1.) An objective assessment says nothing of their value and importance in the world, because value and importance are assigned by individuals for themselves.
From what I can gather, most everyone here is consequentialist, but some are egoist, and some are utilitarian. I’m a utilitarian. I think happiness is inherently valuable. I don’t really know how I can argue about it, and if I did, I’d make it a top-level post, but it’s good to at least find out exactly where we disagree.
2 is basically restating 1
3.) Technological immortality is not just for oneself; I think it is probably rated so highly important because it is for everyone. Everyone must die, and any death is as tragic as any other: to think one must only care about immortality for one’s own sake is fairly cynical.
I meant that immortality for anyone is over-rated. Death isn’t in itself tragic. It’s that once you die, you are no longer living, and thus no longer happy. If you replace the person who died with someone else, there’s still life, and there’s still happiness. The first person isn’t living anymore, but the second wouldn’t be living otherwise.
4.) Finally, immortality is almost guaranteed to be more important than any other goal one could have. Anything else can be deferred and accomplished once you are immortal, but once you have died, that’s it.
Is there any reason to believe that the next generation will be less rational than this one? In any case, this isn’t something inherently bad about death.
Insisting upon calling your own life unimportant is not rational, but perverse.
I consider my life very important. I just don’t consider it uniquely important. If you replace me with someone who’s life is equally important, there’s no net gain or loss.
I’m a utilitarian too; I posted arguments #1 and #2 because I don’t know how I could argue for inherent value either, and Aleph might not be utilitarian. Note, though, that happiness can be inherently valuable, yet the same event can still result in different utility (or importance) for different people: Aleph may not value his own life as much as I value mine, causing immortality to make me more happy than it would make him.
I think you are arguing against straw men, however. No one has said, as far as I’m aware, that one’s own life is necessarily uniquely important, nor was this implied. I have not seen anyone suggest that lives aren’t equivalent in importance, and neither is this required for immortality to be valuable. And what does the next generation’s rationality have to do with the fact that death prevents one from maximizing one’s own happiness? As my happiness is inherently valuable, it’s inherently valuable to me to maximize my own happiness, whether or not the next generation is happy. Surely it is better for our happiness to be added than for theirs to replace my own.
Even by your own examples, immortality is important. You make the argument that happiness would be the same if a death was mitigated by a new life—and this is true, but as an example, it is flawed: how often does that happen? In real life, death does not usually result in new life, so utility is increased dramatically by defeating death. But even if we assume that every death is balanced by a new life, total utility would be most increased if there was new life without the corresponding death.
It seems like you put aside all the drawbacks to death advanced so far—the sadness of others; the debility of age; the fact that we already know how to create new life, thus making death the main enemy of utility; the cost of replacement people; lack of happiness once dead—and wave it aside, saying “besides all those, death isn’t so bad.” Well yes—death isn’t so bad, without all the bad things about death!
I’m not sure exactly what you’re trying to say here. Your original statement was meant to point out that immorality is “not as important as people think”, right? Who is it that thinks immortality is overrated, then? Apparently not me, since we don’t appear to actually disagree that death is bad and immortality is good—which is all I’ve claimed. (We do disagree below, about death not being the end of the world, but that’s not any claim I’ve made before.)
From what I can gather, most everyone here is consequentialist, but some are egoist, and some are utilitarian. I’m a utilitarian. I think happiness is inherently valuable. I don’t really know how I can argue about it, and if I did, I’d make it a top-level post, but it’s good to at least find out exactly where we disagree.
2 is basically restating 1
I meant that immortality for anyone is over-rated. Death isn’t in itself tragic. It’s that once you die, you are no longer living, and thus no longer happy. If you replace the person who died with someone else, there’s still life, and there’s still happiness. The first person isn’t living anymore, but the second wouldn’t be living otherwise.
Is there any reason to believe that the next generation will be less rational than this one? In any case, this isn’t something inherently bad about death.
I consider my life very important. I just don’t consider it uniquely important. If you replace me with someone who’s life is equally important, there’s no net gain or loss.
I’m a utilitarian too; I posted arguments #1 and #2 because I don’t know how I could argue for inherent value either, and Aleph might not be utilitarian. Note, though, that happiness can be inherently valuable, yet the same event can still result in different utility (or importance) for different people: Aleph may not value his own life as much as I value mine, causing immortality to make me more happy than it would make him.
I think you are arguing against straw men, however. No one has said, as far as I’m aware, that one’s own life is necessarily uniquely important, nor was this implied. I have not seen anyone suggest that lives aren’t equivalent in importance, and neither is this required for immortality to be valuable. And what does the next generation’s rationality have to do with the fact that death prevents one from maximizing one’s own happiness? As my happiness is inherently valuable, it’s inherently valuable to me to maximize my own happiness, whether or not the next generation is happy. Surely it is better for our happiness to be added than for theirs to replace my own.
Even by your own examples, immortality is important. You make the argument that happiness would be the same if a death was mitigated by a new life—and this is true, but as an example, it is flawed: how often does that happen? In real life, death does not usually result in new life, so utility is increased dramatically by defeating death. But even if we assume that every death is balanced by a new life, total utility would be most increased if there was new life without the corresponding death.
It seems like you put aside all the drawbacks to death advanced so far—the sadness of others; the debility of age; the fact that we already know how to create new life, thus making death the main enemy of utility; the cost of replacement people; lack of happiness once dead—and wave it aside, saying “besides all those, death isn’t so bad.” Well yes—death isn’t so bad, without all the bad things about death!
I’m not sure exactly what you’re trying to say here. Your original statement was meant to point out that immorality is “not as important as people think”, right? Who is it that thinks immortality is overrated, then? Apparently not me, since we don’t appear to actually disagree that death is bad and immortality is good—which is all I’ve claimed. (We do disagree below, about death not being the end of the world, but that’s not any claim I’ve made before.)