I have argued to some EA leaders that the pandemic called for rapid and intense response as an opportunity to Do a Thing and thereby do a lot of good, and they had two general responses. One was the very reasonable ‘there’s a ton of uncertainty and logistics of actually doing useful things is hard yo’ but what I still don’t understand was the arguments against a hypothetical use of funds that by assumption would work.
In particular (this was pre-Omicron), I presented this hypothetical, based on a claim from David Manheim, doesn’t matter for this purpose if the model of action would have worked or not because we’re assuming it does:
In May 2020, let’s say you know for a fact that the vaccines are highly safe and effective, and on what schedule they will otherwise be available. You can write a $4 billion check to build vaccine manufacturing plants for mRNA vaccines. As a result, in December 2020, there will be enough vaccine for whoever wants one, throughout the world.
Do you write the check?
The answer I got back was an emphatic not only no, but that it was such a naive thing to think it would be a good idea to do, and I needed to learn more about EA.
I will point out that my work proposing funding mechanisms to work on that, and the idea, was being funded by exactly those EA orgs which OpenPhil and others were funding. (But I’m not sure why they people you spoke with claim that they wouldn’t fund this, and following your lead, I’ll ignore the various issues with the practicalities—we didn’t know mRNA was the right thing to bet on in May 2020, the total cost for enough manufacturing for the world to be vaccinated in <6 months is probably a (single digit) multiple of $4bn, etc.)
I haven’t done much research on this, but from a naive perspective, spending 4 billion dollars to move up vaccine access by a few months sounds incredibly unlikely to be a good idea? Is the idea that it is more effective than standard global health interventions in terms of QALYs or a similar metric, or that there’s some other benefit that is incommensurable with other global health interventions? (This feels like asking the wrong question but maybe it will at least help me understand your perspective)
The idea is that the extra production capacity funded with that $4b doesn’t just move up access a few months for rich countries, it also means poor countries get enough doses in months not years, and that there is capacity for making boosters, etc. (It’s a one-time purchase to increase the speed of vaccines for the medium term future. In other words, it changes the derivative, not the level or the delivery date.)
”COVAX, the global program for purchasing and distributing COVID-19 vaccines, has struggled to secure enough vaccine doses since its inception..
Nearly 100 low-income nations are relying on the program for vaccines. COVAX was initially aiming to deliver 2 billion doses by the end of 2021, enough to vaccinate only the most high-risk groups in developing countries. However, its delivery forecast was wound back in September to only 1.425 billion doses by the end of the year.
And by the end of November, less than 576 million doses had actually been delivered.”
I’ve been writing the EA Newsletter and running the EA Forum for three years, and I’m currently a facilitator for the In-Depth EA Program, so I think I’ve learned enough about EA not to be too naïve.
I’m also an employee of Open Philanthropy starting January 3rd, though I don’t speak for them here.
Given your hypothetical and a few minutes of thought, I’d want Open Phil to write the check. It seems like an incredible buy given their stated funding standards for health interventions and reasonable assumptions about the “fewer manufacturing plants” counterfactual. (This makes me wonder whether Alexander Berger is among the leaders you mentioned, though I assume you can’t say.)
Are any of the arguments that you heard against doing so available for others to read? And were the people you heard back from unanimous?
I ask not in the spirit of doubt, but in the spirit of “I’m surprised and trying to figure things out”.
(Also, David Manheim is a major researcher in the EA community, which makes the whole situation/debate feel especially strange. I’d guess that he has more influence on actually EA-funded COVID decisions than most of the people I’d classify as “EA leaders”.)
I have argued to some EA leaders that the pandemic called for rapid and intense response as an opportunity to Do a Thing and thereby do a lot of good, and they had two general responses. One was the very reasonable ‘there’s a ton of uncertainty and logistics of actually doing useful things is hard yo’ but what I still don’t understand was the arguments against a hypothetical use of funds that by assumption would work.
In particular (this was pre-Omicron), I presented this hypothetical, based on a claim from David Manheim, doesn’t matter for this purpose if the model of action would have worked or not because we’re assuming it does:
In May 2020, let’s say you know for a fact that the vaccines are highly safe and effective, and on what schedule they will otherwise be available. You can write a $4 billion check to build vaccine manufacturing plants for mRNA vaccines. As a result, in December 2020, there will be enough vaccine for whoever wants one, throughout the world.
Do you write the check?
The answer I got back was an emphatic not only no, but that it was such a naive thing to think it would be a good idea to do, and I needed to learn more about EA.
I will point out that my work proposing funding mechanisms to work on that, and the idea, was being funded by exactly those EA orgs which OpenPhil and others were funding. (But I’m not sure why they people you spoke with claim that they wouldn’t fund this, and following your lead, I’ll ignore the various issues with the practicalities—we didn’t know mRNA was the right thing to bet on in May 2020, the total cost for enough manufacturing for the world to be vaccinated in <6 months is probably a (single digit) multiple of $4bn, etc.)
I haven’t done much research on this, but from a naive perspective, spending 4 billion dollars to move up vaccine access by a few months sounds incredibly unlikely to be a good idea? Is the idea that it is more effective than standard global health interventions in terms of QALYs or a similar metric, or that there’s some other benefit that is incommensurable with other global health interventions? (This feels like asking the wrong question but maybe it will at least help me understand your perspective)
The idea is that the extra production capacity funded with that $4b doesn’t just move up access a few months for rich countries, it also means poor countries get enough doses in months not years, and that there is capacity for making boosters, etc. (It’s a one-time purchase to increase the speed of vaccines for the medium term future. In other words, it changes the derivative, not the level or the delivery date.)
Is there currently a supply shortage of vaccines?
Yes, a huge one.
”COVAX, the global program for purchasing and distributing COVID-19 vaccines, has struggled to secure enough vaccine doses since its inception..
Nearly 100 low-income nations are relying on the program for vaccines. COVAX was initially aiming to deliver 2 billion doses by the end of 2021, enough to vaccinate only the most high-risk groups in developing countries. However, its delivery forecast was wound back in September to only 1.425 billion doses by the end of the year.
And by the end of November, less than 576 million doses had actually been delivered.”
Thanks for sharing your experience.
I’ve been writing the EA Newsletter and running the EA Forum for three years, and I’m currently a facilitator for the In-Depth EA Program, so I think I’ve learned enough about EA not to be too naïve.
I’m also an employee of Open Philanthropy starting January 3rd, though I don’t speak for them here.
Given your hypothetical and a few minutes of thought, I’d want Open Phil to write the check. It seems like an incredible buy given their stated funding standards for health interventions and reasonable assumptions about the “fewer manufacturing plants” counterfactual. (This makes me wonder whether Alexander Berger is among the leaders you mentioned, though I assume you can’t say.)
Are any of the arguments that you heard against doing so available for others to read? And were the people you heard back from unanimous?
I ask not in the spirit of doubt, but in the spirit of “I’m surprised and trying to figure things out”.
(Also, David Manheim is a major researcher in the EA community, which makes the whole situation/debate feel especially strange. I’d guess that he has more influence on actually EA-funded COVID decisions than most of the people I’d classify as “EA leaders”.)