I skimmed the link about moral realism, and hoo boy, it’s so wrong. It is recursively, fractally wrong.
Let’s consider the argument about “intuitions”. The problem with this argument is following: my intuition tells me that moral realism is wrong. I mean it. It’s not like “I have intuition that moral realism is true but my careful reasoning disproves it”, no, I feel that moral realism is wrong since I first time hear it when I was child and my careful reflection supports this conclusion. Argument from intuitions ignores my existence. The failure to consider that intuitions about morality can be wildly different between people doesn’t make me sympathetic to the argument “most philosophers are moral realists” either.
Most people don’t have those intuitions. Most people have the intuition that future tuesday indifference is irrational and that it’s wrong to torture infants for fun and would be so even if everyone approved.
Argument “from intuition” doesn’t work this way. We appeal to intuitions if we don’t why, but almost everyone feels that X is true and everybody who doesn’t is in psychiatric ward. If you have major intuitive disagreement in baseline population, you don’t use argument from intuition.
Why think that? If I have a strong intuition, in the sense that I feel like I’ve grasped a truth, and others don’t, then it seems the best explanation is that they’re missing something.
I skimmed the link about moral realism, and hoo boy, it’s so wrong. It is recursively, fractally wrong.
Let’s consider the argument about “intuitions”. The problem with this argument is following: my intuition tells me that moral realism is wrong. I mean it. It’s not like “I have intuition that moral realism is true but my careful reasoning disproves it”, no, I feel that moral realism is wrong since I first time hear it when I was child and my careful reflection supports this conclusion. Argument from intuitions ignores my existence. The failure to consider that intuitions about morality can be wildly different between people doesn’t make me sympathetic to the argument “most philosophers are moral realists” either.
Most people don’t have those intuitions. Most people have the intuition that future tuesday indifference is irrational and that it’s wrong to torture infants for fun and would be so even if everyone approved.
Argument “from intuition” doesn’t work this way. We appeal to intuitions if we don’t why, but almost everyone feels that X is true and everybody who doesn’t is in psychiatric ward. If you have major intuitive disagreement in baseline population, you don’t use argument from intuition.
Why think that? If I have a strong intuition, in the sense that I feel like I’ve grasped a truth, and others don’t, then it seems the best explanation is that they’re missing something.
Or that you are mistaken.