Personally, I have a mild preference towards being alive rather than dead, but it’s not strong enough to motivate me to look at cryonics options. (Especially since their availability in Europe is rather bad.) This is partially motivated by the fact that I consider continuity of consciousness to be an illusion in any case—yes, there might be a person tomorrow who remembers thinking the thoughts of me today, but that’s a different person from the one typing these words now.
Of course, I’m evolutionarily hardwired to succumb to that illusion in some degree. Postulating a period of cryonic suspension after which I’m rebuilt, however, feels enough like being effectively killed and then reborn that it breaks the illusion. Also, that illusion is mostly something that operates in ‘near’ mode. Evoking the far, post-revival future gets me into ‘far’ mode, where I’m much less inclined to attach particular value for the survival of this particular being.
Finally, there’s also the fact that I consider our chances of actually building FAI and not getting destroyed by UFAI to be rather vanishingly small.
This is partially motivated by the fact that I consider continuity of consciousness to be an illusion in any case—yes, there might be a person tomorrow who remembers thinking the thoughts of me today, but that’s a different person from the one typing these words now.
Interesting. That thought process is how I made a case for cryonics to a friend recently. Their objection was that they didn’t think it would be them, and I countered with the fact that the you of tomorrow isn’t really the same as the you of today...and yet you still want to live till tomorrow.
Personally, I have a mild preference towards being alive rather than dead, but it’s not strong enough to motivate me to look at cryonics options. (Especially since their availability in Europe is rather bad.)
Do you think that there might be a link between these two things?
Aubrey de Grey often talks about the “pro-death trance”, and says that as long as people think that death from the diseases of aging is inevitable, they’ll find ways to rationalize why “it’s a good thing” or at least “not so bad”.
Do you think that if Cryonics was widely available where you are and that it was affordable (a hundred Euros a year life insurance, f.ex.) that this would increase your interest in it?
I have pretty much the same view as Kaj, I’d get cryonics if it was cheap.
If I did I’d want to put a note that I’d be okay with people using my brain for science when they needed it to test scanning equipment and the like. For some reason I can associate better and feel more positive about imagining papers being published about my brain than being reincarnated in silicon (or carbon nanotubes).
Do you think that if Cryonics was widely available where you are and that it was affordable (a hundred Euros a year life insurance, f.ex.) that this would increase your interest in it?
I often have this thought, and then get a nasty sick feeling along the lines of ‘what the hell kind of expected utility calculation am I doing that weighs a second shot at life against some amount of cash?’ Argument rejected!
This has to be a rationality error. Given that it’s far from guaranteed to work, there has to be an amount that cryonics could cost such that it wouldn’t be worth signing up. I’m not saying that the real costs are that high, just that if you’re making a rational decision such an amount will exist.
Given the sky-high utility I’d place on living, I wouldn’t expect to see the numbers crunch down to a place where a non-huge sum of money is the difference between signing up and not.
So when someone says ‘if it were half the price maybe I’d sign up’ I’m always interested to know exactly what calculations they’re performing, and exactly what it is that reduces the billions of utilons of living down to a marginal cash sum. The (tiny?) chance of cryonics working? Serious coincidence if those factors cancel comfortably. Just smacks of bottom-line to me.
Put it this way—imagine cryonics has been seriously, prohibitively expensive for many years after introduction. Say it still was today, for some reason, and then after much debate and hand-wringing about immortality for the uber-rich, tomorrow suddenly and very publicly dropped to current levels, I’d expect to see a huge upswing in signing up. Such is the human being!
Do you agree with the quantum physics sequence? This is the big reveal:
If you can see the moments of now braided into time, the causal dependencies of future states on past states, the high-level pattern of synapses and the internal narrative as a computation within it—if you can viscerally dispel the classical hallucination of a little billiard ball that is you, and see your nows strung out in the river that never flows—then you can see that signing up for cryonics, being vitrified in liquid nitrogen when you die, and having your brain nanotechnologically reconstructed fifty years later, is actually less of a change than going to sleep, dreaming, and forgetting your dreams when you wake up.
You should be able to see that, now, if you’ve followed through this whole series. You should be able to get it on a gut level—that being vitrified in liquid nitrogen for fifty years (around 3e52 Planck intervals) is not very different from waiting an average of 2e26 Planck intervals between neurons firing, on the generous assumption that there are a hundred trillion synapses firing a thousand times per second. You should be able to see that there is nothing preserved from one night’s sleep to the morning’s waking, which cryonic suspension does not preserve also. Assuming the vitrification technology is good enough for a sufficiently powerful Bayesian superintelligence to look at your frozen brain, and figure out “who you were” to the same resolution that your morning’s waking self resembles the person who went to sleep that night.
Assuming the vitrification technology is good enough for a sufficiently powerful Bayesian superintelligence to look at your frozen brain, and figure out “who you were” to the same resolution that your morning’s waking self resembles the person who went to sleep that night.
But I don’t think the person tomorrow is the same person as me today, either.
Point taken. Any interest in having your volition realized? This seems much more likely to me to matter and I do happen to run an organization aimed at providing it whether you pay us or not but we’d still appreciate your help.
being vitrified in liquid nitrogen when you die, and having your brain nanotechnologically reconstructed fifty years later, is actually less of a change than going to sleep, dreaming, and forgetting your dreams when you wake up.
I haven’t been entirely convinced on that note. The process of dying and the time it takes from heart stopping to head frozen in a jar seems like it would give plenty of opportunity for minor disruptions even granted that a superintelligence could put it back together.
I’m not sure if this has ever been presented as a scenario, but even if you are looking at many minor disruptions, physically speaking, there aren’t that many places that your neurons would have gone.
So, it is possible that many versions of you might be woken up, wedrifid1, wedrifid2, etc. , each the result of a different extrapolation that was minor enough to be extrapolated, yet major enough to deserve a different version. This would only happen if the damages have occurred in a place critical to your sense of self. I simply don’t know enough neurology and neurochemistry to say how much damage this is and where, but I’m sure that the superintelligences would be able to crack that one.
And your great grand children, being the nice sweet posthumans that we expect them to be, (they did recover you, didn’t they?) will spend time with all versions of their great grand parents. Their brains would be running at higher cycles and keeping intelligent conversations on with 10 versions of you will be trivial to them.
Personally, I have a mild preference towards being alive rather than dead, but it’s not strong enough to motivate me to look at cryonics options. (Especially since their availability in Europe is rather bad.) This is partially motivated by the fact that I consider continuity of consciousness to be an illusion in any case—yes, there might be a person tomorrow who remembers thinking the thoughts of me today, but that’s a different person from the one typing these words now.
Of course, I’m evolutionarily hardwired to succumb to that illusion in some degree. Postulating a period of cryonic suspension after which I’m rebuilt, however, feels enough like being effectively killed and then reborn that it breaks the illusion. Also, that illusion is mostly something that operates in ‘near’ mode. Evoking the far, post-revival future gets me into ‘far’ mode, where I’m much less inclined to attach particular value for the survival of this particular being.
Finally, there’s also the fact that I consider our chances of actually building FAI and not getting destroyed by UFAI to be rather vanishingly small.
Interesting. That thought process is how I made a case for cryonics to a friend recently. Their objection was that they didn’t think it would be them, and I countered with the fact that the you of tomorrow isn’t really the same as the you of today...and yet you still want to live till tomorrow.
Do you think that there might be a link between these two things?
Aubrey de Grey often talks about the “pro-death trance”, and says that as long as people think that death from the diseases of aging is inevitable, they’ll find ways to rationalize why “it’s a good thing” or at least “not so bad”.
Do you think that if Cryonics was widely available where you are and that it was affordable (a hundred Euros a year life insurance, f.ex.) that this would increase your interest in it?
I have pretty much the same view as Kaj, I’d get cryonics if it was cheap.
If I did I’d want to put a note that I’d be okay with people using my brain for science when they needed it to test scanning equipment and the like. For some reason I can associate better and feel more positive about imagining papers being published about my brain than being reincarnated in silicon (or carbon nanotubes).
Probably, yes.
I often have this thought, and then get a nasty sick feeling along the lines of ‘what the hell kind of expected utility calculation am I doing that weighs a second shot at life against some amount of cash?’ Argument rejected!
This has to be a rationality error. Given that it’s far from guaranteed to work, there has to be an amount that cryonics could cost such that it wouldn’t be worth signing up. I’m not saying that the real costs are that high, just that if you’re making a rational decision such an amount will exist.
Sorry, should have given more context.
Given the sky-high utility I’d place on living, I wouldn’t expect to see the numbers crunch down to a place where a non-huge sum of money is the difference between signing up and not.
So when someone says ‘if it were half the price maybe I’d sign up’ I’m always interested to know exactly what calculations they’re performing, and exactly what it is that reduces the billions of utilons of living down to a marginal cash sum. The (tiny?) chance of cryonics working? Serious coincidence if those factors cancel comfortably. Just smacks of bottom-line to me.
Put it this way—imagine cryonics has been seriously, prohibitively expensive for many years after introduction. Say it still was today, for some reason, and then after much debate and hand-wringing about immortality for the uber-rich, tomorrow suddenly and very publicly dropped to current levels, I’d expect to see a huge upswing in signing up. Such is the human being!
I agree with all of this.
Do you agree with the quantum physics sequence? This is the big reveal:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/qx/timeless_identity/
But I don’t think the person tomorrow is the same person as me today, either.
Point taken. Any interest in having your volition realized? This seems much more likely to me to matter and I do happen to run an organization aimed at providing it whether you pay us or not but we’d still appreciate your help.
Well, I am a monthly donor, and unless something unexpected happens I’ll be coming over in a few months to see what I can do for SIAI, so yes. :)
I haven’t been entirely convinced on that note. The process of dying and the time it takes from heart stopping to head frozen in a jar seems like it would give plenty of opportunity for minor disruptions even granted that a superintelligence could put it back together.
I’m not sure if this has ever been presented as a scenario, but even if you are looking at many minor disruptions, physically speaking, there aren’t that many places that your neurons would have gone.
So, it is possible that many versions of you might be woken up, wedrifid1, wedrifid2, etc. , each the result of a different extrapolation that was minor enough to be extrapolated, yet major enough to deserve a different version. This would only happen if the damages have occurred in a place critical to your sense of self. I simply don’t know enough neurology and neurochemistry to say how much damage this is and where, but I’m sure that the superintelligences would be able to crack that one.
And your great grand children, being the nice sweet posthumans that we expect them to be, (they did recover you, didn’t they?) will spend time with all versions of their great grand parents. Their brains would be running at higher cycles and keeping intelligent conversations on with 10 versions of you will be trivial to them.