Using my recent attempt at (partially) tabooing “exists” to translate:
Nominalism: We can’t rationally care about abstract objects.
Platonism: We can rationally care about abstract objects.
So far Platonism appears to be “winning” according to this definition since UDT is Platonist in this sense, and there isn’t really a “nominalist decision theory” that’s equivalent or seems as promising.
But what about possibilist versions of Platonism as in “Abstract objects are ones which possibly exist”?
It seems quite rational to care about things which might happen, or which might exist without conceding that they actually will happen or actually do exist.
I voted other because of my confusion on this point. I think we need to taboo “exists”.
Using my recent attempt at (partially) tabooing “exists” to translate:
Nominalism: We can’t rationally care about abstract objects.
Platonism: We can rationally care about abstract objects.
So far Platonism appears to be “winning” according to this definition since UDT is Platonist in this sense, and there isn’t really a “nominalist decision theory” that’s equivalent or seems as promising.
That just shifts the ground to disagreeing about what is “rational” when arguing about different epistemologies.
Shifting the ground to an easier, more tractable problem? Awesome.
That seems a rather new argument for Platonism.
But what about possibilist versions of Platonism as in “Abstract objects are ones which possibly exist”? It seems quite rational to care about things which might happen, or which might exist without conceding that they actually will happen or actually do exist.
I voted ‘other’ to the original question. I would vote ‘accept platonism’ to this question.