I’m a utilitarian too; I posted arguments #1 and #2 because I don’t know how I could argue for inherent value either, and Aleph might not be utilitarian. Note, though, that happiness can be inherently valuable, yet the same event can still result in different utility (or importance) for different people: Aleph may not value his own life as much as I value mine, causing immortality to make me more happy than it would make him.
I think you are arguing against straw men, however. No one has said, as far as I’m aware, that one’s own life is necessarily uniquely important, nor was this implied. I have not seen anyone suggest that lives aren’t equivalent in importance, and neither is this required for immortality to be valuable. And what does the next generation’s rationality have to do with the fact that death prevents one from maximizing one’s own happiness? As my happiness is inherently valuable, it’s inherently valuable to me to maximize my own happiness, whether or not the next generation is happy. Surely it is better for our happiness to be added than for theirs to replace my own.
Even by your own examples, immortality is important. You make the argument that happiness would be the same if a death was mitigated by a new life—and this is true, but as an example, it is flawed: how often does that happen? In real life, death does not usually result in new life, so utility is increased dramatically by defeating death. But even if we assume that every death is balanced by a new life, total utility would be most increased if there was new life without the corresponding death.
It seems like you put aside all the drawbacks to death advanced so far—the sadness of others; the debility of age; the fact that we already know how to create new life, thus making death the main enemy of utility; the cost of replacement people; lack of happiness once dead—and wave it aside, saying “besides all those, death isn’t so bad.” Well yes—death isn’t so bad, without all the bad things about death!
I’m not sure exactly what you’re trying to say here. Your original statement was meant to point out that immorality is “not as important as people think”, right? Who is it that thinks immortality is overrated, then? Apparently not me, since we don’t appear to actually disagree that death is bad and immortality is good—which is all I’ve claimed. (We do disagree below, about death not being the end of the world, but that’s not any claim I’ve made before.)
I’m a utilitarian too; I posted arguments #1 and #2 because I don’t know how I could argue for inherent value either, and Aleph might not be utilitarian. Note, though, that happiness can be inherently valuable, yet the same event can still result in different utility (or importance) for different people: Aleph may not value his own life as much as I value mine, causing immortality to make me more happy than it would make him.
I think you are arguing against straw men, however. No one has said, as far as I’m aware, that one’s own life is necessarily uniquely important, nor was this implied. I have not seen anyone suggest that lives aren’t equivalent in importance, and neither is this required for immortality to be valuable. And what does the next generation’s rationality have to do with the fact that death prevents one from maximizing one’s own happiness? As my happiness is inherently valuable, it’s inherently valuable to me to maximize my own happiness, whether or not the next generation is happy. Surely it is better for our happiness to be added than for theirs to replace my own.
Even by your own examples, immortality is important. You make the argument that happiness would be the same if a death was mitigated by a new life—and this is true, but as an example, it is flawed: how often does that happen? In real life, death does not usually result in new life, so utility is increased dramatically by defeating death. But even if we assume that every death is balanced by a new life, total utility would be most increased if there was new life without the corresponding death.
It seems like you put aside all the drawbacks to death advanced so far—the sadness of others; the debility of age; the fact that we already know how to create new life, thus making death the main enemy of utility; the cost of replacement people; lack of happiness once dead—and wave it aside, saying “besides all those, death isn’t so bad.” Well yes—death isn’t so bad, without all the bad things about death!
I’m not sure exactly what you’re trying to say here. Your original statement was meant to point out that immorality is “not as important as people think”, right? Who is it that thinks immortality is overrated, then? Apparently not me, since we don’t appear to actually disagree that death is bad and immortality is good—which is all I’ve claimed. (We do disagree below, about death not being the end of the world, but that’s not any claim I’ve made before.)