Why is the time-copy even a copy though? If we call some A a copy of some original B, then we have to have reason to associate A with B (if A and B are paintings, the one is a copy of the other if it closely resembles it, say). What association does EpiphanyA at t0 have with EpiphanyB at t1?
Well, I think I persist through time. But you’re saying that time makes copies of me, and I’m curious to know why you think those things are copies and not just new (very short lived) people.
Wait, wait, wait. I’m still confused as to why you think that time is copying me. By what mechanism does time create new instances of me and destroy the old ones? At what interval does this happen? Has anyone actually observed this phenomenon or is it just a theory?
I could reverse the question. Why do you think you’re the same person at different times, as opposed to being a copy? By what mechanism is a single person carried forward through time? Has anyone actually observed this phenomenon, or is it just a theory?
It’s not clear to me that those are fair questions, but then it’s not clear to me that their reversals are fair, either.
Occam’s razor. The theory that I’m being copied and destroyed over and over again doesn’t explain anything additional that I can think of, so it’s more likely the simpler idea (that I am not being copied and destroyed over and over) is true.
Also, not believing that I am being copied does not qualify as a belief. That’s just lack of belief in a theory.
If you guys believe I’m being copied over and over again, that IS a belief though, and if you want me to agree with it, the burden of proof lies on you.
The theory that I’m being copied and destroyed over and over again doesn’t explain anything additional that I can think of,
I think both of you are sorta failing to address (or not addressing clearly enough) the point that objects being “copied” “destroyed” or “persisted” is not really meaningful at the level of physics at all—like envisioning electrons as billiard balls, it’s mapping a concept that’s intuitive in one’s mind onto the physical world where it does not apply.
At the bottommost level of quantum physics that we know of, electrons have no identity. From what I gather to “destroy” an electron from here and “copy” it there is indistinguishable physically (even in principle) from “moving” it from here to there. Those are concepts which are differentiatable in our adapted-via-evolution minds, not in reality.
That having been said I don’t dismiss your concerns about uploading altogether because we still aren’t unconfused enough about consciousness to be able to clarify to ourselves what the fuck it’s supposed to do… I would really like to be unconfused about qualia and the nature of existence before I do any uploading of myself.
Yup. Which is why I say it’s not clear to me those are fair questions.
That said… if in the future two entities exist that are physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from one another, and one of them is me, it follows that either both of them are me, or one and only one of them is me. In the latter case, it seems “me-ness” depends some physically and behaviorally undetectable attribute which only one of them has.
Occam’s razor also seems to suggest that both of them are me, since the alternative posits an additional unnecessary entity in the system.
Yup. Which is why I say it’s not clear to me those are fair questions.
I’m interpreting this as difficulty figuring out who the burden of proof belongs to. I think it helps to realize that with each theory there are at least three options:
Believe it’s true.
Believe it’s false.
Not believe anything.
If you say “There’s a dragon in my garage.” and I say “I don’t believe this.” I am not saying “I believe there is no dragon in your garage.” I’m saying “I don’t have a belief about this.”
Now, I could go in there and inspect everything and conclude that there’s no dragon, at which point I’d have a belief that there isn’t a dragon. But why should I do this? You might claim next that there’s a God in your garage. Then I’d have to go to all sorts of work trying to prove there is no God in your garage. Then you could claim that there’s a pink elephant, and on and on.
This is why, if you want people to believe something the burden of proof lies on you—you can’t just turn it around and say “Well prove that it’s NOT this way!”—if that were the rule, people would troll the crap out of us with dragons and Gods and pink elephants and such.
Does that give you any clarity in whose burden it is to offer evidence regarding time copying people?
Occam’s razor also seems to suggest that both of them are me, since the alternative posits an additional unnecessary entity in the system.
No. The additional entity is not unnecessary. The second instance is absolutely required to explain the way you reacted to my teleporter with technical failure argument.
I am surprised you didn’t update after that by recognizing that there were two separate instances, and I don’t know what to do about it. I’m stumped as to why you aren’t seeing it this way.
If you say “There’s a dragon in my garage.” and I say “I don’t believe this.” I am not saying “I believe there is no dragon in your garage.” I’m saying “I don’t have a belief about this.”
Perhaps you are. That’s certainly not what I would be saying if someone said that to me and I gave that reply.
This is why, if you want people to believe something the burden of proof lies on you—you can’t just turn it around and say “Well prove that it’s NOT this way!”
Proof in the sense you are discussing here is mostly useful when trying to win debates. I have no particular desire for you to believe anything in particular.
The second instance is absolutely required to explain the way you reacted to my teleporter with technical failure argument.
The unnecessary entity in the second case is the physically and behaviorally undetectable attribute which only the “real me” has. I don’t see any need for it, and I have no idea why you think it’s necessary to explain any part of my reaction to any of your hypotheticals.
Well, it doesn’t even perfectly preserve the original, so I fail to see what else it could be but a copy.
You might argue that for some reason the time-derived copy is more important than an artificial copy, of course, but why?
Why is the time-copy even a copy though? If we call some A a copy of some original B, then we have to have reason to associate A with B (if A and B are paintings, the one is a copy of the other if it closely resembles it, say). What association does EpiphanyA at t0 have with EpiphanyB at t1?
You… don’t see a reason to associate future-you with present-you?
Well, I think I persist through time. But you’re saying that time makes copies of me, and I’m curious to know why you think those things are copies and not just new (very short lived) people.
I don’t think the distinction is meaningful. Possibly we just mean different things by the word “copy”?
I think I should, at this point, just ask for some elaboration on the theory.
Wait, wait, wait. I’m still confused as to why you think that time is copying me. By what mechanism does time create new instances of me and destroy the old ones? At what interval does this happen? Has anyone actually observed this phenomenon or is it just a theory?
I could reverse the question. Why do you think you’re the same person at different times, as opposed to being a copy? By what mechanism is a single person carried forward through time? Has anyone actually observed this phenomenon, or is it just a theory?
It’s not clear to me that those are fair questions, but then it’s not clear to me that their reversals are fair, either.
Occam’s razor. The theory that I’m being copied and destroyed over and over again doesn’t explain anything additional that I can think of, so it’s more likely the simpler idea (that I am not being copied and destroyed over and over) is true.
Also, not believing that I am being copied does not qualify as a belief. That’s just lack of belief in a theory.
If you guys believe I’m being copied over and over again, that IS a belief though, and if you want me to agree with it, the burden of proof lies on you.
I think both of you are sorta failing to address (or not addressing clearly enough) the point that objects being “copied” “destroyed” or “persisted” is not really meaningful at the level of physics at all—like envisioning electrons as billiard balls, it’s mapping a concept that’s intuitive in one’s mind onto the physical world where it does not apply.
At the bottommost level of quantum physics that we know of, electrons have no identity. From what I gather to “destroy” an electron from here and “copy” it there is indistinguishable physically (even in principle) from “moving” it from here to there. Those are concepts which are differentiatable in our adapted-via-evolution minds, not in reality.
That having been said I don’t dismiss your concerns about uploading altogether because we still aren’t unconfused enough about consciousness to be able to clarify to ourselves what the fuck it’s supposed to do… I would really like to be unconfused about qualia and the nature of existence before I do any uploading of myself.
Yup. Which is why I say it’s not clear to me those are fair questions.
That said… if in the future two entities exist that are physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from one another, and one of them is me, it follows that either both of them are me, or one and only one of them is me. In the latter case, it seems “me-ness” depends some physically and behaviorally undetectable attribute which only one of them has.
Occam’s razor also seems to suggest that both of them are me, since the alternative posits an additional unnecessary entity in the system.
I’m interpreting this as difficulty figuring out who the burden of proof belongs to. I think it helps to realize that with each theory there are at least three options:
Believe it’s true. Believe it’s false. Not believe anything.
If you say “There’s a dragon in my garage.” and I say “I don’t believe this.” I am not saying “I believe there is no dragon in your garage.” I’m saying “I don’t have a belief about this.”
Now, I could go in there and inspect everything and conclude that there’s no dragon, at which point I’d have a belief that there isn’t a dragon. But why should I do this? You might claim next that there’s a God in your garage. Then I’d have to go to all sorts of work trying to prove there is no God in your garage. Then you could claim that there’s a pink elephant, and on and on.
This is why, if you want people to believe something the burden of proof lies on you—you can’t just turn it around and say “Well prove that it’s NOT this way!”—if that were the rule, people would troll the crap out of us with dragons and Gods and pink elephants and such.
Does that give you any clarity in whose burden it is to offer evidence regarding time copying people?
No. The additional entity is not unnecessary. The second instance is absolutely required to explain the way you reacted to my teleporter with technical failure argument.
I am surprised you didn’t update after that by recognizing that there were two separate instances, and I don’t know what to do about it. I’m stumped as to why you aren’t seeing it this way.
Perhaps you are. That’s certainly not what I would be saying if someone said that to me and I gave that reply.
Proof in the sense you are discussing here is mostly useful when trying to win debates. I have no particular desire for you to believe anything in particular.
The unnecessary entity in the second case is the physically and behaviorally undetectable attribute which only the “real me” has. I don’t see any need for it, and I have no idea why you think it’s necessary to explain any part of my reaction to any of your hypotheticals.