To apply it to a more manageable example, my beliefs about psychological sex differences in humans have changed considerably over both long and short timescales, to the point where I actively anticipate having different beliefs about them in the near future. In spite of this, I have no way of knowing which of those beliefs I’m going to demote or reject in future, because if I had such information it would be factored into the beliefs themselves.
Beliefs about facts that were extensively studied probably won’t change, unless I expect new observations to be made that resolve some significant uncertainty. For example, special relativity and population of USA in 2007 will stay about the same, while my belief about USD:EUR ratio in 2011 will change in 2011, updating with actual observations. I don’t see any problem with being able to distinguish such cases, it always comes down to whether I expect new observations/inferences to be made.
Your second paragraph still sounds to me as if you continue to make the mistake I pointed out. You can’t know how your beliefs will change (become stronger or become weaker), but you can know that certain beliefs will probably change (in one of these directions). So, you can’t know which belief you’ll accept in the future, but you can know that the level of certainty in a given belief will probably shift.
Well, how would you answer the question?
To apply it to a more manageable example, my beliefs about psychological sex differences in humans have changed considerably over both long and short timescales, to the point where I actively anticipate having different beliefs about them in the near future. In spite of this, I have no way of knowing which of those beliefs I’m going to demote or reject in future, because if I had such information it would be factored into the beliefs themselves.
Beliefs about facts that were extensively studied probably won’t change, unless I expect new observations to be made that resolve some significant uncertainty. For example, special relativity and population of USA in 2007 will stay about the same, while my belief about USD:EUR ratio in 2011 will change in 2011, updating with actual observations. I don’t see any problem with being able to distinguish such cases, it always comes down to whether I expect new observations/inferences to be made.
Your second paragraph still sounds to me as if you continue to make the mistake I pointed out. You can’t know how your beliefs will change (become stronger or become weaker), but you can know that certain beliefs will probably change (in one of these directions). So, you can’t know which belief you’ll accept in the future, but you can know that the level of certainty in a given belief will probably shift.
I don’t think I’m making a mistake. I think we’re agreeing.
I don’t have an understanding of that, but don’t think it’s worth pursuing further.