I am still thoroughly unpersuaded. Birth rates are one thing. Retention rates are quite another. As we’ve seen from the evidence of Quiverfull, and other Evangelical Christian communities in the US, most children do not remain in the community and continue its practices. The Middle East is experiencing high population growth but is also the most rapidly secularizing region in the world.
Kaufmann seems to be making the mistake of assuming that because many Middle Eastern countries mandate Islam as a state religion, that means that the people residing in those countries are necessarily devout.
Finally with regards to the “depth” of Westernization, I would argue that changes to marriage practices and family structure are an even deeper form of Westernization than adoption of particular political values.
I’m not sure Kaufmann does making that mistake. He focuses on extreme sects within each religion, not on Islam as a whole, and mostly on Western countries rather than the Middle East. You could say I’m making the mistake, because I discuss the probability of non-Westerners buying into Western values. Yeah, that could be. But I also would distinguish between secularization (and other kinds of modernization) and Westernization. (Japan did the one but not the other, for example.)
You’re right that marriage and family structure are “deep”. A friend of mine suggested that other “deep” Western exports are also important. For example, Erdogan sits atop a recognizably Weberian bureaucracy. That’s an institution not a market product. However, I’d say that political and cultural values are, if not deep, important. It matters, say, that Turkey is very far from a liberal state—even if Ataturk introduced Western-style state structures, and if Turks are embracing love marriage and fewer children.
But I also would distinguish between secularization (and other kinds of modernization) and Westernization. (Japan did the one but not the other, for example.)
Where your argument is concerned, it’s a distinction without a difference. Secularization absolutely destroys birthrates. When Japan secularized, its total fertility rate (TFR) dropped to 1.4. China’s TFR was 6.32. It is 1.6 today. India’s TFR has dropped from 5.9 to 2.2. The decline in the Arab world, while not as severe as that in Asia, is still pronounced. Egypt’s TFR has dropped from 6.7 to 3.3. Jordan dropped from 8.0 (!) to 2.8. Morocco dropped from 7.0 to 2.4.
I think secularization is a nontrivial cause of these declines.
I am still thoroughly unpersuaded. Birth rates are one thing. Retention rates are quite another. As we’ve seen from the evidence of Quiverfull, and other Evangelical Christian communities in the US, most children do not remain in the community and continue its practices. The Middle East is experiencing high population growth but is also the most rapidly secularizing region in the world.
Kaufmann seems to be making the mistake of assuming that because many Middle Eastern countries mandate Islam as a state religion, that means that the people residing in those countries are necessarily devout.
Finally with regards to the “depth” of Westernization, I would argue that changes to marriage practices and family structure are an even deeper form of Westernization than adoption of particular political values.
I’m not sure Kaufmann does making that mistake. He focuses on extreme sects within each religion, not on Islam as a whole, and mostly on Western countries rather than the Middle East. You could say I’m making the mistake, because I discuss the probability of non-Westerners buying into Western values. Yeah, that could be. But I also would distinguish between secularization (and other kinds of modernization) and Westernization. (Japan did the one but not the other, for example.)
You’re right that marriage and family structure are “deep”. A friend of mine suggested that other “deep” Western exports are also important. For example, Erdogan sits atop a recognizably Weberian bureaucracy. That’s an institution not a market product. However, I’d say that political and cultural values are, if not deep, important. It matters, say, that Turkey is very far from a liberal state—even if Ataturk introduced Western-style state structures, and if Turks are embracing love marriage and fewer children.
Where your argument is concerned, it’s a distinction without a difference. Secularization absolutely destroys birthrates. When Japan secularized, its total fertility rate (TFR) dropped to 1.4. China’s TFR was 6.32. It is 1.6 today. India’s TFR has dropped from 5.9 to 2.2. The decline in the Arab world, while not as severe as that in Asia, is still pronounced. Egypt’s TFR has dropped from 6.7 to 3.3. Jordan dropped from 8.0 (!) to 2.8. Morocco dropped from 7.0 to 2.4.
I think secularization is a nontrivial cause of these declines.