I think it’s important to first accept the deterministic nature of the self (of one’s self?), in the sense that we are an object determined by the interaction of atoms, and through our wetware is created the subject/our subjectivity. In the absence of AI we can already pass through this phase of realisation/acceptance (the nausea of the realisation of being an object).
To the question; so what do I do now?, we have the answer that our lives and behaviour, while in a sense deterministic, are also ‘inevitable’, in the important sense that regardless of any realisation, I will still go on living, responding to my ‘subjective’ urges/needs, will continue identify and attempt to carry out ‘authentic’ human behaviours and experiences. Nothing changes.
Our subjectivity is inevitable—and insofar as it is a creation of our wetware, our ‘fabricated subjectivity’ is true/authentic subjectivity—in a materialist world, can there be any other way for subjectivity? So will be the case with super-advanced AI—we will still be human, our human behaviour/wants and needs will remain inevitable—we will still live human lives. We may be imprisoned, we may be freed of practical concerns, just like many of us are right now.
This feels like the intersection of Analytic and Continental Philosopy, the former being rigorous science-like analysis detached from subjectivity, the later being more closely concerned with the human experience.
While we’re determined, we also determine the future. The atoms that do that are called you. They make up beliefs and passions and you. You are not an object. You are a subject, and you determine your own future. The nexus of past influences is called you and your thoughts. Don’t skimp on care in thinking; your future is up to you.
You are a subject, and you determine your own future
Not so much , given deteminism.
Determinism allows you to cause the future in a limited sense. Under determinism, events still need to be caused,and your (determined) actions can be part of the cause of a future state that is itself determined, that has probability 1.0. Determinism allows you to cause the future ,but it doesn’t allow you to control the future in any sense other than causing it. (and the sense in which you are causing the future is just the sense in which any future state depends on causes in he past—it is nothing special and nothing different from physical causation). It allows, in a purely theoretical sense “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A” … but without the ability to have actually chosen b.
You are a link in a deterministic chain that leads to a future state, so without you, the state will not happen … not that you have any choose use in the matter. You can’t stop or change the future because you can’t fail to make your choices, or make them differently. You can’t anything of your own, since everything about you and your choices was determined by at the time of the Big Bang. Under determinism , you are nothing special...only the BB is special.
Tthis is still true under many worlds. even though MWI implies that there is not a single inevitable future, it doesn’t allow you to influence the future in a way that makes future A more likely than future B , as a result of some choice you make now. Under MW determinism, the probabilities of A and B are what they are, and always were—before you make a decision, after you make a decision , and before you were born. You can’t choosee between them, even in the sense of adjusting the probabilities.
Libertarian free will, by contrast, does allow the future to depend on decisions which are not themselves determined. That means there are valid statements of the form “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A”. And you actually could have made choice a or choice b....these are real possibilities, not merely conceptual or logical ones.
I think Seth is not so much contradicting you here but using a deterministic definition of “self” as that which we are referring to as a particular categorisation of the deterministic process, the one experienced as “making decisions”, and importantly “deliberating over decisions”. Whether we are determined or not, the effort one puts into their choices is not wasted, it is data-processing that produces better outcomes in general.
One might be determined to throw in the towel on cognitive effort if they were to take a particular interpretation of determinism, and they, and the rest of us, would be worse off for it. So, the more of us who expend the effort to convince others of the benefits of continuing cognitive effort in spite of a deterministic universe are doing a service to the future, determined or otherwise.
Cognitive effort is inevitable. It would take a special kind of ‘person who fails the psychopath test’, somehow lacking urges/feelings, to be able to switch off completely and fade into nothingness.
Libertarian free will is a contradiction in terms. Randomness is not what we want. Compatibilist free will has all the properties worth wanting: your values and beliefs determine the future, to the extent you exert the effort to make good decisions. Whether you do that is also determined, but it is determined by meaningful things like how you react to this statement.
Determinism has no actionable consequences if it’s true. The main conclusion people draw, my efforts at making decisions don’t matter, is dreadfully wrong.
“Optimism is a duty. The future is open. It is not predetermined. No one can predict it, except by chance. We all contribute to determining it by what we do. We are all equally responsible for its success.”—Karl Popper
Agree wholeheartedly. I’m trying to describe transcending the realisation of determinism, in the sense of not getting bogged down by it, to then go about living a good human life.
In the absence of AI we can already pass through this phase of realisation/acceptance (the nausea of the realisation of being an object)
Clearly—Sartre was going through it in the early 20th century. I think, while I’ve never had much trouble with squaring my existence with materialism, I do feel like this period is giving me somewhat of a relapse, and as you say, this is not really within my control.
This feels like the intersection of Analytic and Continental Philosophy
Exactly, I think I was having a continental moment, please do forgive me, we can now return to our scheduled rationality. But really, that’s what I’m on about, our claim on rationality has, I guess, been pretty important to me, and I may just be suffering the side effects of seeing it being eroded in real time (the claim, not the rationality itself).
I think it’s important to first accept the deterministic nature of the self (of one’s self?), in the sense that we are an object determined by the interaction of atoms, and through our wetware is created the subject/our subjectivity. In the absence of AI we can already pass through this phase of realisation/acceptance (the nausea of the realisation of being an object).
To the question; so what do I do now?, we have the answer that our lives and behaviour, while in a sense deterministic, are also ‘inevitable’, in the important sense that regardless of any realisation, I will still go on living, responding to my ‘subjective’ urges/needs, will continue identify and attempt to carry out ‘authentic’ human behaviours and experiences. Nothing changes.
Our subjectivity is inevitable—and insofar as it is a creation of our wetware, our ‘fabricated subjectivity’ is true/authentic subjectivity—in a materialist world, can there be any other way for subjectivity?
So will be the case with super-advanced AI—we will still be human, our human behaviour/wants and needs will remain inevitable—we will still live human lives. We may be imprisoned, we may be freed of practical concerns, just like many of us are right now.
This feels like the intersection of Analytic and Continental Philosopy, the former being rigorous science-like analysis detached from subjectivity, the later being more closely concerned with the human experience.
While we’re determined, we also determine the future. The atoms that do that are called you. They make up beliefs and passions and you. You are not an object. You are a subject, and you determine your own future. The nexus of past influences is called you and your thoughts. Don’t skimp on care in thinking; your future is up to you.
Not so much , given deteminism.
Determinism allows you to cause the future in a limited sense. Under determinism, events still need to be caused,and your (determined) actions can be part of the cause of a future state that is itself determined, that has probability 1.0. Determinism allows you to cause the future ,but it doesn’t allow you to control the future in any sense other than causing it. (and the sense in which you are causing the future is just the sense in which any future state depends on causes in he past—it is nothing special and nothing different from physical causation). It allows, in a purely theoretical sense “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A” … but without the ability to have actually chosen b. You are a link in a deterministic chain that leads to a future state, so without you, the state will not happen … not that you have any choose use in the matter. You can’t stop or change the future because you can’t fail to make your choices, or make them differently. You can’t anything of your own, since everything about you and your choices was determined by at the time of the Big Bang. Under determinism , you are nothing special...only the BB is special.
Tthis is still true under many worlds. even though MWI implies that there is not a single inevitable future, it doesn’t allow you to influence the future in a way that makes future A more likely than future B , as a result of some choice you make now. Under MW determinism, the probabilities of A and B are what they are, and always were—before you make a decision, after you make a decision , and before you were born. You can’t choosee between them, even in the sense of adjusting the probabilities.
Libertarian free will, by contrast, does allow the future to depend on decisions which are not themselves determined. That means there are valid statements of the form “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A”. And you actually could have made choice a or choice b....these are real possibilities, not merely conceptual or logical ones.
I think Seth is not so much contradicting you here but using a deterministic definition of “self” as that which we are referring to as a particular categorisation of the deterministic process, the one experienced as “making decisions”, and importantly “deliberating over decisions”. Whether we are determined or not, the effort one puts into their choices is not wasted, it is data-processing that produces better outcomes in general.
One might be determined to throw in the towel on cognitive effort if they were to take a particular interpretation of determinism, and they, and the rest of us, would be worse off for it. So, the more of us who expend the effort to convince others of the benefits of continuing cognitive effort in spite of a deterministic universe are doing a service to the future, determined or otherwise.
Precisely what I meant, good catch on the effort bit.
Cognitive effort is inevitable. It would take a special kind of ‘person who fails the psychopath test’, somehow lacking urges/feelings, to be able to switch off completely and fade into nothingness.
Libertarian free will is a contradiction in terms. Randomness is not what we want. Compatibilist free will has all the properties worth wanting: your values and beliefs determine the future, to the extent you exert the effort to make good decisions. Whether you do that is also determined, but it is determined by meaningful things like how you react to this statement.
Determinism has no actionable consequences if it’s true. The main conclusion people draw, my efforts at making decisions don’t matter, is dreadfully wrong.
“Optimism is a duty. The future is open. It is not predetermined. No one can predict it, except by chance. We all contribute to determining it by what we do. We are all equally responsible for its success.”—Karl Popper
I am yet to find a statement by Popper that I disagree with.
Agree wholeheartedly. I’m trying to describe transcending the realisation of determinism, in the sense of not getting bogged down by it, to then go about living a good human life.
Very well said, I have expressed this exact sentiment more clumsily many times. I concur.
Clearly—Sartre was going through it in the early 20th century. I think, while I’ve never had much trouble with squaring my existence with materialism, I do feel like this period is giving me somewhat of a relapse, and as you say, this is not really within my control.
Exactly, I think I was having a continental moment, please do forgive me, we can now return to our scheduled rationality. But really, that’s what I’m on about, our claim on rationality has, I guess, been pretty important to me, and I may just be suffering the side effects of seeing it being eroded in real time (the claim, not the rationality itself).
Continental moments are great. I feel like that’s the end game once we transcend science and analysis.