I’m interested too. I think several of the above are solvable issues. AFAICT:
Solved by simple modifications to markets:
Races to correct naive bidders
Defending the true price from incorrect bidders for $ w/o letting price shift
Seem doable with thought:
Billing for information value
Policy conditionals
Seem hard/idk if it’s possible to fully solve:
Collating information known by different bidders
Preventing tricking other bidders for profit
General enterprise of credit allocation for knowledge creation
I’m interested too. I think several of the above are solvable issues. AFAICT:
Solved by simple modifications to markets:
Races to correct naive bidders
Defending the true price from incorrect bidders for $ w/o letting price shift
Seem doable with thought:
Billing for information value
Policy conditionals
Seem hard/idk if it’s possible to fully solve:
Collating information known by different bidders
Preventing tricking other bidders for profit
General enterprise of credit allocation for knowledge creation