Any rational agent (optimization process) in any world with some regularities would exploit these regularities, which means use math. A reflective self-optimizing rational agent would arrive to the same math as us, because the math is unique.
Assuming it started with the same laws of inference and axioms. Also I was mostly thinking of statements about the world, e.g., physics.
Assuming it started with the same laws of inference and axioms
Or equivalent ones. But no matter where it started, it won’t arrive at different primitive-recursive truths, at least according to my brain’s current understanding.
Also I was mostly thinking of statements about the world, e.g., physics.
Is there significant difference? Wherever there are regularities in physics, there’s math (=study of regularities). Where no regularities exist, there’s no rationality.
I think the poor things are already dead. More generally, I am aware of that post, but is it relevant? The possible mind design space is of course huge and contains lots of irrational minds, but here I am arguing about universality of rationality.
But rationality is defined by external criteria—it’s about how to win (=achieve intended goals). Morality doesn’t have any such criteria. Thus, “rational minds” is a natural category. “Moral minds” is not.
Assuming it started with the same laws of inference and axioms. Also I was mostly thinking of statements about the world, e.g., physics.
Or equivalent ones. But no matter where it started, it won’t arrive at different primitive-recursive truths, at least according to my brain’s current understanding.
Is there significant difference? Wherever there are regularities in physics, there’s math (=study of regularities). Where no regularities exist, there’s no rationality.
What about the poor beings with an anti-iductive prior? More generally read this post by Eliezer.
I think the poor things are already dead. More generally, I am aware of that post, but is it relevant? The possible mind design space is of course huge and contains lots of irrational minds, but here I am arguing about universality of rationality.
My point, as I stated above, is that every argument I’ve heard against universality of morality applies just as well to rationality.
I agree with your statement:
I would also agree with the following:
The possible mind design space is of course huge and contains lots of immoral minds, but here I am arguing about universality of morality.
But rationality is defined by external criteria—it’s about how to win (=achieve intended goals). Morality doesn’t have any such criteria. Thus, “rational minds” is a natural category. “Moral minds” is not.