As before, you are having problems getting altruistic (meaning not entirely egoistic) morality out of hedonism.
It seems that, if this ‘certain hedonist’ were really fully rational, they would start caring about their pleasures and pains equally across days.
Sure. But that’s not the same thing as:
But I think this is false—it would realize that the distinction between itself and others is totally arbitrary, as Parfit argues in reasons and persons (summarized by Richard here).
The Hedonist is motivated to care about tuesdays, because it gets them more of the utility they already care about. However, the individual who realises that distinctions between individuals are objected arbitrary isn’t automatically motivated to act on it, and is somewhat motivated not to, since altruistic morality tends to lose the altruist utility.
The two claims are basically about two kinds of rationality—the first is instrumental, the second epistemic.
This thesis is controversial, but I think true if moral realism is true.
Of course it’s the other way round—you need it to be true to support MR.
If one was fully rational, they would not have future Tuesday indifference, because it’s irrational. Similarly, if one was fully rational they’d realize that it’s better to be happy than make paperclips.
Same problem—the first is a kind of rationality that takes the UF as given, the second changes it.
First, we don’t have any smart people who don’t care about their suffering either.
But that doesn’t help because the gap between egoism and altruism is the whole problem.
Have you read Parfit on this? The FTI argument is in on what matters—the argument that we’d care about others if we were very rational is in reasons and persons. One could be a moral realist while denying that reason alone would make us moral—Sidgwick is a good example.
As before, you are having problems getting altruistic (meaning not entirely egoistic) morality out of hedonism.
Sure. But that’s not the same thing as:
The Hedonist is motivated to care about tuesdays, because it gets them more of the utility they already care about. However, the individual who realises that distinctions between individuals are objected arbitrary isn’t automatically motivated to act on it, and is somewhat motivated not to, since altruistic morality tends to lose the altruist utility.
The two claims are basically about two kinds of rationality—the first is instrumental, the second epistemic.
Of course it’s the other way round—you need it to be true to support MR.
Same problem—the first is a kind of rationality that takes the UF as given, the second changes it.
But that doesn’t help because the gap between egoism and altruism is the whole problem.
Have you read Parfit on this? The FTI argument is in on what matters—the argument that we’d care about others if we were very rational is in reasons and persons. One could be a moral realist while denying that reason alone would make us moral—Sidgwick is a good example.
I’ve read RYC’s summary. Your summary doesn’t bring out that it’s an argument for altruism.