I don’t think that most high-complexity algorithms for building a life-permitting observable universe would allow a theory as simple as human physics to approximate the algorithm as well as our observable universe does.
Do you think the observable universe is a lot more complicated than it appears?
This is trivially false. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that there is a short, simple set of rules for building a life permitting observable universe. Now add an arbitrary, small, highly complex perturbation to that set of rules. Voila, infinitely many high complexity algorithms which can be well-approximated by low complexity algorithms.
How does demonstrating ‘infinitely many algorithms have property X’ help falsify ‘most algorithms lack property X’? Infinitely many integers end with the string …30811, but that does nothing to suggest that most integers do.
Maybe most random life-permitting algorithms beyond a certain level of complexity have lawful regions where all one’s immediate observations are predictable by simple rules. But in that case I’d want to know the proportion of observers in such universes that are lucky enough to end up in an island of simplicity. (As opposed to being, say, Boltzmann brains.)
most high-complexity algorithms for building a life-permitting observable universe would allow
I have no idea what these algorithms might be are and neither do you. Accordingly I don’t see any basis for speculating what will they allow.
Do you think the observable universe is a lot more complicated than it appears?
I think the observable universe appears to be very complicated.
I am still interested in what do you mean by “short” and “simple”. The default rule is that “man is the measure of all things” so presumably you are using these words in the context of what is short and simple for the human brain.
Requiring the universe to be constructed in a way that is short and simple for the brains of a single species on a planet in a provincial star system in some galaxy seems to be carrying the anthropic principle a bit too far.
I have no idea what these algorithms might be are and neither do you. Accordingly I don’t see any basis for speculating what will they allow.
Well, let’s think about whether we have a proof of concept. What’s an example of a generalization about high-complexity algorithms that might show most of them to be easily usefully compressed, for an observer living inside one? At this point it’s OK if we don’t know that the generalization holds; I just want to know what it could even look like to discover that a universe that looks like ours (as opposed to, say, one that looks like a patchwork or a Boltzmann Braintopia) is the norm for high-complexity sapience-permitting worlds.
ETA: Since most conceivable universes are very very complicated, I’d agree that we probably live in a very very complicated universe, if it could be shown that our empirical data doesn’t strongly support nomic simplicity.
The default rule is that “man is the measure of all things” so presumably you are using these words in the context of what is short and simple for the human brain.
No, I’m saying it’s short and simple relative to the number of ways a universe could be, and short and simple relative to the number of ways a life-bearing universe could be. There’s no upper bound on how complicated a universe could in principle be, but there is a lower bound, and our physics is, even in human terms, not far off from that lower bound.
Humans have a preference for simple laws because those are the ones we can understand and reason about. The history of physics is a history of coming up with gradually more complex laws that are better approximations to reality.
Why not expect this trend to continue with our best model of reality becoming more and more complex?
How do you know the list is short and the rules are simple?
What do the words “short” and “simple” mean here?
I don’t think that most high-complexity algorithms for building a life-permitting observable universe would allow a theory as simple as human physics to approximate the algorithm as well as our observable universe does.
Do you think the observable universe is a lot more complicated than it appears?
This is trivially false. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that there is a short, simple set of rules for building a life permitting observable universe. Now add an arbitrary, small, highly complex perturbation to that set of rules. Voila, infinitely many high complexity algorithms which can be well-approximated by low complexity algorithms.
How does demonstrating ‘infinitely many algorithms have property X’ help falsify ‘most algorithms lack property X’? Infinitely many integers end with the string …30811, but that does nothing to suggest that most integers do.
Maybe most random life-permitting algorithms beyond a certain level of complexity have lawful regions where all one’s immediate observations are predictable by simple rules. But in that case I’d want to know the proportion of observers in such universes that are lucky enough to end up in an island of simplicity. (As opposed to being, say, Boltzmann brains.)
The observable universe is enormously complicated, not in its rules but in its configuration (“indexical” complexity = complexity).
I have no idea what these algorithms might be are and neither do you. Accordingly I don’t see any basis for speculating what will they allow.
I think the observable universe appears to be very complicated.
I am still interested in what do you mean by “short” and “simple”. The default rule is that “man is the measure of all things” so presumably you are using these words in the context of what is short and simple for the human brain.
Requiring the universe to be constructed in a way that is short and simple for the brains of a single species on a planet in a provincial star system in some galaxy seems to be carrying the anthropic principle a bit too far.
Well, let’s think about whether we have a proof of concept. What’s an example of a generalization about high-complexity algorithms that might show most of them to be easily usefully compressed, for an observer living inside one? At this point it’s OK if we don’t know that the generalization holds; I just want to know what it could even look like to discover that a universe that looks like ours (as opposed to, say, one that looks like a patchwork or a Boltzmann Braintopia) is the norm for high-complexity sapience-permitting worlds.
ETA: Since most conceivable universes are very very complicated, I’d agree that we probably live in a very very complicated universe, if it could be shown that our empirical data doesn’t strongly support nomic simplicity.
No, I’m saying it’s short and simple relative to the number of ways a universe could be, and short and simple relative to the number of ways a life-bearing universe could be. There’s no upper bound on how complicated a universe could in principle be, but there is a lower bound, and our physics is, even in human terms, not far off from that lower bound.
Humans have a preference for simple laws because those are the ones we can understand and reason about. The history of physics is a history of coming up with gradually more complex laws that are better approximations to reality.
Why not expect this trend to continue with our best model of reality becoming more and more complex?
In this case I can apply the “short & simple” descriptor to anything at all in the observable universe. That makes it not very useful.