Libertarian free will is a contradiction in terms. Randomness is not what we want. Compatibilist free will has all the properties worth wanting: your values and beliefs determine the future, to the extent you exert the effort to make good decisions. Whether you do that is also determined, but it is determined by meaningful things like how you react to this statement.
Determinism has no actionable consequences if it’s true. The main conclusion people draw, my efforts at making decisions don’t matter, is dreadfully wrong.
One might be determined to throw in the towel on cognitive effort if they were to take a particular interpretation of determinism, and they, and the rest of us, would be worse off for it.
Determinists are always telling each other to act like libertarians. That’s a clue that libertarianism is worth wanting.
@James Stephen Brown
Compatibilist free will has all the properties worth wanting: your values and beliefs determine the future, to the extent you exert the effort to make good decisions.
No it doesn’t, because it doesn’t have the property of being able to shape the future, or steer towards a future that wasn’t inevitable. Which is pretty important if you are trying to avoid the AI kills everyone future
Libertarian free will is able to do that.
Naturalistic libertarianism appeals to some form of indeterminism, or randomness, inherent in physics rather than a soul or ghost-in-the-machine unique to humans, , that overrides the physical behaviour of the brain. The problem is to explain how indeterminism does not undermine other features of a kind free will “worth wanting”—purposiveness, rationality and so on.
Randomness is not what we want
Explaining NLFW in terms of “randomness” is difficult, because the word has connotations of purposelessness , meaninglessness, and so on. But these are only connotations, not strict implications. “Not deteminism” doesn’t imply lack of reason , purpose , or control. It doesn’t have to separate your from from your beliefs and values. Therefore,I prefer the term “indeterminism” over the term “randomness”.
So, how to explain indeterminism does not undermine other features of a kind free will “worth wanting”.
Part of the answer is to note that mixtures of indeterminism and determinism are possible, so that libertarian free will is not just pure randomness, where any action is equally likely.
Another part is proposing a mechanism , with indeterminism occurring at different places and times, rather than being slathered evenly over neural activity.
Another part is noting that control doesn’t have to mean predetermination.
Another part is that notice that a choice between things you wish to do cannot leave you doing something you do not wish to do, something unconnected to your desires and beliefs.
The basic mechanism is that the unconscious mind proposes various ideas and actions , which a the conscious mind decides between. Thus is similar to the mechanism provided by the determinist Sam Harris. He makes much of the fact that the conscious mind, the executive function, does not predetermined the suggestions: I argue that the choice between them, the decision to act in one rather than another, *is* conscious control. -- and conscious control clearly exists in health adults.
Part of the answer is to note that mixtures of indeterminism and determinism are possible, so that libertarian free will is not just pure randomness, where any action is equally likely.
This is really interesting, because I agree with this, but also agree with what Seth’s saying. I think this disagreement might actually be largely a semantic one. As such, I’m going to (try to) avoid using the terms ‘libertarian’ or ‘compatibilist’ free will. First of all I agree with the use of “indeterminism” to mean non-uniform randomness. I agree that there is a way that determinism and indeterminism can be mixed in such a way as give rise to an emergent property that is not present in either purely determined or purely random systems. I understand this in relation to the idea of evolutionary “design” which emerges from a system that necessarily has both determined and indeterminate properties (indeterminate at least at the level of the genes, they might not be ultimately indeterminate).
I’m going to employ a decision-making map that seeks to clarify my understanding of the how we make decisions and where we might get “what we want” from.
As I see it, the items in white are largely set, and change only gradually, and with no sense of control involved. I don’t believe we have any control over our genes, our intentions or desires, what results our actions will have, of the world—I also don’t think we have any control over our model of ourselves or the world, those are formed subconsciously. But our effort (in the green areas) allows for deliberative decision making, following an evolutionary selection process, in which our conscious awareness is involved.
In this way we are not beholden to the first action available to us, we can, instead of taking an action in the world, make a series of simulated actions in our head, consciously experiencing the predicted outcome of those actions, until we find a satisfactory one. So, you don’t end up with a determined or a random solution, you end up with an option based on your conscious experience of your simulated options. This process satisfies my wants in terms of my sense that I have some control (when I make the effort) over my decisions. At the same time, I’m agnostic about whether true indeterminism exists at all, but, like with evolution, with randomness at the level of the cell (that may not be ultimately random), I think even in an entirely determined universe, we exist on a level that is subject to, at least, some apparent indeterminism. And even if that apparent indeterminism turns out to be determined, our (eternal) inability to calculate what is determined, still means we have no grounds to act in any way other than as if we have the control we feel we have.
I’m actually not sure if this makes me a compatibilist or not.
Determinists are always telling each other to act like libertarians. That’s a clue that libertarianism is worth wanting.
So, I don’t think my position is the same as asserting that we should act like libertarians, as I have (now) described my conception of the situation, I just think I should act consistent with this conception. By analogy, there are still people who say atheists often act according to “religious” moral values, but in fact they’re not—it’s just that morality is mode of behaviour that has all the same functions regardless of one’s belief system.
Libertarian free will is a contradiction in terms. Randomness is not what we want. Compatibilist free will has all the properties worth wanting: your values and beliefs determine the future, to the extent you exert the effort to make good decisions. Whether you do that is also determined, but it is determined by meaningful things like how you react to this statement.
Determinism has no actionable consequences if it’s true. The main conclusion people draw, my efforts at making decisions don’t matter, is dreadfully wrong.
Determinists are always telling each other to act like libertarians. That’s a clue that libertarianism is worth wanting. @James Stephen Brown
No it doesn’t, because it doesn’t have the property of being able to shape the future, or steer towards a future that wasn’t inevitable. Which is pretty important if you are trying to avoid the AI kills everyone future
Libertarian free will is able to do that.
Naturalistic libertarianism appeals to some form of indeterminism, or randomness, inherent in physics rather than a soul or ghost-in-the-machine unique to humans, , that overrides the physical behaviour of the brain. The problem is to explain how indeterminism does not undermine other features of a kind free will “worth wanting”—purposiveness, rationality and so on.
Explaining NLFW in terms of “randomness” is difficult, because the word has connotations of purposelessness , meaninglessness, and so on. But these are only connotations, not strict implications. “Not deteminism” doesn’t imply lack of reason , purpose , or control. It doesn’t have to separate your from from your beliefs and values. Therefore,I prefer the term “indeterminism” over the term “randomness”.
So, how to explain indeterminism does not undermine other features of a kind free will “worth wanting”.
Part of the answer is to note that mixtures of indeterminism and determinism are possible, so that libertarian free will is not just pure randomness, where any action is equally likely.
Another part is proposing a mechanism , with indeterminism occurring at different places and times, rather than being slathered evenly over neural activity.
Another part is noting that control doesn’t have to mean predetermination.
Another part is that notice that a choice between things you wish to do cannot leave you doing something you do not wish to do, something unconnected to your desires and beliefs.
The basic mechanism is that the unconscious mind proposes various ideas and actions , which a the conscious mind decides between. Thus is similar to the mechanism provided by the determinist Sam Harris. He makes much of the fact that the conscious mind, the executive function, does not predetermined the suggestions: I argue that the choice between them, the decision to act in one rather than another, *is* conscious control. -- and conscious control clearly exists in health adults.
This is really interesting, because I agree with this, but also agree with what Seth’s saying. I think this disagreement might actually be largely a semantic one. As such, I’m going to (try to) avoid using the terms ‘libertarian’ or ‘compatibilist’ free will. First of all I agree with the use of “indeterminism” to mean non-uniform randomness. I agree that there is a way that determinism and indeterminism can be mixed in such a way as give rise to an emergent property that is not present in either purely determined or purely random systems. I understand this in relation to the idea of evolutionary “design” which emerges from a system that necessarily has both determined and indeterminate properties (indeterminate at least at the level of the genes, they might not be ultimately indeterminate).
I’m going to employ a decision-making map that seeks to clarify my understanding of the how we make decisions and where we might get “what we want” from.
As I see it, the items in white are largely set, and change only gradually, and with no sense of control involved. I don’t believe we have any control over our genes, our intentions or desires, what results our actions will have, of the world—I also don’t think we have any control over our model of ourselves or the world, those are formed subconsciously. But our effort (in the green areas) allows for deliberative decision making, following an evolutionary selection process, in which our conscious awareness is involved.
In this way we are not beholden to the first action available to us, we can, instead of taking an action in the world, make a series of simulated actions in our head, consciously experiencing the predicted outcome of those actions, until we find a satisfactory one. So, you don’t end up with a determined or a random solution, you end up with an option based on your conscious experience of your simulated options. This process satisfies my wants in terms of my sense that I have some control (when I make the effort) over my decisions. At the same time, I’m agnostic about whether true indeterminism exists at all, but, like with evolution, with randomness at the level of the cell (that may not be ultimately random), I think even in an entirely determined universe, we exist on a level that is subject to, at least, some apparent indeterminism. And even if that apparent indeterminism turns out to be determined, our (eternal) inability to calculate what is determined, still means we have no grounds to act in any way other than as if we have the control we feel we have.
I’m actually not sure if this makes me a compatibilist or not.
So, I don’t think my position is the same as asserting that we should act like libertarians, as I have (now) described my conception of the situation, I just think I should act consistent with this conception. By analogy, there are still people who say atheists often act according to “religious” moral values, but in fact they’re not—it’s just that morality is mode of behaviour that has all the same functions regardless of one’s belief system.