I’m pretty interested in this as an exercise of ‘okay yep a bunch of those problems seem real. Can we make conceptual or mechanism-design progress on them in like an afternoon of thought?’
I’m interested too. I think several of the above are solvable issues. AFAICT:
Solved by simple modifications to markets:
Races to correct naive bidders
Defending the true price from incorrect bidders for $ w/o letting price shift
Seem doable with thought:
Billing for information value
Policy conditionals
Seem hard/idk if it’s possible to fully solve:
Collating information known by different bidders
Preventing tricking other bidders for profit
General enterprise of credit allocation for knowledge creation
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I’m pretty interested in this as an exercise of ‘okay yep a bunch of those problems seem real. Can we make conceptual or mechanism-design progress on them in like an afternoon of thought?’
I’m interested too. I think several of the above are solvable issues. AFAICT:
Solved by simple modifications to markets:
Races to correct naive bidders
Defending the true price from incorrect bidders for $ w/o letting price shift
Seem doable with thought:
Billing for information value
Policy conditionals
Seem hard/idk if it’s possible to fully solve:
Collating information known by different bidders
Preventing tricking other bidders for profit
General enterprise of credit allocation for knowledge creation