The conditions necessary for life are also necessary for iPads: the argument hinges on things like the ability of subatomic particles to come together to form atoms, or the ability of stars to burn. It’s not a question of one interesting type of complexity versus another, but of a vast selection space of universes in which there is nothing complex or interesting, versus a tiny space of universes in which there are many interesting things like iPads and life.
I admit this explanation lacks a rigorous definition of “interesting”, but I think the least that can be said is that our universe is interesting in being a wild outlier in various physical and mathematical characteristics, and not just “interesting to beings with the same value system as ourselves”.
The solution to the fine-tuning argument is the existence of large numbers of universes with different values, plus anthropic principle.
The solution to the fine-tuning argument is the existence of large numbers of universes with different values, plus anthropic principle.
This still leaves a question: Why is it that the laws of physics imply that out of the space of all possible combinations of physical constants, only a tiny subspace gives rise to an interesting universe?
So any universe that produces life will also produce iPads? I find that counter-intuitive.
That’s logically different from what I said. I think my sentence was logically equivalent to (L → C) & (I → C) (life exists implies certain conditions must exist, and iPads exist means those same conditions must exist). I interpret what you say as L → I (if life, then iPads), which you can’t prove from my premises.
For a natural language example, if I play Civilization IV, I must own a computer, and if I play Team Fortress II I must own a computer, but it’s not necessarily true that if I play Civilization IV, I must also play Team Fortress II. So “the conditions necessary for Civilization IV are also necessary for Team Fortress II”, but not “Anyone who plays Civilization IV also plays Team Fortress II”.
I don’t think interesting is another word for valuable in this context. Consider a bag of balls, 999,999 of which are blue and one of which is red. I reach into the bag blindfolded and pick the one red ball. This is surprising! It’s not that the red ball is more valuable than me to the blue balls. I may not have cared about the color of the balls at all before picking one. But it’s interesting, because the red ball is quite different from all the other balls and it’s surprising that I chose the one unique one.
(in Bayesian terms, any theory that says there’s some correlation between the color of a ball and its likelihood of getting picked is suddenly going to have a huge advantage over theories that ball-picking is a random process, or sorted by some non-color variable like tiny weight differences).
Suppose (and I am making this up because I don’t remember the exact fine tuning argument, but I think it is loyal to the spirit of the original) that there are a million possible different weights for the proton, and that all of those weights except 5,000 units result in protons sitting around doing nothing and the Universe remaining a bunch of disconnected protons, but that weight 5,000 uniquely allows the formation of atoms. Suppose also that there is nothing to distinguish the other 999,999 possible proton weights from one another; ie weight 10,000 doesn’t allow some different form of atom or something, it’s either atoms or nothing. And suppose our universe has proton weight of 5,000 units.
This is the same scenario as reaching into the bag of 999,999 blue balls and one red ball, and picking out the red ball. You may not have cared what color the ball was before you reached in and picked it, but because there is a co-incidence between two very rare properties (redness and getting picked-ness), you now have evidence supporting a theory that red balls are more likely to get picked.
I think your argument is that you only became interested in red after you saw it was the red ball you picked, so that doesn’t count. But if it’s really 999,999 blue balls and one red one, and that’s the only difference, I think you don’t risk too much hindsight bias in picking out color as a relevant variable. Likewise, 999,999 universes where protons sit around doing nothing for a few trillion years, versus ours, makes ours look interesting even before talking about its value.
You are correct, my apologies. However your original wording is congruent with Luke’s point: If the universe is fine-tuned for life, then it’s even more fine-tuned for iPads.
About your second point, I think you are thinking of a much stronger version of the fine tuning premise than what I’ve ever heard articulated. (Fine-tuned for atoms vs. fine-tuned for life)
I’ll have to do a bit more research to see what the projected alternatives are, but I can’t immediately recall any support for “99,9999% of everything else would be identical”. If that were indeed the case, then we’ may have to fall back on anthropics and the multiverse. (on second thought, even just the difference between the values itself may be enough of a universe differentiator). What I do recall is a sort of “different but not life-permitting” set of universes.
Off to do some more research, any sources you may have would be appreciated.
The stronger version is AIUI physically right and the more interesting version. Many arguments against fine-tuning are applicable only to the weaker version—eg Douglas Adams’s puddle.
The conditions necessary for life are also necessary for iPads: the argument hinges on things like the ability of subatomic particles to come together to form atoms, or the ability of stars to burn. It’s not a question of one interesting type of complexity versus another, but of a vast selection space of universes in which there is nothing complex or interesting, versus a tiny space of universes in which there are many interesting things like iPads and life.
I admit this explanation lacks a rigorous definition of “interesting”, but I think the least that can be said is that our universe is interesting in being a wild outlier in various physical and mathematical characteristics, and not just “interesting to beings with the same value system as ourselves”.
The solution to the fine-tuning argument is the existence of large numbers of universes with different values, plus anthropic principle.
This still leaves a question: Why is it that the laws of physics imply that out of the space of all possible combinations of physical constants, only a tiny subspace gives rise to an interesting universe?
So would any universe that produces life will also produce iPads?
That’s logically different from what I said. I think my sentence was logically equivalent to (L → C) & (I → C) (life exists implies certain conditions must exist, and iPads exist means those same conditions must exist). I interpret what you say as L → I (if life, then iPads), which you can’t prove from my premises.
For a natural language example, if I play Civilization IV, I must own a computer, and if I play Team Fortress II I must own a computer, but it’s not necessarily true that if I play Civilization IV, I must also play Team Fortress II. So “the conditions necessary for Civilization IV are also necessary for Team Fortress II”, but not “Anyone who plays Civilization IV also plays Team Fortress II”.
I don’t think interesting is another word for valuable in this context. Consider a bag of balls, 999,999 of which are blue and one of which is red. I reach into the bag blindfolded and pick the one red ball. This is surprising! It’s not that the red ball is more valuable than me to the blue balls. I may not have cared about the color of the balls at all before picking one. But it’s interesting, because the red ball is quite different from all the other balls and it’s surprising that I chose the one unique one.
(in Bayesian terms, any theory that says there’s some correlation between the color of a ball and its likelihood of getting picked is suddenly going to have a huge advantage over theories that ball-picking is a random process, or sorted by some non-color variable like tiny weight differences).
Suppose (and I am making this up because I don’t remember the exact fine tuning argument, but I think it is loyal to the spirit of the original) that there are a million possible different weights for the proton, and that all of those weights except 5,000 units result in protons sitting around doing nothing and the Universe remaining a bunch of disconnected protons, but that weight 5,000 uniquely allows the formation of atoms. Suppose also that there is nothing to distinguish the other 999,999 possible proton weights from one another; ie weight 10,000 doesn’t allow some different form of atom or something, it’s either atoms or nothing. And suppose our universe has proton weight of 5,000 units.
This is the same scenario as reaching into the bag of 999,999 blue balls and one red ball, and picking out the red ball. You may not have cared what color the ball was before you reached in and picked it, but because there is a co-incidence between two very rare properties (redness and getting picked-ness), you now have evidence supporting a theory that red balls are more likely to get picked.
I think your argument is that you only became interested in red after you saw it was the red ball you picked, so that doesn’t count. But if it’s really 999,999 blue balls and one red one, and that’s the only difference, I think you don’t risk too much hindsight bias in picking out color as a relevant variable. Likewise, 999,999 universes where protons sit around doing nothing for a few trillion years, versus ours, makes ours look interesting even before talking about its value.
You are correct, my apologies. However your original wording is congruent with Luke’s point: If the universe is fine-tuned for life, then it’s even more fine-tuned for iPads.
About your second point, I think you are thinking of a much stronger version of the fine tuning premise than what I’ve ever heard articulated. (Fine-tuned for atoms vs. fine-tuned for life)
I’ll have to do a bit more research to see what the projected alternatives are, but I can’t immediately recall any support for “99,9999% of everything else would be identical”. If that were indeed the case, then we’ may have to fall back on anthropics and the multiverse. (on second thought, even just the difference between the values itself may be enough of a universe differentiator). What I do recall is a sort of “different but not life-permitting” set of universes.
Off to do some more research, any sources you may have would be appreciated.
The stronger version is AIUI physically right and the more interesting version. Many arguments against fine-tuning are applicable only to the weaker version—eg Douglas Adams’s puddle.