[...] would you feel better if tortured one of my children, if I also made two other children I treated nicely?
[...] Given the survey results, I feel fairly confident that he would, yes.
Really? I recall the Less Wrong survey result that most of us are consequentialists. And it’s safe to assert that torturing a baby is theoretically compensated by an improvement in the welfare of a sufficient number of preexisting babies (with some hedges thrown in that might prevent torture in practice). But the ethical significance of creating new persons is not clear, especially in light of impossibility results in population ethics. And in light of anthropic difficulties, Eliezer himself leans towards privileging the welfare of already-existing persons.
Really? I recall the Less Wrong survey result that most of us are consequentialists. And it’s safe to assert that torturing a baby is theoretically compensated by an improvement in the welfare of a sufficient number of preexisting babies (with some hedges thrown in that might prevent torture in practice). But the ethical significance of creating new persons is not clear, especially in light of impossibility results in population ethics. And in light of anthropic difficulties, Eliezer himself leans towards privileging the welfare of already-existing persons.