Taking the cryonics mindset to its logical conclusion, the most “rational” thing to do is commit suicide at age 30 and have yourself cryopreserved. Waiting until a natural death at a ripe old age, there may be too much neural damage to reconstitute the mind/brain. And since you’re destined to die anyway, isn’t the loss of 50 years of life a rational trade off for the miniscule chance of infinite life?
Please explain how suicide “logically” follows from what you call the “cyronics mindset”.
One possible motivation for being interested in cryonics (mine, for instance) is that you value having enjoyable and novel experiences. There is a small probability that by having my brain preserved, I will gain access to a very large supply of these experiences. And as I currently judge such things, dying and having my brain rot would put a definite and irrevocable stop to having such experiences.
It would be stupid to commit suicide now, even if I had arranged for cryonics, because the evidence is largely in favor of my being able to arrange for 20 years of novel enjoyable experiences starting now, while successful suspension and revival remains a long shot. I do not feel confident enough in calculations which multiply a very large utility of future life after revival, by a very small probability of eventual revival.
However there is a small but non-negligible chance that I will be diagnosed with a fatal disease during that period. At the moment the diagnosis is established my options for funding suspension simultaneously vanish; and most of my capital at that time should rationally be invested in fighting the disease (and making plans for my family). My capacity to arrange for future enjoyable experiences will effectively plummet to near zero as a result; I will have lost an option I now have, which appears to be the only option of its kind.
As long as my brain remains capable of novel enjoyable experiences, and I have plenty of evidence around me that older people are so capable, there is no “neural damage” to protect against. I would reason differently if I were diagnosed with, say, Alzheimer’s. I would prefer not to grapple with the question “how much of myself can I lose and still be myself”.
It may seem odd to care that much about my 10-year-removed future self. But “caring about future selves” and “not committing suicide” are at least consistent choices, and they both seem logically consistent with an investment in cyronics.
Taking the cryonics mindset to its logical conclusion, the most “rational” thing to do is commit suicide at age 30 and have yourself cryopreserved.
That might follow if you assign certain probabilities, utilities and discount factors, but it certainly isn’t the obvious logical conclusion. Even for most cryonics advocates, very likely living for at least 40 years more beats the a small extra chance of being revived in the future. “Paying a bit extra for the chance of being revived later on is worth it” does not equal “killing yourself for the chance of being revived later on is worth it”.
(Not even if we assumed the most inconvenient possible world where committing suicide at the age of 30 actually did improve your chances of getting successfully cryopreserved—in the world we live in, the following police investigation etc. would probably just reduce the odds.)
Plus, suicide allows you to make a controlled Exit and a controlled delivery in the cryopreserved state. You could die in a car accident, trapped in the wreckage for hours before they extract you, while your brain degenerates. You could be shot in the head. You could develop a neural disease or a brain tumor.
You just can’t take these chances. The rational solution is suicide at an early age.
Taking the cryonics mindset to its logical conclusion, the most “rational” thing to do is commit suicide at age 30 and have yourself cryopreserved. Waiting until a natural death at a ripe old age, there may be too much neural damage to reconstitute the mind/brain. And since you’re destined to die anyway, isn’t the loss of 50 years of life a rational trade off for the miniscule chance of infinite life?
NO.
Please explain how suicide “logically” follows from what you call the “cyronics mindset”.
One possible motivation for being interested in cryonics (mine, for instance) is that you value having enjoyable and novel experiences. There is a small probability that by having my brain preserved, I will gain access to a very large supply of these experiences. And as I currently judge such things, dying and having my brain rot would put a definite and irrevocable stop to having such experiences.
It would be stupid to commit suicide now, even if I had arranged for cryonics, because the evidence is largely in favor of my being able to arrange for 20 years of novel enjoyable experiences starting now, while successful suspension and revival remains a long shot. I do not feel confident enough in calculations which multiply a very large utility of future life after revival, by a very small probability of eventual revival.
However there is a small but non-negligible chance that I will be diagnosed with a fatal disease during that period. At the moment the diagnosis is established my options for funding suspension simultaneously vanish; and most of my capital at that time should rationally be invested in fighting the disease (and making plans for my family). My capacity to arrange for future enjoyable experiences will effectively plummet to near zero as a result; I will have lost an option I now have, which appears to be the only option of its kind.
As long as my brain remains capable of novel enjoyable experiences, and I have plenty of evidence around me that older people are so capable, there is no “neural damage” to protect against. I would reason differently if I were diagnosed with, say, Alzheimer’s. I would prefer not to grapple with the question “how much of myself can I lose and still be myself”.
It may seem odd to care that much about my 10-year-removed future self. But “caring about future selves” and “not committing suicide” are at least consistent choices, and they both seem logically consistent with an investment in cyronics.
That might follow if you assign certain probabilities, utilities and discount factors, but it certainly isn’t the obvious logical conclusion. Even for most cryonics advocates, very likely living for at least 40 years more beats the a small extra chance of being revived in the future. “Paying a bit extra for the chance of being revived later on is worth it” does not equal “killing yourself for the chance of being revived later on is worth it”.
(Not even if we assumed the most inconvenient possible world where committing suicide at the age of 30 actually did improve your chances of getting successfully cryopreserved—in the world we live in, the following police investigation etc. would probably just reduce the odds.)
What is the calculated utility of signing up for cryonics? I’ve never seen a figure.
It’ll vary drastically depending on who you ask. Hanson puts the worth of cryonic suspension at $125,000, assuming 50K$/year income.
No, because cryonics is expected to improve dramatically during our lifetimes. So the longer you wait to be preserved, the more likely it will work.
Capital letters don’t change math. Something is either a logical, rational conclusion given what you know or it isn’t.
Plus, suicide allows you to make a controlled Exit and a controlled delivery in the cryopreserved state. You could die in a car accident, trapped in the wreckage for hours before they extract you, while your brain degenerates. You could be shot in the head. You could develop a neural disease or a brain tumor.
You just can’t take these chances. The rational solution is suicide at an early age.
Depends on how high a probability you assign to cryonics working.