From a western perspective, supporting Ukraine means further empowering our globe-spanning military-industrial complex, and the political and espionage interests behind it, to engage in unknown further mischief, in pursuit of unknown further agendas. The USA has given more than $10 billion to Ukraine already this year, and has been a factor in Ukrainian politics for decades. So I support a ceasefire and I oppose sponsorship of insurgency in Russia. But my opinions don’t count.
the future, if the West wins, is uncertain in many ways;
war is bad;
and disagree connotationally:
The future of Ukraine, if Russia wins, although much more certain, is definitely not good. I would expect lower quality of life for Ukrainians (compared to the situation before the war, not literally to the moment when bombs are falling on their houses, of course), both from the economical (of a median person) and human rights perspectives.
This war started in 2014 and escalated in spring 2022. What was your opinion on the war back then? The specific thing about autumn 2022 is that the Russian forces are now losing the occupied territory of Ukraine relatively quickly. Also, Russia losing this war might prevent future attempts at conquests. In a parallel reality where Russia gains the territory of Ukraine without much resistance, I would expect taking Belarus next (without much resistance) and within five years yet another attack.
I would expect taking Belarus next (without much resistance)
Isn’t there a good chance for that no matter how the conflict in Ukraine goes? Given that Belarus already has a dictator, would much change through that?
I assume that Lukashenka is probably happier being a sovereign dictator than mere governor. His generals and other people in positions of power probably also prefer being near the top of the food chain rather than being integrated into Russian structures and becoming underlings of someone in Moscow. Their bargaining position, however weak it might be now, would probably get worse. Therefore, I would expect Lukashenka to drag his feet, even if Putin insists.
...why wouldn’t Belarus already be a part of Russia? I doubt that Putin would say no.
EDIT:
Conditional on “Lukashenka wants Belarus to merge with Russia”, my best guess is that his army opposes it (for selfish reasons) and Lukashenka cannot ignore the wishes of his own army.
A decisively defeated Russia will have fewer resources with which to coerce him. And if he’s smart and keeps his powder dry like he has, he will have more resources with which to resist.
And if he gets overthrown in a color revolution, the Belarussians have not yet gotten so much blood on their hands as to preclude support from the West.
In 2014, the rise of the Islamic State was the main thing on my mind. But even then, I saw the fighting in Ukraine as Russia vs America, and both events, along with the rise of Xi and Modi, as part of a tremendous shift from “unipolar” to “multipolar” geopolitics. The Trump presidency, in a sense, completed the revolution, bringing ideological change to America itself—but then Covid scrambled things enough, that there was a liberal restoration under Biden. Still, things are not as they were—Biden is now fighting a three-front struggle, against Putin, Xi, and Trump; and the progressive wing of his own party also has a greatly reduced appetite for global intervention. Whatever its outcome, the war in Ukraine already looks like a struggle between two poles of a multipolar world, rather than a global alliance against a rogue state.
I am not denying the Russian or European influences. My point is that the west is not some neutral third party that only got involved in 2022. Ukraine was already a factor in American politics, so much so that it provided the rationale for the first impeachment of Donald Trump.
So I support a ceasefire and I oppose sponsorship of insurgency in Russia. But my opinions don’t count.
You opinions count, though most of us disagree with you. Thus, the replies.
Let’s suppose that supporting Ukraine does further empower ‘our globe-spanning military-industrial complex’. But failing to support Ukraine empower the rival globe-spanning military-industrial complex that in addition to Russia includes Iran, Syria, and China.
A ceasefire that results in Russia keeping more Ukrainian land than it started will empower this rival military-industrial complex and set the precedent for rewarding aggression while weakening Ukraine militarily and strategically. Even letting Russia keep Don-Bas and Crimea will leave Ukraine vulnerable to future invasions.
So, which globe-spanning military-industrial complex do you oppose more?
It’s absurd to equate the shaky and informal coalition of Russia, China, Iran, and Syria with the 750+ extraterritorial bases, worldwide naval dominance, and global surveillance network of the US Military.
True. But looking at the expected value of the two, it seems that USA hegemony is less harmful for my values. And it’s also a simple matter of not paying Danegeld, as that tends to not end well.
Currently the west is on top. And will probably stay there. But that’s in part because of these kind of reactions and opportunities to put down the other side. Iran has been under sanctions for ages—whether they’re effective is debatable, but they certainly don’t help. China is now getting kneecapped via the new chip embargoes. Russia had the second largest army so the war in Ukraine is a perfect opportunity to inflict as much damage as possible, virtually for free.
Living in Poland, a lot is said about how bad the Nazis were. A lot is done to remember. But everyone knows the Russians were worse. Currently it turns out that apart from nukes, the Russians aren’t that scary anymore. If they can be neutralized at the cost of drawing out the war in Ukraine for a bit longer, I reckon it’s worth it, cynical as that may sound. Most Ukrainians also think so.
In general, if I have to choose between the NSA snooping in all my data and people getting disappeared, then I’d choose the west. At least I can publicly gripe about how bad they are and even publish methods of circumventing them without worrying about getting arrested (with the obvious caveats). Yes, they play around with starting conflicts, and don’t have a good track record of tidying up after themselves. But they’re also the only thing stopping Russia, China, Iran and Syria from doing the same.
I’m not equating the West and Anti-West in terms of power. I agree that the Anti-West is much weaker. That doesn’t mean it’s incapable of becoming a threat in the future.
One may live under a variety of political orders. Life becomes difficult when you’re caught between two systems fighting each other. As an Australian, I had no problems with the rise of China, until the Trump presidency forced Australia to choose between its economic provider and its security provider.
Actually, while he was campaigning, Trump had an advisor, Carter Page, who proposed an entente between China, Russia, and America. But Page was purged along with all the Russophiles, and Trump wanted his trade war with China, and now under Biden, the idea that all nations should be liberal democracies has been restored to the list of reasons why east and west are at odds. And maybe the odds were always against a LaRouche-style peaceful coexistence of such different powers.
The way I see it, America has had supreme power in the world twice, and has a chance at a third time. First was in 1945, when only the USA has the bomb, and everywhere else was in ruins. Then came 1991, when American information society was suddenly the only serious political and economic model remaining. The third chance is due to artificial intelligence, although perhaps it’s more accurate to say that, whatever posthuman order characterizes the era of AI, it’s most likely to first take shape on the territory of America.
So personal preferences aside, there is a sense in which I judge the meta-alliance of “NATO+Quad” as more likely to win than “SCO+Iran”. But winning only because of AI, and only in the sense that it gets to be ground zero of the AI-driven transformation of the world. If it weren’t for AI, I would not expect America to ever be on top again.
A lot of the involvement of the US and EU in Ukraine politics is getting them to build anti-corruption structures into their system. That’s probably welcome by the Ukrainian population as getting parliamentarians to do anti-corruption initiatives that the population wants is generally hard.
If you think that US involvement is net negative, do you have examples of that?
If you are speaking about the US being a factor in Ukrainian politics for decades then a lot of what the US did is not about war.
The EU and the US aren’t just pushing Ukraine to war. They want to do institution building that reduces corruption and that lets Ukraine respect the minority rights of Russian speakers.
If the US or EU had veto power over Ukraine laws, the decommunization laws that made it a criminal offense to insult Ukrainians who mass murdered Jews, Poles, and Communists during WW2 wouldn’t have happened in 2015. The Russian talk about denazification seems like a straight answer to the decommunization project that decided to glorify people who extreminated Jews, Poles, and Communists.
Tens of thousands are dead, and millions have fled their homes. The country may have lost all of its eastern provinces. That’s a heavy price to pay for whatever new political and psychological atmosphere was attained.
If Ukraine would have done what the West wanted they would have abided by the Minsk agreements. The far right in Ukraine and its militia (who did have a habit of attacking political gatherings) didn’t like the Minsk agreements and as a result, Ukraine didn’t abide by the agreements which is a key reason why the invasion in 2022 happened.
Maybe, if the West would have put more pressure on Ukraine to follow the West’s demands at protecting minority rights, the 2022 invasion could have been averted.
From a western perspective, supporting Ukraine means further empowering our globe-spanning military-industrial complex, and the political and espionage interests behind it, to engage in unknown further mischief, in pursuit of unknown further agendas. The USA has given more than $10 billion to Ukraine already this year, and has been a factor in Ukrainian politics for decades. So I support a ceasefire and I oppose sponsorship of insurgency in Russia. But my opinions don’t count.
I agree technically:
the future, if the West wins, is uncertain in many ways;
war is bad;
and disagree connotationally:
The future of Ukraine, if Russia wins, although much more certain, is definitely not good. I would expect lower quality of life for Ukrainians (compared to the situation before the war, not literally to the moment when bombs are falling on their houses, of course), both from the economical (of a median person) and human rights perspectives.
This war started in 2014 and escalated in spring 2022. What was your opinion on the war back then? The specific thing about autumn 2022 is that the Russian forces are now losing the occupied territory of Ukraine relatively quickly. Also, Russia losing this war might prevent future attempts at conquests. In a parallel reality where Russia gains the territory of Ukraine without much resistance, I would expect taking Belarus next (without much resistance) and within five years yet another attack.
Isn’t there a good chance for that no matter how the conflict in Ukraine goes? Given that Belarus already has a dictator, would much change through that?
I assume that Lukashenka is probably happier being a sovereign dictator than mere governor. His generals and other people in positions of power probably also prefer being near the top of the food chain rather than being integrated into Russian structures and becoming underlings of someone in Moscow. Their bargaining position, however weak it might be now, would probably get worse. Therefore, I would expect Lukashenka to drag his feet, even if Putin insists.
I heard that Lukashenka lobbied for a merger of Russia and Belarus because he liked his chances of eventually becoming leader of the combined entity.
Yes, but that was decades ago, when Yeltsin was president! The ‘union state’ has been moribund since the early aughts.
😲
But then...
...why wouldn’t Belarus already be a part of Russia? I doubt that Putin would say no.
EDIT:
Conditional on “Lukashenka wants Belarus to merge with Russia”, my best guess is that his army opposes it (for selfish reasons) and Lukashenka cannot ignore the wishes of his own army.
OK, well, here is where I got the information in my previous comment—somewhere in the first 47 minutes of this.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sFmugMGl4Uo
Yes, it’s bad for Lukashenka but that’s not something that matters to us.
Do you think that Lukashenka has more resources to resist if Russia has no territory in Ukraine?
A decisively defeated Russia will have fewer resources with which to coerce him. And if he’s smart and keeps his powder dry like he has, he will have more resources with which to resist.
And if he gets overthrown in a color revolution, the Belarussians have not yet gotten so much blood on their hands as to preclude support from the West.
In 2014, the rise of the Islamic State was the main thing on my mind. But even then, I saw the fighting in Ukraine as Russia vs America, and both events, along with the rise of Xi and Modi, as part of a tremendous shift from “unipolar” to “multipolar” geopolitics. The Trump presidency, in a sense, completed the revolution, bringing ideological change to America itself—but then Covid scrambled things enough, that there was a liberal restoration under Biden. Still, things are not as they were—Biden is now fighting a three-front struggle, against Putin, Xi, and Trump; and the progressive wing of his own party also has a greatly reduced appetite for global intervention. Whatever its outcome, the war in Ukraine already looks like a struggle between two poles of a multipolar world, rather than a global alliance against a rogue state.
Was it really only the United States that was a factor in Ukrainian politics?
I am not denying the Russian or European influences. My point is that the west is not some neutral third party that only got involved in 2022. Ukraine was already a factor in American politics, so much so that it provided the rationale for the first impeachment of Donald Trump.
Depends on how you interpret the “policy factor”.
You opinions count, though most of us disagree with you. Thus, the replies.
Let’s suppose that supporting Ukraine does further empower ‘our globe-spanning military-industrial complex’. But failing to support Ukraine empower the rival globe-spanning military-industrial complex that in addition to Russia includes Iran, Syria, and China.
A ceasefire that results in Russia keeping more Ukrainian land than it started will empower this rival military-industrial complex and set the precedent for rewarding aggression while weakening Ukraine militarily and strategically. Even letting Russia keep Don-Bas and Crimea will leave Ukraine vulnerable to future invasions.
So, which globe-spanning military-industrial complex do you oppose more?
It’s absurd to equate the shaky and informal coalition of Russia, China, Iran, and Syria with the 750+ extraterritorial bases, worldwide naval dominance, and global surveillance network of the US Military.
True. But looking at the expected value of the two, it seems that USA hegemony is less harmful for my values. And it’s also a simple matter of not paying Danegeld, as that tends to not end well.
Currently the west is on top. And will probably stay there. But that’s in part because of these kind of reactions and opportunities to put down the other side. Iran has been under sanctions for ages—whether they’re effective is debatable, but they certainly don’t help. China is now getting kneecapped via the new chip embargoes. Russia had the second largest army so the war in Ukraine is a perfect opportunity to inflict as much damage as possible, virtually for free.
Living in Poland, a lot is said about how bad the Nazis were. A lot is done to remember. But everyone knows the Russians were worse. Currently it turns out that apart from nukes, the Russians aren’t that scary anymore. If they can be neutralized at the cost of drawing out the war in Ukraine for a bit longer, I reckon it’s worth it, cynical as that may sound. Most Ukrainians also think so.
In general, if I have to choose between the NSA snooping in all my data and people getting disappeared, then I’d choose the west. At least I can publicly gripe about how bad they are and even publish methods of circumventing them without worrying about getting arrested (with the obvious caveats). Yes, they play around with starting conflicts, and don’t have a good track record of tidying up after themselves. But they’re also the only thing stopping Russia, China, Iran and Syria from doing the same.
I’m not equating the West and Anti-West in terms of power. I agree that the Anti-West is much weaker. That doesn’t mean it’s incapable of becoming a threat in the future.
One may live under a variety of political orders. Life becomes difficult when you’re caught between two systems fighting each other. As an Australian, I had no problems with the rise of China, until the Trump presidency forced Australia to choose between its economic provider and its security provider.
Actually, while he was campaigning, Trump had an advisor, Carter Page, who proposed an entente between China, Russia, and America. But Page was purged along with all the Russophiles, and Trump wanted his trade war with China, and now under Biden, the idea that all nations should be liberal democracies has been restored to the list of reasons why east and west are at odds. And maybe the odds were always against a LaRouche-style peaceful coexistence of such different powers.
The way I see it, America has had supreme power in the world twice, and has a chance at a third time. First was in 1945, when only the USA has the bomb, and everywhere else was in ruins. Then came 1991, when American information society was suddenly the only serious political and economic model remaining. The third chance is due to artificial intelligence, although perhaps it’s more accurate to say that, whatever posthuman order characterizes the era of AI, it’s most likely to first take shape on the territory of America.
So personal preferences aside, there is a sense in which I judge the meta-alliance of “NATO+Quad” as more likely to win than “SCO+Iran”. But winning only because of AI, and only in the sense that it gets to be ground zero of the AI-driven transformation of the world. If it weren’t for AI, I would not expect America to ever be on top again.
A lot of the involvement of the US and EU in Ukraine politics is getting them to build anti-corruption structures into their system. That’s probably welcome by the Ukrainian population as getting parliamentarians to do anti-corruption initiatives that the population wants is generally hard.
If you think that US involvement is net negative, do you have examples of that?
This war looks like a net negative to me. But both sides disagree.
If you are speaking about the US being a factor in Ukrainian politics for decades then a lot of what the US did is not about war.
The EU and the US aren’t just pushing Ukraine to war. They want to do institution building that reduces corruption and that lets Ukraine respect the minority rights of Russian speakers.
If the US or EU had veto power over Ukraine laws, the decommunization laws that made it a criminal offense to insult Ukrainians who mass murdered Jews, Poles, and Communists during WW2 wouldn’t have happened in 2015. The Russian talk about denazification seems like a straight answer to the decommunization project that decided to glorify people who extreminated Jews, Poles, and Communists.
Tens of thousands are dead, and millions have fled their homes. The country may have lost all of its eastern provinces. That’s a heavy price to pay for whatever new political and psychological atmosphere was attained.
If Ukraine would have done what the West wanted they would have abided by the Minsk agreements. The far right in Ukraine and its militia (who did have a habit of attacking political gatherings) didn’t like the Minsk agreements and as a result, Ukraine didn’t abide by the agreements which is a key reason why the invasion in 2022 happened.
Maybe, if the West would have put more pressure on Ukraine to follow the West’s demands at protecting minority rights, the 2022 invasion could have been averted.