This is trivially false. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that there is a short, simple set of rules for building a life permitting observable universe. Now add an arbitrary, small, highly complex perturbation to that set of rules. Voila, infinitely many high complexity algorithms which can be well-approximated by low complexity algorithms.
How does demonstrating ‘infinitely many algorithms have property X’ help falsify ‘most algorithms lack property X’? Infinitely many integers end with the string …30811, but that does nothing to suggest that most integers do.
Maybe most random life-permitting algorithms beyond a certain level of complexity have lawful regions where all one’s immediate observations are predictable by simple rules. But in that case I’d want to know the proportion of observers in such universes that are lucky enough to end up in an island of simplicity. (As opposed to being, say, Boltzmann brains.)
This is trivially false. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that there is a short, simple set of rules for building a life permitting observable universe. Now add an arbitrary, small, highly complex perturbation to that set of rules. Voila, infinitely many high complexity algorithms which can be well-approximated by low complexity algorithms.
How does demonstrating ‘infinitely many algorithms have property X’ help falsify ‘most algorithms lack property X’? Infinitely many integers end with the string …30811, but that does nothing to suggest that most integers do.
Maybe most random life-permitting algorithms beyond a certain level of complexity have lawful regions where all one’s immediate observations are predictable by simple rules. But in that case I’d want to know the proportion of observers in such universes that are lucky enough to end up in an island of simplicity. (As opposed to being, say, Boltzmann brains.)