I may well be being obtuse, but it seems to me that there’s something very odd about the phrase “theism / objective morality”, with its suggestion that basically the two are the same thing.
This reflects a confusion I have about how popular philosophical opinion is in favor of moral realism, yet against theism. It seems that getting the correct answer to all possible moral problems would require prodigious intelligence, and so I don’t really understand the conjunct of moral realism and atheism. This likely reflects my ignorance of the existent philosophical literature, though to be honest like most LessWrongers I’m a little skeptical of the worth of the average philosopher’s opinion, especially about subjects outside of his specialty. Also if I averaged philosophical opinion over, say, the last 500 years, then I think theism would beat atheism. Also, there’s the algorithm from music appreciation, which is like “look at what good musicians like”, which I think would strongly favor theism. Still, I admit I’m confused.
Have you actually argued forcefully that your god is also Aquinas’s and Leibniz’s? I ask because first you say you could, which kinda suggests you haven’t actually done it so far (at least not in public), but then you start talking about “counterarguments”, which kinda suggests that you have and people have responded.
I’ve kinda argued it on the meta-level, i.e. I’ve argued about when it is or isn’t appropriate to assume that you’re actually referring to the same concept versus just engaging in syncretism. But IIRC I haven’t yet forcefully argued that my god is Leibniz’s God. So, yeah, it’s a mixture.
BTW, realistically, I won’t be able to reply to your comment re CEV/rightness, though as a result of your comment I do plan on re-reading the meta-ethics sequence to see if “right” is anywhere (implicitly or explicitly) defined as CEV.
Also if I averaged philosophical opinion over, say, the last 500 years, then I think theism would beat atheism.
(nods) Very likely. To the extent that this technique is useful for rank-ordering philosophical positions I ought to adopt, I can also use it to rank-order various theological positions to determine which particular theology to adopt. (I’ve never done this, but I predict it’s one that endorses literacy.)
Surely typical moral realists, atheist or otherwise, don’t believe that they’ve got the correct answer to all possible moral problems. (Just as no one thinks they’re factually correct about everything.)
I don’t think “averaged philosophical opinion” is likely to have much value. Nor “averaged opinion of good musicians” when you’re talking about something that isn’t primarily musical, especially when you average over a period for much of which (e.g.) many of the best employment opportunities for musicians were working for religious organizations.
(Human with a finite brain; apologies for errors or omissions.)
Surely typical moral realists, atheist or otherwise, don’t believe that they’ve got the correct answer to all possible moral problems.
Apparently I mis-stated something. I’m a little too spent to fully rectify the situation, so here’s some word salad: moral realism implies belief in a Form of the Good, but ISTM that the Form of the Good has to be personal, because only intelligences can solve moral problems; specifically, I think a true Form of the Good has to be a superintelligence, i.e. a god, who, if the god is also the Form of the Good, we call God. ISTM that belief in a Form of the Good that isn’t personal is an obvious error that any decent moral philosopher should recognize, and so I think there must be something wrong with how I’m formulating the problem or with how I’m conceptualizing others’ representation of the problem.
This reflects a confusion I have about how popular philosophical opinion is in favor of moral realism, yet against theism. It seems that getting the correct answer to all possible moral problems would require prodigious intelligence, and so I don’t really understand the conjunct of moral realism and atheism. This likely reflects my ignorance of the existent philosophical literature, though to be honest like most LessWrongers I’m a little skeptical of the worth of the average philosopher’s opinion, especially about subjects outside of his specialty. Also if I averaged philosophical opinion over, say, the last 500 years, then I think theism would beat atheism. Also, there’s the algorithm from music appreciation, which is like “look at what good musicians like”, which I think would strongly favor theism. Still, I admit I’m confused.
I’ve kinda argued it on the meta-level, i.e. I’ve argued about when it is or isn’t appropriate to assume that you’re actually referring to the same concept versus just engaging in syncretism. But IIRC I haven’t yet forcefully argued that my god is Leibniz’s God. So, yeah, it’s a mixture.
I replied to Wei Dai’s comment here.
BTW, realistically, I won’t be able to reply to your comment re CEV/rightness, though as a result of your comment I do plan on re-reading the meta-ethics sequence to see if “right” is anywhere (implicitly or explicitly) defined as CEV.
(Inebriated, apologies for errors or omissions.)
(nods) Very likely. To the extent that this technique is useful for rank-ordering philosophical positions I ought to adopt, I can also use it to rank-order various theological positions to determine which particular theology to adopt. (I’ve never done this, but I predict it’s one that endorses literacy.)
Surely typical moral realists, atheist or otherwise, don’t believe that they’ve got the correct answer to all possible moral problems. (Just as no one thinks they’re factually correct about everything.)
I don’t think “averaged philosophical opinion” is likely to have much value. Nor “averaged opinion of good musicians” when you’re talking about something that isn’t primarily musical, especially when you average over a period for much of which (e.g.) many of the best employment opportunities for musicians were working for religious organizations.
(Human with a finite brain; apologies for errors or omissions.)
Apparently I mis-stated something. I’m a little too spent to fully rectify the situation, so here’s some word salad: moral realism implies belief in a Form of the Good, but ISTM that the Form of the Good has to be personal, because only intelligences can solve moral problems; specifically, I think a true Form of the Good has to be a superintelligence, i.e. a god, who, if the god is also the Form of the Good, we call God. ISTM that belief in a Form of the Good that isn’t personal is an obvious error that any decent moral philosopher should recognize, and so I think there must be something wrong with how I’m formulating the problem or with how I’m conceptualizing others’ representation of the problem.