Even without the US the EU has more than double the defense budget of Russia. European willingness to defend one of the countries of the EU is by a magnitude higher than the willingness to defend Ukraine or Georgia.
There are open borders in the EU and that means people from the baltic states are free to travel around. As a result many EU citizens have interacted with people from the baltic states
Latvia has a per capita GDP (PPP) of 20,000 while Ukraine has one of 7,500. Latvia has a functioning democracy and is not ruled by a bunch of oligarchs. It’s from an European perspective worth protecting in a way that Ukraine simply isn’t. Or Moldova, Georgia, Belarus or Azerbaijan for that matter.
I would also expect that Latvia gives it’s minorities certain rights because it’s legally obliged to do so under EU law that Ukraine didn’t.
The contract that you linked to doesn’t specify that the US has a legal duty to protect the Ukraine.
I would also expect that Latvia gives it’s minorities certain rights because it’s legally obliged to do so under EU law that Ukraine didn’t.
This isn’t directly relevant to the discussion, but if Russia were ever to attack Latvia, their excuse would probably precisely be the treatment of ethnic Russians. It is, in fact, a recurring theme in Russian media.
The reason for this is that in order to be eligible for a full citizenship one is required to pass Latvian language competency and Latvian history exams. What is more, Latvia allows dual citizenship, but only if the other citizenship is of a country that belongs to the list that is specified by a law. Russia is not on the list.
Citizens of the former USSR who possess neither Latvian nor other citizenship who live in Latvia are eligible for a non-citizen passport. They are allowed to naturalize provided they pass the aforementioned exams. However, for various reasons many are unwilling (few are unable) to do so. For example, traveling to Russia is easier for a non-citizen than a citizen of Latvia. However, it is easier to work and travel in the Schengen Area if one is a non-citizen of Latvia than a citizen of Russia. Thus some people might find it disadvantageous to choose one citizenship (in their day-to-day lives traveling is more important than having the right to vote).
Peter Van Elsuwege, a scholar in European law at Ghent University, states that the Latvian law is grounded upon the established legal principle that persons who settle under the rule of an occupying power gain no automatic right to nationality. A number of historic precedents support this, according to Van Elsuwege, most notably the case of Alsace-Lorraine when the French on recovering the territory in 1918 did not grant citizenship to German settlers despite Germany having annexed the territory 47 years earlier in 1871.
However, as you can imagine, the fact that these non-citizens (mostly Russians) do not have voting rights is a target of outrage in Russian media. Furthermore, many ethnic Russians in Latvia watch a lot of it and this results in them having different opinions (about e.g. situation in Ukraine) than ethnic Latvians. However, it is not clear whether they would actually support Russia in the case of armed conflict.
Please note that I’m neither Latvian, nor an expert on Latvian law, therefore the story above may contain some inaccuracies. Still, LW readers might find it helpful for their probability estimates of potential wars and/or other events.
Thank you. I’d wondered about whether ethnic Russians were actually being mistreated, though this doesn’t answer the question of whether they were being mistreated in Ukraine.
The next question is whether they’ve being treated differently now that Russia is doing some invading.
Russian language seems to have high informal status, since, according to wikipedia
A 2012 study showed that:
on the radio, 3.4% of songs are in Ukrainian while 60% are in Russian
over 60% of newspapers, 83% of journals and 87% of books are in Russian
28% of TV programs are in Ukrainian, even on state-owned channels.
and business affairs are still mainly dealt with in Russian. Some people even claim that
“There is an established Russian-speaking environment in big cities and it exerts pressure on people,” she claims. “They think that they will not belong to it if they speak Ukrainian.”
and, according to the same article
Sociological surveys show a huge gap between the number of those who speak Ukrainian at home and those who also use it at work and in public. For Kyiv, this is about 50% and 20% accordingly.
At the same time, according to the Constitution, the state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.
However, in 2012 the new law gave Russian status of regional language and approved its use in courts and other government institutions in areas where the percentage of Russians exceeds 10%.
As you can see, we can observe the gap between formal status and informal status of Russian in Ukraine. Thus for any language related event there are at least two different interpretations. For example, on February 2014, the new Ukrainian government tried to repeal 2012 language law. While many Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians saw it as an attempt to finally curtail Russification (in the informal sphere), many Russian speakers “saw the move as more evidence that the antigovernment protests in Kiev that toppled Yanukovich’s government were intent on pressing for a nationalistic agenda.”
Obviously, back in 2012 it was Ukrainian speakers who saw the new law as unfairly “narrowing the sphere of use of Ukrainian language” and on February 2014 they thought that it was their chance to reverse it. However, they were far too much in haste, and, even though the acting president vetoed the bill, a backlash among Russian speakers probably made Russia’s military takeover of Crimea much easier.
Although the language isn’t everything, but, according to an opinion poll
among respondents who support Ukraine’s entry into the Customs Union, the vast majority (72%) speak in favor of granting Russian the status of the state language. However, among respondents who support the signing of the free trade zone agreement with the EU, the vast majority (72%) are against bilingualism
Another point made by the same poll shows that it is, at least partially, a matter of personal identity beyond language:
Despite the fact that Ukrainian is mostly spoken by elderly people, young people oppose bilingualism more.
(indeed, it seems that for many Ukrainians this whole EU vs.Customs Union dilemma is more about identity than economics).
But I digress. In short, it seems to me that if Russians were actually being mistreated, their language would not have such a high informal status in Ukraine, which is disproportionate to the share of actual ethnic Russians in Ukrainian population. However, due to the differences between formal, informal public and informal private spheres certain actions (e.g. by the government) can be perceived as unfair by a certain segment of population.
(Disclaimer: I am not a Ukrainian; the story above may contain some inaccuracies. In addition, an actual Ukrainian would be able to tell what exactly are prevailing sentiments now)
That’s interesting. I would have estimated more pressure from the EU on that issue. From a quick googling it seemed that nobody sued in the European Court of Human Rights about the issue.
I understand it’s something the EU does criticise them for. I suspect we don’t see that kind of lawsuit because the people who care most about the issue also don’t want to legitimise EU power in Latvia.
Even without the US the EU has more than double the defense budget of Russia. European willingness to defend one of the countries of the EU is by a magnitude higher than the willingness to defend Ukraine or Georgia.
There are open borders in the EU and that means people from the baltic states are free to travel around. As a result many EU citizens have interacted with people from the baltic states
Latvia has a per capita GDP (PPP) of 20,000 while Ukraine has one of 7,500. Latvia has a functioning democracy and is not ruled by a bunch of oligarchs. It’s from an European perspective worth protecting in a way that Ukraine simply isn’t. Or Moldova, Georgia, Belarus or Azerbaijan for that matter.
I would also expect that Latvia gives it’s minorities certain rights because it’s legally obliged to do so under EU law that Ukraine didn’t.
The contract that you linked to doesn’t specify that the US has a legal duty to protect the Ukraine.
This isn’t directly relevant to the discussion, but if Russia were ever to attack Latvia, their excuse would probably precisely be the treatment of ethnic Russians. It is, in fact, a recurring theme in Russian media.
The reason for this is that in order to be eligible for a full citizenship one is required to pass Latvian language competency and Latvian history exams. What is more, Latvia allows dual citizenship, but only if the other citizenship is of a country that belongs to the list that is specified by a law. Russia is not on the list.
Citizens of the former USSR who possess neither Latvian nor other citizenship who live in Latvia are eligible for a non-citizen passport. They are allowed to naturalize provided they pass the aforementioned exams. However, for various reasons many are unwilling (few are unable) to do so. For example, traveling to Russia is easier for a non-citizen than a citizen of Latvia. However, it is easier to work and travel in the Schengen Area if one is a non-citizen of Latvia than a citizen of Russia. Thus some people might find it disadvantageous to choose one citizenship (in their day-to-day lives traveling is more important than having the right to vote).
How such an unusual situation came into existence? If I understand correctly, in early 1990s Latvia desperately tried to avoid breakaway regions, because in 1989 only 49% of the non-Latvian population supported the idea of the independence of Latvia (the number of Latvians supporting the idea made up 93%). It should be noted that, according to wikipedia, such situation is not without a precedent:
However, as you can imagine, the fact that these non-citizens (mostly Russians) do not have voting rights is a target of outrage in Russian media. Furthermore, many ethnic Russians in Latvia watch a lot of it and this results in them having different opinions (about e.g. situation in Ukraine) than ethnic Latvians. However, it is not clear whether they would actually support Russia in the case of armed conflict.
Please note that I’m neither Latvian, nor an expert on Latvian law, therefore the story above may contain some inaccuracies. Still, LW readers might find it helpful for their probability estimates of potential wars and/or other events.
Thank you. I’d wondered about whether ethnic Russians were actually being mistreated, though this doesn’t answer the question of whether they were being mistreated in Ukraine.
The next question is whether they’ve being treated differently now that Russia is doing some invading.
It seems unlikely. In a poll held by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in May 2009 in Ukraine, 96% of respondents were positive about Russians as an ethnic group, 93% respected the Russian Federation and 76% respected the Russian establishment..
In the 2001 Ukrainian census 17.3% of the population of Ukraine identied as ethnic Russians (58.3% in Crimea) while 77.8% as Ukrainians. However, in 2012, only 50% of respondents consider Ukrainian their native language, 29% - Russian. Moreover, 20% consider both Ukrainian and Russian their mother tongue and 45% usually speak Ukrainian at home, 39% - Russian and 15% - both Ukrainian and Russian (equally).
Russian language seems to have high informal status, since, according to wikipedia
and business affairs are still mainly dealt with in Russian. Some people even claim that
and, according to the same article
At the same time, according to the Constitution, the state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. However, in 2012 the new law gave Russian status of regional language and approved its use in courts and other government institutions in areas where the percentage of Russians exceeds 10%.
As you can see, we can observe the gap between formal status and informal status of Russian in Ukraine. Thus for any language related event there are at least two different interpretations. For example, on February 2014, the new Ukrainian government tried to repeal 2012 language law. While many Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians saw it as an attempt to finally curtail Russification (in the informal sphere), many Russian speakers “saw the move as more evidence that the antigovernment protests in Kiev that toppled Yanukovich’s government were intent on pressing for a nationalistic agenda.” Obviously, back in 2012 it was Ukrainian speakers who saw the new law as unfairly “narrowing the sphere of use of Ukrainian language” and on February 2014 they thought that it was their chance to reverse it. However, they were far too much in haste, and, even though the acting president vetoed the bill, a backlash among Russian speakers probably made Russia’s military takeover of Crimea much easier.
Although the language isn’t everything, but, according to an opinion poll
Another point made by the same poll shows that it is, at least partially, a matter of personal identity beyond language:
(indeed, it seems that for many Ukrainians this whole EU vs.Customs Union dilemma is more about identity than economics).
But I digress. In short, it seems to me that if Russians were actually being mistreated, their language would not have such a high informal status in Ukraine, which is disproportionate to the share of actual ethnic Russians in Ukrainian population. However, due to the differences between formal, informal public and informal private spheres certain actions (e.g. by the government) can be perceived as unfair by a certain segment of population.
(Disclaimer: I am not a Ukrainian; the story above may contain some inaccuracies. In addition, an actual Ukrainian would be able to tell what exactly are prevailing sentiments now)
That’s interesting. I would have estimated more pressure from the EU on that issue. From a quick googling it seemed that nobody sued in the European Court of Human Rights about the issue.
I understand it’s something the EU does criticise them for. I suspect we don’t see that kind of lawsuit because the people who care most about the issue also don’t want to legitimise EU power in Latvia.