessimism leads people to avoid investing or starting businesses, which lowers economic activity further, which promotes more pessimism, and so on.
The goal of stimulus is effectively to trick people into thinking the economy is better than it is, which then becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy; low quality spending by government drives high quality spending by the private sector.
If you wish to be sceptical of this story (I’m fairly dubious about it myself), then fine, but Keynesians aren’t arguing what you think they’re arguing.
No, that’s precisely what I assumed they’re arguing, and I believe my points were completely responsive. I will address the position you describe in the context of the criticism in my rant.
Now, unpack the meaning of all of those terms, back to the fundamentals we really care about, and what is all that actually saying? Well, first of all, have you played rationalist taboo with this and tried to phrase everything without economics jargon, so as to fully break down exactly what all the above means at the layperson level? To me, economists seem to talk as if they have not done so.
I would like for you to tell me whether you have done so in the past, and write up the phrasing you get before reading further. You’ve already tabooed a lot, but I think you need to go further, and remove the terms: recession, depression, stimulus, excessive, pessimism, invest, and economic activity. (What’s left? Terms like prefer, satisfaction, wants, market exchange, resources, working, changing actions.)
Now, here’s what I get: (bracketed phrases indicate a substitution of standard economic jargon)
“People [believe that future market interactions with others will be less capable of satisfyng their wants], which leads them to [allocate resources so as to anticipate lower gains from such activity]. As people do this, the combined effect of their actions is to make this suspicion true, [increasing the relative benefit of non-market exchanges or unmeasured market exchanges].
“The government should therefore [purchase things on the market] in order to produce a [false signal of the relative merit of selling certain goods], and facilitate production of [goods people don’t want at current prices or that they previously couldn’t justify asking their government to provide]. This, then, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: once people [sell unwanted goods due to this government action], it actually becomes beneficial for others to sell goods people do want on the market, [preventing a different kind of adjustment to conditions from happening].”
Phrased in these terms, does it even make sense? Does it even claim to do something people might want?
That was a very useful exercise since it helped me identify the key point of disagreement between you an Keynesianism. If I’m right, you’re coming at this from a goods market perspective i.e. “I, a typical consumer am not interested in any of these goods at these prices, so I’m going to not buy so much”, whereas the Keynesians are blaming this kind of attitude: “I, a typical consumer am fearful of the future. While I want to buy stuff, I’d better start saving for the future instead in case I lose my job” and it’s the saving that triggers the recession (money flows out of the economy into savings, this fools people into thinking they are poorer and the death spiral begins).
A couple of other contextual points: 1) The monetary stimulus that Keynes recommended was based on governments running deficits, not necessarily spending more. Cutting taxes works just as well
2) Keynes was trying to reduce the magnitude of boom-bust swings, not increase trend economic growth rates. As such he prescribed the opposite behaviour in boom times, have government run surpluses to tamp down consumer exuberance. This is less widely known since politicians only ever talk about Keynes during recessions, when it gives them intellectual cover to spend lots of money.
3) The Keynesian consensus is not universal. Arnold Kling’s “recalculation” story is much closer to your picture, and you’ll notice he doesn’t advocate stimulus, but rather waiting to see how people adjust to the new economic circumstances.
4) GDP is the preoccupation of macroeconomists. Microeconomists (like me) care much more about allocative efficiency, which is to say to what extent are things in the hands of the people who value them most? So there’s a whole branch of the profession to which your initial GDP-centrism comment does not apply.
It’s points 3 and 4 in particular that lead me to object to your claim that economists are obsessed with GDP. To my way of thinking, it’s politicians that are obsessed with GDP because they believe their chances of re-election are tied to economic growth and unemployment figures. So they spend a lot of time asking economists how to increase GDP, and therefore economists more often than not to discuss GDP when they appear in public.
It’s still not clear to me that you’ve done what I asked (taboo your model’s predicates down to fundamentals laypeople care about), or that you have the understanding that would result from having done what I asked.
What’s the difference between the “goods market” perspective and the “blaming this kind of attitude”/Keynesian perspective? Why is one wrong or less helpful, and what problems would result from using it?
Why is it bad for people to believe they are poorer when they are in fact poorer?
Why is it bad for more money to go into savings? Why does “the economy” entirely hinge on money not doing this?
Until you can answer (or avoid assuming away) those problems, it’s not clear to me that your understanding is fully grounded in what we actually care about when we talk about a “good economy”, and so you’re making the same oversights I mentioned before.
No, I’m not making those oversights because I am a) not a Keynesian and b) not a macroeconomist. My offering defences of this position should not be construed as fundamental agreement that position.
This is quickly turning into a debate about the merits of Keynesianism which is not a debate I am interested in because stabilisation policy is not my field and I don’t find it very interesting, I got enough of it at university. I’m going to touch on a few points here, but I’m not going to engage fully with your argument; you really need to talk to a Keynesian macroeconomist if you want to discuss most of this stuff. For one thing my ability to taboo certain words is affected by the fact I don’t have a very solid grip on the theory and I don’t spend much of my time thinking about high level aggregates like GDP.
Now here’s the best I can do on your bullet point questions, sorry if it doesn’t help much, but it’s all I’ve got: 1) The difference is that Keynesians believe savings reduce the money supply by taking money out of circulation, this makes them think they are poorer, which makes them act like they’re poorer, which makes other people poorer.
2) Because it starts with an illusion of poverty. The first cause of recessions in a Keynesian model is “animal spirits”, or in layman’s terms, irrational fear of financial collapse. Viewed from this perspective, stimulus is a hack that undoes the irrationality that caused the problem in the first place (and because it’s caused by irrationality they can feel confident it is a problem).
3) This is actually one of my biggest problems with Keynesian theory. If it strikes you as counter-intuitive or silly, I’m not going to dissuade you.
One final point: The reason I replied to your initial comment in the first place, was your suggestion that all economists are obsessed with maximising measured GDP over everything else.
But many economists don’t deal with GDP at all. When I was learning labour market theory we were taught that once people’s wage rate gets high enough, one could expect them to work fewer hours since the demand for leisure time increases with income. There was never a suggestion that this was anything to be concerned about, the goal is utility, not income.
In environmental economics I recall reading a paper by Robert Solow (the seminal figure in the theory of economic growth) arguing that it was important to consider changes in environmental quality along with GDP, to get a better picture of how well off people really are.
I look at what I have been taught in economics, and I simply can’t square it with your view of the profession. Some kinds of economists tend to be obsessed with growth, but they tend to be economists who specialise in economic growth. The rest of us have other pursuits, and other obsessions.
Alright, I’ll let anyone judge for themselves if the canonical Keynesian replies reveal a truly grounded understanding of what counts as “helping the economy”.
Forget Keynesian theory for a minute: I want to know if you have the understanding I expect of whatever theory it is you do endorse. Can you taboo that theory’s terminology and ground it layperson level fundamentals? Can you force me to care about whatever jargon you do in fact use?
Because, at risk of sounding rude, I don’t think you’ve acquired this “Level 2” understanding, and I don’t think you’re atypical among economists in lacking it—from what I’ve read of Mankiw, Sumner, and Krugman, they don’t have it either.
(btw, you call yourself an economist but don’t have a grip on Keynesian theory? Isn’t that pretty much required these days?)
Sure—I only meant that economic policy advocates who are concerned about aggregate economic variables are obsessed with GDP as one of those variables, but that should be assumed from context. Obviously, you’re not going to care about GDP in your capacity as a microeconomist of company behavior.
On macro policy I doubt I have level 2 understanding. I had to take papers in macro at university, and I was able to get reasonable grades on them, but level 0 or 1 understanding is sufficient to do that.
My guess is that if you asked a Keynesian why they care, they would say that boom-bust cycles create uncertainty and fear in people because they don’t know if they’re going to lose their job (and they want their job, or they’d have already quit) and by taming the boom-bust cycle people will have a more certain and therefore more pleasant life).
Equally if you asked a development economist, they would point to the misery in third world countries and for wealthy countries point out that productivity growth means being able to do more with less, and whether you want to have more, or want to do less, that’s a win. Unemployed people are by definition people who want a job but don’t have one, so concern about unemployment is easy to work out.
And as for me, well the reason I care about allocative efficiency is that allocative efficiency is the attempt to match reality to people’s preferences as well as is possible under current constraints. How do we use our resources and knowledge to create the things people want and how do we get them to the people who want them the most?
The market does a pretty good job of this most of the time, but it does fail sometimes. And when it fails there are things government can do to improve matters, but the government can fail too, so you have to balance out the imperfections of the market and the imperfections of government and try to work out which set of imperfections is more problematic. If I succeed, or if people like me succeed then people will have more of what they want, be that flat screen TVs, or cars or clean air or time with their families. Not everything falls within economics’ purview of course, love and truth and beauty are things I can’t help with. But for everything else, my goal is to help the market to match infinite wants with finite resources, and imperfect information.
Perhaps it should have been, but I failed to assume this. And microeconomics is a lot wider than company behaviour, it covers pretty much everything but GDP and unemployment.
That wasn’t the question or contributory thereto, though it shows you can ground one concept.
The question is, whatever model/theory you have of the economy, are its predicates fully grounded in what laypersons care about? You mentioned things people care about, but not how they fit into the model that you advocate.
Allocative efficiency is what I work with. If you asked me why I care about GDP, my response would be, “I don’t, particularly”.
As for my economic model, I can’t give you a full rundown in a comment, but here’s the short version: 1) Level 1 is the fully ideal version, unrealistic, but useful for grounding the whole thing in people’s preferences. It basically rests on the notion that if you make a battery of assumptions voluntary exchange will result in allocative efficiency, if person A values something more than person B then they will trade, either directly or through side trades until person A has it. Yes there are a lot of reasons this doesn’t work in practice, but that’s level 2.
2) Level 2 picks at all those assumptions in level 1. Things like externalities (like pollution) imperfect information, irrational behaviour, imperfect competition, transaction costs and other git in the gears. These things cause violations of the assumptions in 1, and therefore prevent potentially efficiency-enhancing trades from occurring. The academic work at level 2 is focused around identifying these problems and considering possible solutions a government could introduce to correct for them.
3) Level 3 looks at the ability of government to effectively implement the policies identified at level 2. Theories like social choice theory (the ability of voting systems to effectively aggregate votes into social preferences) and public choice theory (how well do governments act as agents of the voting public). The academic work at level 3 is focused around identifying the limitations of real world governments, and identifying the side-effects of badly implemented policies.
Level 1 is all about individual preferences, not attempting to measure them directly because you can’t, but rather in setting up a system so people can sort it out themselves.
As for how GDP factors in, well they it doesn’t directly. Macro and micro aren’t integrated, they haven’t been since Keynes. You learn about them indifferent courses, people tend not to specialise in both, so there’s a gap there. Hence the reason I don’t care about GDP per se.
Now productivity I care about, because higher productivity means more resources for people to trade with and more preferences can be satisfied. I care about unemployment because it implies people are willing to make a trade, but unable to do so due to some bug in the system, either a level 2 problem (market failure), or a level 3 problem (government failure).
James_K:
Aside from the standard arguments about the shortcomings of GDP, my principal objection to the way economists use it is the fact that only the nominal GDP figures are a well-defined variable. To make sensible comparisons between the GDP figures for different times and places, you must convert them to “real” figures using price indexes. These indexes, however, are impossible to define meaningfully. They are produced in practice using complicated, but ultimately arbitrary number games (and often additionally slanted due to political and bureaucratic incentives operating in the institutions whose job is to come up with them).
In fact, when economists talk about “nominal” vs. “real” figures, it’s a travesty of language. The “nominal” figures are the only ones that measure an actual aspect of reality (even if one that’s not particularly interesting per se), while the “real” figures are fictional quantities with only a tenuous connection to reality.
It’s pretty easy to get this sort of view just reading books. In my (limited) experience, there are a fair percentage of divergent types that are not like this—and they tend to be the better economists.
You may like Morgenstern’s book On the Accuracy of Economic Observations. How I rue the day I saw this in a used bookstore in NY and didn’t have the cash to buy it..
EDIT: fixed title name
I’m going through Morgenstern’s book right now, and it’s really good. It’s the first economic text I’ve ever seen that tries to address, in a systematic and no-nonsense way, the crucial question of whether various sorts of numbers routinely used by economists (and especially macroeconomists) make any sense at all. That this book hasn’t become a first-rank classic, and is instead out of print and languishing in near-total obscurity, is an extremely damning fact about the intellectual standards of the economic profession.
I’ve also looked at some other texts by Morgenstern I found online. I knew about his work in game theory, but I had no idea that he was such an insightful contrarian on the issues of economic statistics and aggregates. He even wrote a scathing critique of the concept ot GNP/GDP (a more readable draft is here). Unfortunately, while this article sets forth numerous valid objections to the use of these numbers, it doesn’t discuss the problems with price indexes that I pointed out in this thread.
realitygrill:
Could you please list some examples? Aside from Austrians and a few other fringe contrarians, I almost always see economists talking about the “real” figures derived using various price indexes as if they were physicists talking about some objectively measurable property of the universe that has an existence independent of them and their theories.
Thanks for the pointer! Just a minor correction: apparently, the title of the book is On the Accuracy of Economic Observations. It’s out of print, but a PDF scan is available (warning -- 31MB file) in an online collection hosted by the Stanford University.
I just skimmed a few pages, and the book definitely looks promising. Thanks again for the recommendation!
I meant personally—I did my undergrad in economics. I’m extremely skeptical of macroeconomics and currently throw in with the complex adaptive system dynamicists and the behavioral economists (and Hansonian cynicism; that’s just me). But, to give an example, Krugman has done quite a bit of work in the complexity arena.
Yeah, you’re welcome! The first I heard of that book was someone using the example of calculating in-flows and out-flows of gold. Each country’s estimates differed by orders of magnitude or something like that, and even signs.
There are a number of reasonably priced copies on amazon.
Oh good, they certainly weren’t that reasonable the last I checked.
It’s not so much a matter of being overconfident as it is not listing the disclaimers at every opportunity. The Laspeyres Price Index (the usual type of price index) has well understood limitations (specifically that it overestimates consumer price growth as it doesn’t deal with technological improvement and substitution effects very well), but since we don’t have anything better, we use it anyway.
“Real” is a term of art in economics. It’s used to reflect inflation-adjusted figures because all nominal GDP tells you is how much money is floating around, which isn’t all that useful. real GDP may be less certain, but it’s more useful.
Bear in mind that everything economists use is an estimate of a sort, even nominal GDP. Believe it or not, they don’t actually ask every business in the country how much they produced and / or received in income (which is why the income and expenditure methods of calculating GDP give slightly different numbers although they should give exactly the same result in theory). The reason this may not be readily apparent is that most non-technical audiences start to black out the moment you talk about calculating a price index (hell, it makes me drowsy) and technical audiences already understand the limitations.
James_K:
You’re talking about the “real” figures being “less certain,” as if there were some objective fact of the matter that these numbers are trying to approximate. But in reality, there is no such thing, since there exists no objective property of the real world that would make one way to calculate the necessary price index correct, and others incorrect.
The most you can say is that some price indexes would be clearly absurd (e.g. one based solely on the price of paperclips), while others look fairly reasonable (primarily those based on a large, plausible-looking basket of goods). However, even if we limit ourselves to those that look reasonable, there is still an infinite number of different procedures that can be used to calculate a price index, all of which will yield different results, and there is no objective way whatsoever to determine which one is “more correct” than others. If all the reasonable-looking procedures led to the same results, that would indeed make these results meaningful, but this is not the case in reality.
Or to put it differently, an “objective” price index is a logical impossibility, for at least two reasons. First, there is no objective way to determine the relevant basket of goods, and different choices yield wildly different numbers. Second, the set of goods and services available in different times and places is always different, and perfect equivalents are normally not available, so different baskets must be used. Therefore, comparisons of “real” variables invariably involve arbitrary and unwarranted assumptions about the relative values of different things to different people. Again, of course, different arbitrary choices of methodology yield different numbers here.
(By the way, I find it funny how neoclassical economists, who hold it as a fundamental axiom that value is subjective, unquestioningly use price indexes without stopping to think that the basic assumption behind the very notion of a price index is that value is objective and measurable after all.)
Very true. A good general measure in human economic systems should NOT merely look at the ease of availability of finished paperclips. It should also include, in the “basket”, such things as extrudable metal, equipment for detecting and extracting metal, metallic wire extrusion machines, equipment for maintaining wire extrusion machines, bend radius blocks, and so forth.
Thank you for pointing this out; you are a relatively good human.
That is a very poor inference on their part.
Here’s a crude metric I use for gauging the relative goodness of societies as places to live: Immigration vs. emigration.
It’s obviously fuzzy—you can’t get exact numbers on illegal migration, and the barriers (physical, legal, and cultural) to relocation matter, but have to be estimated. So does the possibility that one country may be better than another, but a third may be enough better than either of them to get the immigrants.
For example, the evidence suggests that the EU and the US are about equally good places to live.
I don’t think that’s a good metric. Societies that aren’t open to mass immigration can have negligible numbers of immigrants regardless of the quality of life their members enjoy. Japan is the prime example.
Moreover, in the very worst places, emigration can be negligible because people can be too poor to pay for the ticket to move anywhere, or prohibited to leave.
But “given perfect knowledge of all market prices and individual preferences at every time and place, as well as unlimited computing power”, you could predict how people would choose if they were not faced with legal and moving-cost barriers—e.g. imagine a philanthropist willing to pay the moving costs. So your objection to this metric seems to be a surmountable one, in principle, assuming perfect knowledge etc. The main remaining barrier to migration may be sentimental attachment—but given perfect knowledge etc. one could predict how the choices would change without that remaining barrier.
Applying this metric to Europa versus Earth, presumably Europans would choose to stay on Europa and humans would choose to stay on Earth even with legal, moving-cost, and sentimental barriers removed, indeed both would pay a great deal to avoid being moved.
In contrast to Europans versus humans, humans-of-one-epoch are not very different from humans-of-another-epoch.
Excellent point—although I would pay a good deal to move to Europa, given a few days worth of air and heat.
A fair point, though I think societies like that are pretty rare. Any other notable examples?
Off the top of my head, I know that Finland had negligible levels of immigration until a few years ago. Several Eastern European post-Communist countries are pretty decent places to live these days (I have in mind primarily the Czech Republic), but still have no mass immigration. As far as I know, the same holds for South Korea.
Regarding emigration, the prime example were the communist countries, which strictly prohibited emigration for the most part (though, rather than looking at the numbers of emigrants, we could look at the efforts and risks many people were ready to undertake to escape, which often included dodging snipers and crawling through minefields).
The basket used is based on a representation of what people are currently consuming. This means we don’t have to second-guess people’s preferences. Unique goods like houses pose a problem, but there’s not really anything we can do about that, so the normal process is to take an average of existing houses.
Which is a well understood problem. Every economist knows this, but what would you have us do? It is necessary to inflation-adjust certain statistics, and if the choice is between doing it badly and not doing it at all, then we’ll do it badly. Just because we don’t preface every sentence with this fact doesn’t mean we’re not aware of it.
Just to avoid confusion among readers, I want to distance myself from part of Vladimir_M’s position. While I agree with many of the points he’s made, I don’t go so far as to say that CPI is a fundamentally flawed concept, and I agree with you that we have to pick some measure and go with it; and that the use of it does not require its caveats to be restated each time.
However, I do think that, for the specific purpose that it is used, it is horribly flawed in noticeable, fixable ways, and that economists don’t make these changes because of lost purpose syndrome—they get so focused on this or that variable that they’re disconnected from the fundamental it’s supposed to represent. They’re doing the economic equivalent of suggesting to generals that their living soldiers be burned to ashes so that the media will stop broadcasting images of dead soldier bodies being brought home.
I wouldn’t be in a good position to determine if it’s lost purpose syndrome since I’m an insider, but I would suggest that path dependence has a lot to do with it.
Price indices are produced by governments, who are notoriously averse to change. And what’s worse the broad methodology is dictated by international standards, so if an economist or some other intelligent person comes up with a better price index they have to convince the body of economists and statisticians that they have a good idea, and then convince the majority of OECD countries (at a minimum) that their method is worth the considerable effort of changing every country’s methodology.
That’s a high hurdle to cross.
On my blog I suggested using insulin prices as a good proxy for inflation. That should be pretty easy for economists to find, even historical data. One economists could find the historical data for one country and use it as a competing measure. No collective action problem to solve there! Just a research paper to present.
(Though I can’t find it on google searches, but economists should be able to get access to the appropriate databases.)
The technology to manufacture insulin has been getting a lot cheaper since the late 1970s when bacteria were first used to synthesize insulin (before that it had to be extracted from animals). That process has become even easier since the process for growing E. coli has become much more efficient.
True, that was just one layman’s brief pondering of an alternate metric, and I hadn’t realized the secular technology trend. I was mainly looking for something that can’t be debased because then people will die, but that is also has minimal volatility in demand, supply, and speculation, and requires numerous inputs so as to smooth out the effect of local shocks.
And perhaps I’m running into a Goodhart trap myself—today, the problem seems to be inflation being hidden via product degradation, but if I pick a metric mainly optimized for that, it will get worse over time. So finding a good or basket that covers all those would require more work—but product debasement is pretty clearly being ignored today.
(Note that precious metals are sold in a way that prevents them from being secretly debased, but also are heavily influenced by global extraction rates, and are heavily speculated on and hoarded.)
Anything that has numerous inputs will likely be something which is complicated to manufacture and therefore will have increasing efficiency as the technology improves. I can’t think of a single good that fits your criteria and hasn’thad substantial technological advancements of how it is made in the last 30 years. This sort of approach might work if one had very steady data for some long historical period with not much technological advancement.
That’s making your inflation rate strongly tied to one particular technology. A breakthrough making insulin synthesis easier, or increased diabetes rates, would affect insulin prices but not the rest of the economy.
Would error bars be a bad thing?
Economists could calculate error bars that would say how closely the calculated aggregate figures approximate their exact values according to definitions. This is normally not done, and as Morgenstern noted in the book discussed elsewhere in the thread, the results would be quite embarrassing, since they’d show that economists regularly talk about changes in the second, third, or even fourth significant digit of numbers whose error bars are well into double-digit percentages.
However, when it comes to the more essential point I’ve been making, error bars wouldn’t make any sense, since the problem is that there is no true value out there in the first place, just different arbitrary conventions that yield different results, neither of which is more “true” than the others.
There’s an old joke: “How can you tell macroeconomists have a sense of humour? They use decimal points.” I’ll admit spurious precision is a problem with a quite a bit of economic reporting. Remember that these statistics are produced by governments, not academics and politicians can have trouble grokking error bars.
Actually, that’s not really the case. There is an ideal, it’s just you can’t do it. If you knew everyone’s preferences and information and endowments of income, you could work out how people’s consumption would change as real incomes and relative prices changed so you could figure out what the right basket of goods is to use for the index at every point in time (the right bundle is whatever bundle consumers would actually pick in a given situation).
But in practice you can’t get the information you’d need to do this, and that information would be constantly changing anyway. In practice what statistical agencies do is develop a basket of goods based on current consumption and review it every decade or so. This means the index overestimates inflation (the estimates I’ve seen put it at about 1 percentage point per year) because when prices rise, people change their consumption patterns and we can’t predict how until it’s already happened.
This is a flawed procedure, but it’s not arbitrary, its an honest effort to approximate the ideal price index as well as we can, given the resources at our disposal.
James_K:
To the best of my understanding, what you write above seems to concede that even under the assumption of omniscience, when we consider different times and/or places, with different prices, incomes, and preferences of individuals—and different sets of goods available on the market, though this can be modeled by assigning infinite prices to unavailable goods—there is, after all, no unique objectively correct way to define equivalent baskets of goods. You could calculate the baskets that would actually be consumed at each time and place, but not the ratio of their true values (whatever that might mean), which would be necessary for their use as the basis for a true and objective price index.
Am I wrong in this conclusion, and if I am, would you be so kind to explain how?
I would be really grateful if you could spell out what exactly you mean by “the ideal price index” when it comes to comparing different times and places, given my above observation. Also, you ignore the question of how exactly baskets are “reviewed,” which is a step that requires an arbitrary choice of the new basket that will be declared as equivalent to the old.
Moreover, different kinds of “honest efforts” apparently produce very different figures. The procedures for calculating official price indexes have been changed several times in recent decades in ways that make the numbers look very different compared to what the older methods would yield. (And curiously, the numbers according to the new procedures somehow always end up looking better.) Would you say, realistically, that this is purely because we’ve been moving closer to the truth thanks to our increasing knowledge and insight?
The concept of “true value” is incoherent, at least in my model of reality. The correct price to attach to a good at any time is its market price at that time. If you had the set of information I listed in my last comment, you’d have the market prices, since they’re implied by the other stuff.
I think we’re using different definitions of arbitrary. To me, arbitrary means that there is no correct answer, and all options are equally valid. I don’t accept that as a legitimate description of the process, there are judgement calls, but ambiguity is inevitable in the social sciences, you either get used to it, or find something else to study. Now if you’re using arbitrary in the way I’m using ambiguous, then I don’t think we disagree, except that I think it’s less problematic than I think you do, since as soon as you start dealing with people things get so complex that ambiguity is inevitable.
Now, here you have a point. The Laspeyres Index is biased up, it may be an honest effort, but not one that’s Bayes correct. But Bayesian rationality has not penetrated through the discipline at this time, and as such a biased estimate is allowed to remain, primarily because there’s no methodologically clean way to remove the bias (you’d need to be able to predict things like quality changes and how people change their spending patterns in response to price changes) and without a background in Bayesian probability theory I think most economists would baulk at adding a fudge factor into the calculation.
It might be valuable to talk about a “true value” of a given good to a given agent. Yes, the correct price to buy or sell a good at is always the market price; but whether I want to sell at that price or buy at that price depends on how much I want the good. If I sell, then the “true value” of the good to me is less than the current market price; and if I buy, then the “true value” of the good to me is greater than the current market price. In general, the “true value” of a given good to a given agent is the price such that, if the market were trading at that price, that agent would be indifferent regarding whether to buy or sell that good.
Yes that is a coherent definition of true value. It’s not a concept that maps well to price indices though.
James_K:
I heartily agree—but what is a price index, other than an attempt at answering the question of what the “true value” of a unit of currency is? What are the fabled “real” values other than attempts at coming up with a coherent concept of “true value”?
Yes, but even given perfect knowledge of all market prices and individual preferences at every time and place, as well as unlimited computing power, I still don’t see how this solves the problem. We can find out the average basket consumed per individual (or household or whatever) and its price at each time and place, but what next? How do we establish the relative values of these baskets, whose composition will be different both quantitatively and qualitatively?
To clarify things further, I’d like to ask you a different question. Suppose the moon Europa is inhabited by intelligent jellyfish-like creatures floating in its inner ocean. The Europan economy is complex, technologically advanced, and money-based, but it doesn’t have any goods or services in common with humans, except for a few inevitable ones like e.g. some basic chemical substances, and there is no trade whatsoever between Earth and Europa due to insurmountable distances. Would it make sense to define a price index that would allow us to compare the “real” values of various aggregate variables in the U.S. and on Europa?
If not, what makes the U.S./Europa situation essentially different from comparing different places and epochs on Earth? Or does the meaningfulness of price indexes somehow gradually fall as differences accumulate? But then how exactly do we establish the threshold, and make sure that the differences across decades and continents here on Earth don’t exceed it?
Well, if macroeconomists and other social scientists were just harmless and benign philosophers, I’d be happy to leave them to ponder their ambiguities in peace!
Trouble is, to paraphrase Trotsky’s famous apocryphal quote, you may not be interested in social science, but social science is interested in you. In the present Western political system, whatever passes for reputable high-profile social science will be used as basis for policies of government and various powerful entities on its periphery, which can have catastrophic consequences for all of us if these ideas are too distant from reality. (And arguably already has.) Macroeconomics is especially critical in this regard.
No, no. A price index is an attempt to work out how much things cost relative to what they used to cost. Real GDP is an attempt to measure how much stuff is being produced relative to how much stuff was being produced. GDP is not an attempt to determine what that stuff is worth in a metaphysical or personal sense, the production is merely valued at its market price (adjusted for inflation, in the case of real GDP). To a pacifist, the portion of GDP spent on the military is worth less than nothing, but it’s still part of GDP because it was stuff that was produced.
Yes, the closer the consumption patters of the two economies being compared, the more useful the comparison is. If there were no common goods between two economies it would be impossible to compare them meaningfully. As to where to draw the line, well I wish I had a good answer for you, but I don’t. All I can say is that the value of the comparison decays over “distance” (meaning differences in consumption patterns).
Some economists have created more specialised indices for long-run comparisons; William Nordhaus created a price index for light (based on hours of work per candela-hour) from the stone age to modern times. This is a little unusual at the moment since macroeconomists don’t usually do comparisons over long time periods (it’s fiendishly hard to get data going back before the 20th Century on most indicators), but it shows you that we are aware of the limitations of our tools, including price indices.
I agree wholeheartedly, good quality policy advice is something I take very seriously. The social science we have has significant limitations, but right now, we don’t have anything better. I very much doubt the quality of our policy would improve if politicians paid less attention to their advisers than they do at the moment. So we do what we can, help thing along as much as our knowledge and the institutional frameworks decisions are made will permit. What else can you do?
James_K:
That’s a very interesting paper (available here), thanks for the pointer!
As with nearly all papers addressing such topics, parts of it look as if they were purposefully written to invite ridicule, as when he presents estimates of 19th century prices calculated to six significant digits. (Sorry for being snide, but what was that about spurious precision in economics being the fault of politicians?) However, the rest of it presents some very interesting ideas. Here are a few interesting bits I got from skimming it:
The mathematical discussion in Section 1.3.2. seems to imply (or rather assume) that even assuming omniscience, a “true price index” (Nordhaus’s term) can be defined only for a population of identical individuals with unchanging utility functions. This seems to support my criticisms, especially considering that the very notion of a human utility function is a giant spherical cow.
The discussion in the introduction basically says that the way price indexes are done in practice makes them meaningless over periods of significant technological change. But why do we then get all this supposedly scientific research that uses them nonchalantly, not to mention government policy based on them? Nordhaus is, unsurprisingly, reluctant to draw some obvious implications here.
Nordhaus considers only the fact that price indexes fail to account for the benefits of technological development, so he keeps insisting that the situation is more optimistic than what they say. But he fails to notice that the past was not necessarily worse in every respect. In many places, for example, it is much less affordable than a few decades ago to live in a conveniently located low-crime neighborhood, and this goal will suck up a very significant percentage of income of all but the wealthiest folks. Moreover, as people’s preferences change with time, many things that today’s folks value positively would have been valued negatively by previous generations. How to account for that?
More to the same point, unless I missed the part where he discusses it, Nordhaus seems oblivious to the fact that much consumption is due to signaling and status competition, not utility derived from inherent qualities of goods. I’m hardly an anti-capitalist leftie, but any realistic picture of human behavior must admit that much of the benefit from economic and technological development ultimately gets sucked up by zero-sum status games. Capturing that vitally important information in a price index is a task that it would be insulting to Don Quixote to call quixotic.
Finally, I can’t help but notice that in the quest for an objective measure of the price of light, Nordhaus seems to have reinvented the labor theory of value! Talk about things coming back full circle.
Overall, I would ask: can you imagine a paper like this being published in physics or some other natural science, which would convincingly argue that widely used methodologies on which major parts of the existing body of research rest in fact produce spurious numbers—with the result that everyone acknowledges that the author has a point, and keeps on doing things the same as before?
[facepalm] OK, I’m not making any excuse for that. Given the magnitude of his findings he doesn’t even need them to make his point.
Yes, you can’t produce a true price index. But less-than-true price indices can still be useful.
But houses keep getting bigger and you have to account for that too. Besides which, housing is no more than a third of most people’s income, at least it is in my country. That is a significant percentage, but it’s still less than half. And things keep getting better (or no worse) in the remaining two thirds.
Assuming it’s even possible to adjust for that, I’d really want to apply the adjustment to GDP, not prices. Signalling isn’t a matter of cost but rather value.
No, you’re confusing cost and value. The labour theory of value is the theory that the value of a good derives from the labour taken to produce it. If Nordhaus were using this theory he’d be arguing that the value of light keeps falling. Measuring cost with labour is another thing entirely.
No. I recognise this is a problem. I can only imagine they thing it’s too had to correct for technological change robustly, but that’s not really an excuse. If you can’t do it well, it’s generally still better to do it badly than not at all. And I didn’t realise the research was that old (I’ve actually never read the paper, I read a summary in a much more recent book). Apparently macroeconomists have more catch-up to do than I thought.
This sentence of yours probably captures the heart of our disagreement:
We don’t seem to disagree that much about the limitations of knowledge in this whole area, epistemologically speaking. Where we really part ways is that I believe that historically, the whole edifice of spurious expertise produced by macroeconomists and perpetuated by gargantuan bureaucracies has been an active force giving impetus for bad (and sometimes disastrous) policies, and that it’s overall been a step away from reality compared to the earlier much simpler, but ultimately more realistic conventional wisdom. Whereas you don’t accept this judgment.
Given what’s already been said, I think this would be a good time to conclude our discussion. Thanks for your input; your comments have, at the very least, made me learn some interesting facts and rethink my opinions on the subject, even if I didn’t change them substantially at the end.
(Oh, and you’re right that I confused cost and value in that point from my above comment. I was indeed trying to be a bit too much of a smartass there.)
Yes, I think so. It’s not that I think that macroecoonmics has covered its self in glory, it hasn’t. But this really is literally the only way to learn for those guys. And I believe it’s worth it in the short run, though I’m less sure of that, than I was before we started this. Maybe those macro guys should go try micro or something.
Same here, it’s been fun.
How much did it cost a cave man to walk outside? Or are we including the time he spent digging renovations to put the sky-light in his roof?
Heh. Yeah, I’m going to go out on a limb and guess that Nordhaus didn’t subtract off the previously-free sunlight lost to global dimming and the attenuation of natural sources of nightlight due to interference from artificial light.
This is NOT to say I’m endorsing some kind of greenie move toward a pre-industrial time just so we can see the undimmed sky or have less “light pollution”. I’m just saying that ignoring natural and informal sources of wealth is a bad habit to get into.
Reading paper to see if I can guess them right...
ETA: Ohhhhhh! Can I call ’em or what?
James_K:
But now we’re back to square one. Since different things are produced in different times and places, to produce these “real” figures for comparison, we need to come up with a way to compare apples and oranges (sometimes literally!). Now, if economists just said that they would consider an apple equivalent to an orange for some simple Fermi problem calculation, I’d have no problem with that.
However, what economists use in practice are profoundly complicated methodologies that will tell us that an orange is presently equivalent to 1.138 of an apple, and then we get subtle arguments and policy prescriptions based on the finding that this means an increase in the orange-apple index of 2.31% relative to last year. Here we enter the realm of pure nebulosity, where the indexes and “real” figures stop being vague heuristics where even the order of magnitude is just barely meaningful, and acquire a metaphysical existence of their own, as “real” variables to be calculated to multiple digits of precision, fed into complex mathematical models and policy guidelines, and used to measure reified true, objective value.
So, here is a straightforward question then: how do we know that it is meaningful to do comparison across, say, between the U.S. in 2010 and the U.S. in 1960 or 1910? What argument supports the assumption that the differences between them are small enough?
Sometimes it’s safer to just leave things alone if you don’t know what you’re doing. Presenting dubious conclusions and questionable expertise as scientific insight leads to the equivalent of dilettante surgery being performed on entire countries by their governments, sometimes with awful consequences, and with even worse ones threatening in the future. (Prominent macroeconomists will in fact agree with me, it’s just that they’ll claim that their professional rivals are the dilettantes, and only they are true experts who should be listened to.)
I happen to agree that macroeconomists are overdoing it on the level of precision they can provide. Arnold Kilng (himself a macroeconomist) made this same point in a blog post last year: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/03/paragraphs_to_p.html
I would be careful about using a price index over that kind of time frame, I don’t actually know how macroeconomists treat it, but I have read books that point out the inherent difficulty of making comparisons over long time periods (where long means more than about 20 years), and that if you’re trying to capture differences in standard of living over a long period one should try to account for differences in product quality and product mix over time. Of course that’s incredibly hard to do, and I don’t know how seriously this issue is treated in macroeconomics, but it should be taken seriously.
I strongly agree. However, there are two limiting factors when applying to this logic to policy advice: 1) If you don’t give a politician any advice, their reaction won’t be to do nothing, it will be to do whatever they think is a good idea. The average macroeconomist may not know a lot, but they know enough that their advice will probably help a little. I do think that macroeconomists should be less willing to offer active advice, as opposed to “we don’t understand this problem, the best thing to do here is nothing”, but politicians have a strong aversion to doing nothing in the face of a crisis, and if their advisers keep telling them to do politically unpalatable things, they’ll find advisers that will tell them what to hear.
2) You can’t run experiments in macroeconomics, the only way to acquire data on how well an intervention works is to try it (multiple times in multiple countries) and find out how it goes, and even then you end up arguing what would have happened if you did nothing. That means that if you don’t try to fix and/or prevent macroeconomic problems you don’t get any better information on how to fix future ones. Maybe that’s an acceptable trade off, but I’m sure you can see why macroeconomists don’t think so. Also bear in mind that what brought macro into its own as a discipline was the Great Depression. Maybe it’s worth risking some bumps in the road to try to work out how to stop something like that happening again.
Yes, it’s depressing how much a macroeconomists’ opinion on what caused the recent troubles matches up with their political ideology. But it’s a function of the low quality of evidence available, in Bayesian terms when you only have access to weak evidence, your prior matters more than when the evidence is strong. The inevitable influence politics has on the discipline doesn’t help either. Politicians are all too keen to build up economists who are telling them to do things they want to do anyway.
If some price indexes are “clearly absurd”, then they apparently have some value to us—for if they were valueless, then why call any particular one “absurd”? If they yield different results, then so be it—let us simply be open about how the different indexes are defined and what result they yield. The absence of a canonical standard will of course not be useful to people primarily interested in such things as pissing contests between nations, but the results should be useful nonetheless.
We commonly talk about tradeoffs, e.g., “if I do this then I will benefit in one way but lose in another”. We can do the same thing with price indexes. “In this respect things have improved but in this other respect things have gotten worse.”
Constant:
Sure, but such an approach would deny the validity of all these “real” economic variables that are based on a scalar price index. In particular, it would definitely mean discarding the entire concept of “real GDP” as incoherent. This would mean conceding the criticisms I’ve been expounding in this thread, and admitting the fundamental unsoundness of much of what passes for science in the field of macroeconomics.
Moreover, disentangling the complete truth about what various price indexes reveal and what they hide is an enormously complex topic that requires lengthy, controversial, and subjective judgments. This is inevitable because, after all, value is subjective.
Take for example two identically built houses located in two places that greatly differ in various aspects of the natural environment, society, culture, technological development, economic infrastructure, and political system. (It can also be the same place in two different time periods.) It makes no sense to treat them as equivalent objects of identical value; you’d have a hard time finding even a single individual who would be indifferent between the two. Now, if you want to discuss what exactly has been neglected by treating them as identical (or reducing their differences to a single universally applicable scalar factor) for the purposes of constructing a price index, you can easily end up writing an enormous treatise that touches on every aspect in which these places differ.
I’ve heard that the trick works less well each time it’s used (perhaps within a limited time period). Is this plausible?