Well, aren’t you privileging the hypothesis that cryonics works? I mean, I look at Eliezer’s argument above, and the unstated assumption is, “Cryonics works and has no ill side effects.” Well, lets question that assumption. What if cryonics doesn’t work? What if it works, but leaves you disabled? I know several people who have “living wills”—they’d rather be dead than disabled. Unless you’re saying that your hypothetical thawing process will be nearly perfectly safe, I’d argue that there is a risk of disability, an outcome which may rank below death (depending on your individual value function, of course).
Given the above, would you say, “Anyone who doesn’t buy cryonics for their children is a bad parent?” After all, aren’t you imposing your value function vis a vis potential disability onto your children? Shouldn’t we let them decide their own values regarding such a significant issue?
Well, aren’t you privileging the hypothesis that cryonics works?
Making people into psychopaths would be extremely difficult even if you were trying to do it. Cryonics working is a hypothesis that I would put as ‘very slightly more likely than a desirable technological singularity’. It is worth the $300 a year because it is one of very few things that can actually save your life in the long term.
Unless you’re saying that your hypothetical thawing process will be nearly perfectly safe, I’d argue that there is a risk of disability, an outcome which may rank below death (depending on your individual value function, of course).
I count all those scenarios as ‘cryonics not working’.
I mean, I look at Eliezer’s argument above, and the unstated assumption is, “Cryonics works and has no ill side effects.”
That’s not his assumption. The assumption is that there is a non-negligible chance that cryonics will work—one chance in ten would be more than sufficient. Another assumption is that the opportunity to spend more time alive is far more desirable than death. It then follows that it’s nuts not to sign up.
Yeah, as wedrifid pointed out in a sibling post, I think Eliezer and I have different conceptions of what it means for cryonics to “work”. I was defining “works” as a having a thawing process that doesn’t kill you, but has the risk of disability. Eliezer, I now realize, has a much more stringent definition of the term.
Now, one more question, if you will humor me. What sort of incentives can we use to ensure that we are not used as guinea pigs for an experimental thawing process? For example, our descendants may want us thawed as soon as possible, even when the thawing process may not have been made sufficiently safe by our own criteria. How can we set up the incentives so that our descendants don’t thaw us using a procedure that we consider unnecessarily risky?
Only a much wealthier, more technologically advanced society would unfreeze corpses. Less technologically advanced societies couldn’t do it, and poorer societies wouldn’t bother.
Over time, wealth eventually causes the cultural changes we call “moral progress”.
Almost all bad scenarios lead to cryopreserved people never being revived. They either become “gray goo”, are eaten by roving bands of cannibals, are converted into paperclips, etc.
So anyway, I think in most scenarios reanimation will be better than death.
Over time, wealth eventually causes the cultural changes we call “moral progress”.
This seems a non-sequitur to me. There are a number of examples where wealth and moral progress are found together, but there are also examples where they are not. China and oil-rich Arab states come to mind.
Culture changes slowly, but economic growth can happen quickly. China is still quite poor, first of all, but it still seems that significant moral progress has occurred in China, and in only 30 years or so.
The wealthier Arab states are still pretty regressive, but we must consider how bad they used to be. For instance, as recently as the 1950s, 20% of the population of Saudi Arabia were slaves.
Alcor’s patient care trust board is composed of people who are signed up for cryonics. A majority of members on the board must have a cryopreserved relative or significant other. They could try to use people they don’t care about as guinea pigs, but there are also bylaws about ethically reviving people.
How can we set up the incentives so that our descendants don’t thaw us using a procedure that we consider unnecessarily risky?
I suppose extend whichever incentives that we use to make our descendants even bother with us at all. (Outside my field too I am afraid. I’m more of a ‘take direct action myself’ kind of guy than a ‘find some way to make people do stuff even when I am dead’ kind of guy.)
Well, aren’t you privileging the hypothesis that cryonics works?
We have actual object-level reasons to believe that.
What if it works, but leaves you disabled? I know several people who have “living wills”—they’d rather be dead than disabled. Unless you’re saying that your hypothetical thawing process will be nearly perfectly safe
I think it would be, since a safe process appears to be possible and you can (and presumably would) just be left frozen until it was sufficiently developed.
Shouldn’t we let them decide their own values regarding such a significant issue?
You can’t not decide. Not signing them up is still deciding.
Well, aren’t you privileging the hypothesis that cryonics works? I mean, I look at Eliezer’s argument above, and the unstated assumption is, “Cryonics works and has no ill side effects.” Well, lets question that assumption. What if cryonics doesn’t work? What if it works, but leaves you disabled? I know several people who have “living wills”—they’d rather be dead than disabled. Unless you’re saying that your hypothetical thawing process will be nearly perfectly safe, I’d argue that there is a risk of disability, an outcome which may rank below death (depending on your individual value function, of course).
Given the above, would you say, “Anyone who doesn’t buy cryonics for their children is a bad parent?” After all, aren’t you imposing your value function vis a vis potential disability onto your children? Shouldn’t we let them decide their own values regarding such a significant issue?
Making people into psychopaths would be extremely difficult even if you were trying to do it. Cryonics working is a hypothesis that I would put as ‘very slightly more likely than a desirable technological singularity’. It is worth the $300 a year because it is one of very few things that can actually save your life in the long term.
I count all those scenarios as ‘cryonics not working’.
That’s not his assumption. The assumption is that there is a non-negligible chance that cryonics will work—one chance in ten would be more than sufficient. Another assumption is that the opportunity to spend more time alive is far more desirable than death. It then follows that it’s nuts not to sign up.
Yeah, as wedrifid pointed out in a sibling post, I think Eliezer and I have different conceptions of what it means for cryonics to “work”. I was defining “works” as a having a thawing process that doesn’t kill you, but has the risk of disability. Eliezer, I now realize, has a much more stringent definition of the term.
Now, one more question, if you will humor me. What sort of incentives can we use to ensure that we are not used as guinea pigs for an experimental thawing process? For example, our descendants may want us thawed as soon as possible, even when the thawing process may not have been made sufficiently safe by our own criteria. How can we set up the incentives so that our descendants don’t thaw us using a procedure that we consider unnecessarily risky?
Only a much wealthier, more technologically advanced society would unfreeze corpses. Less technologically advanced societies couldn’t do it, and poorer societies wouldn’t bother.
Over time, wealth eventually causes the cultural changes we call “moral progress”.
Almost all bad scenarios lead to cryopreserved people never being revived. They either become “gray goo”, are eaten by roving bands of cannibals, are converted into paperclips, etc.
So anyway, I think in most scenarios reanimation will be better than death.
This seems a non-sequitur to me. There are a number of examples where wealth and moral progress are found together, but there are also examples where they are not. China and oil-rich Arab states come to mind.
Culture changes slowly, but economic growth can happen quickly. China is still quite poor, first of all, but it still seems that significant moral progress has occurred in China, and in only 30 years or so.
The wealthier Arab states are still pretty regressive, but we must consider how bad they used to be. For instance, as recently as the 1950s, 20% of the population of Saudi Arabia were slaves.
Alcor’s patient care trust board is composed of people who are signed up for cryonics. A majority of members on the board must have a cryopreserved relative or significant other. They could try to use people they don’t care about as guinea pigs, but there are also bylaws about ethically reviving people.
Dammit quanticle, I’m an engineer/biochemist/statistician, not an economist!
I suppose extend whichever incentives that we use to make our descendants even bother with us at all. (Outside my field too I am afraid. I’m more of a ‘take direct action myself’ kind of guy than a ‘find some way to make people do stuff even when I am dead’ kind of guy.)
COool manWe have actual object-level reasons to believe that.
I think it would be, since a safe process appears to be possible and you can (and presumably would) just be left frozen until it was sufficiently developed.
You can’t not decide. Not signing them up is still deciding.