I’m pretty interested in this as an exercise of ‘okay yep a bunch of those problems seem real. Can we make conceptual or mechanism-design progress on them in like an afternoon of thought?’
I’m interested too. I think several of the above are solvable issues. AFAICT:
Solved by simple modifications to markets:
Races to correct naive bidders
Defending the true price from incorrect bidders for $ w/o letting price shift
Seem doable with thought:
Billing for information value
Policy conditionals
Seem hard/idk if it’s possible to fully solve:
Collating information known by different bidders
Preventing tricking other bidders for profit
General enterprise of credit allocation for knowledge creation
I’m pretty interested in this as an exercise of ‘okay yep a bunch of those problems seem real. Can we make conceptual or mechanism-design progress on them in like an afternoon of thought?’
I’m interested too. I think several of the above are solvable issues. AFAICT:
Solved by simple modifications to markets:
Races to correct naive bidders
Defending the true price from incorrect bidders for $ w/o letting price shift
Seem doable with thought:
Billing for information value
Policy conditionals
Seem hard/idk if it’s possible to fully solve:
Collating information known by different bidders
Preventing tricking other bidders for profit
General enterprise of credit allocation for knowledge creation