Luke was making a point that outlawing slavery has ended an institution that has existed throughout much of recorded history, but that’s disingenuous, I think, because there are more slaves than there ever were
If one looks only at absolute numbers, I imagine there are very few things, good or bad, which are not at a historic peak.
Another point in favor of disregarding lower proportions: would you feel better if tortured one of my children, if I also made two other children I treated nicely? After all, I would’ve decreased the rate of tortured children in the world.
This is a restatement of the fundamental meaning of utilitarianism, if one eliminates the rhetorical equation of ‘torture’ with ‘treated nicely’. Given the survey results, I feel fairly confident that he would, yes.
[...] would you feel better if tortured one of my children, if I also made two other children I treated nicely?
[...] Given the survey results, I feel fairly confident that he would, yes.
Really? I recall the Less Wrong survey result that most of us are consequentialists. And it’s safe to assert that torturing a baby is theoretically compensated by an improvement in the welfare of a sufficient number of preexisting babies (with some hedges thrown in that might prevent torture in practice). But the ethical significance of creating new persons is not clear, especially in light of impossibility results in population ethics. And in light of anthropic difficulties, Eliezer himself leans towards privileging the welfare of already-existing persons.
If one looks only at absolute numbers, I imagine there are very few things, good or bad, which are not at a historic peak.
This is a restatement of the fundamental meaning of utilitarianism, if one eliminates the rhetorical equation of ‘torture’ with ‘treated nicely’. Given the survey results, I feel fairly confident that he would, yes.
Really? I recall the Less Wrong survey result that most of us are consequentialists. And it’s safe to assert that torturing a baby is theoretically compensated by an improvement in the welfare of a sufficient number of preexisting babies (with some hedges thrown in that might prevent torture in practice). But the ethical significance of creating new persons is not clear, especially in light of impossibility results in population ethics. And in light of anthropic difficulties, Eliezer himself leans towards privileging the welfare of already-existing persons.