Please explain how suicide “logically” follows from what you call the “cyronics mindset”.
One possible motivation for being interested in cryonics (mine, for instance) is that you value having enjoyable and novel experiences. There is a small probability that by having my brain preserved, I will gain access to a very large supply of these experiences. And as I currently judge such things, dying and having my brain rot would put a definite and irrevocable stop to having such experiences.
It would be stupid to commit suicide now, even if I had arranged for cryonics, because the evidence is largely in favor of my being able to arrange for 20 years of novel enjoyable experiences starting now, while successful suspension and revival remains a long shot. I do not feel confident enough in calculations which multiply a very large utility of future life after revival, by a very small probability of eventual revival.
However there is a small but non-negligible chance that I will be diagnosed with a fatal disease during that period. At the moment the diagnosis is established my options for funding suspension simultaneously vanish; and most of my capital at that time should rationally be invested in fighting the disease (and making plans for my family). My capacity to arrange for future enjoyable experiences will effectively plummet to near zero as a result; I will have lost an option I now have, which appears to be the only option of its kind.
As long as my brain remains capable of novel enjoyable experiences, and I have plenty of evidence around me that older people are so capable, there is no “neural damage” to protect against. I would reason differently if I were diagnosed with, say, Alzheimer’s. I would prefer not to grapple with the question “how much of myself can I lose and still be myself”.
It may seem odd to care that much about my 10-year-removed future self. But “caring about future selves” and “not committing suicide” are at least consistent choices, and they both seem logically consistent with an investment in cyronics.
Please explain how suicide “logically” follows from what you call the “cyronics mindset”.
One possible motivation for being interested in cryonics (mine, for instance) is that you value having enjoyable and novel experiences. There is a small probability that by having my brain preserved, I will gain access to a very large supply of these experiences. And as I currently judge such things, dying and having my brain rot would put a definite and irrevocable stop to having such experiences.
It would be stupid to commit suicide now, even if I had arranged for cryonics, because the evidence is largely in favor of my being able to arrange for 20 years of novel enjoyable experiences starting now, while successful suspension and revival remains a long shot. I do not feel confident enough in calculations which multiply a very large utility of future life after revival, by a very small probability of eventual revival.
However there is a small but non-negligible chance that I will be diagnosed with a fatal disease during that period. At the moment the diagnosis is established my options for funding suspension simultaneously vanish; and most of my capital at that time should rationally be invested in fighting the disease (and making plans for my family). My capacity to arrange for future enjoyable experiences will effectively plummet to near zero as a result; I will have lost an option I now have, which appears to be the only option of its kind.
As long as my brain remains capable of novel enjoyable experiences, and I have plenty of evidence around me that older people are so capable, there is no “neural damage” to protect against. I would reason differently if I were diagnosed with, say, Alzheimer’s. I would prefer not to grapple with the question “how much of myself can I lose and still be myself”.
It may seem odd to care that much about my 10-year-removed future self. But “caring about future selves” and “not committing suicide” are at least consistent choices, and they both seem logically consistent with an investment in cyronics.