I’m not sure Kaufmann does making that mistake. He focuses on extreme sects within each religion, not on Islam as a whole, and mostly on Western countries rather than the Middle East. You could say I’m making the mistake, because I discuss the probability of non-Westerners buying into Western values. Yeah, that could be. But I also would distinguish between secularization (and other kinds of modernization) and Westernization. (Japan did the one but not the other, for example.)
You’re right that marriage and family structure are “deep”. A friend of mine suggested that other “deep” Western exports are also important. For example, Erdogan sits atop a recognizably Weberian bureaucracy. That’s an institution not a market product. However, I’d say that political and cultural values are, if not deep, important. It matters, say, that Turkey is very far from a liberal state—even if Ataturk introduced Western-style state structures, and if Turks are embracing love marriage and fewer children.
But I also would distinguish between secularization (and other kinds of modernization) and Westernization. (Japan did the one but not the other, for example.)
Where your argument is concerned, it’s a distinction without a difference. Secularization absolutely destroys birthrates. When Japan secularized, its total fertility rate (TFR) dropped to 1.4. China’s TFR was 6.32. It is 1.6 today. India’s TFR has dropped from 5.9 to 2.2. The decline in the Arab world, while not as severe as that in Asia, is still pronounced. Egypt’s TFR has dropped from 6.7 to 3.3. Jordan dropped from 8.0 (!) to 2.8. Morocco dropped from 7.0 to 2.4.
I think secularization is a nontrivial cause of these declines.
I’m not sure Kaufmann does making that mistake. He focuses on extreme sects within each religion, not on Islam as a whole, and mostly on Western countries rather than the Middle East. You could say I’m making the mistake, because I discuss the probability of non-Westerners buying into Western values. Yeah, that could be. But I also would distinguish between secularization (and other kinds of modernization) and Westernization. (Japan did the one but not the other, for example.)
You’re right that marriage and family structure are “deep”. A friend of mine suggested that other “deep” Western exports are also important. For example, Erdogan sits atop a recognizably Weberian bureaucracy. That’s an institution not a market product. However, I’d say that political and cultural values are, if not deep, important. It matters, say, that Turkey is very far from a liberal state—even if Ataturk introduced Western-style state structures, and if Turks are embracing love marriage and fewer children.
Where your argument is concerned, it’s a distinction without a difference. Secularization absolutely destroys birthrates. When Japan secularized, its total fertility rate (TFR) dropped to 1.4. China’s TFR was 6.32. It is 1.6 today. India’s TFR has dropped from 5.9 to 2.2. The decline in the Arab world, while not as severe as that in Asia, is still pronounced. Egypt’s TFR has dropped from 6.7 to 3.3. Jordan dropped from 8.0 (!) to 2.8. Morocco dropped from 7.0 to 2.4.
I think secularization is a nontrivial cause of these declines.