By which you mean, I suppose, that my skill as a rhetorician has exceeded my skill as a rationalist. Well, you may be right. Supposing you are, what do you suggest I do about it?
I do think you are glorifying democracy.
Well, yes, I am. Not our democracy, not any narrow technique for promoting democracy, but democracy as the broad principle that people should have a decisive say in the decisions that affect them strikes me as pretty awesome. I guess I might be claiming benefits for democracy in excess of what I have evidence to support, and that if I were an excellent rationalist, I would simply say, “I do not know what the effects of attempting democracy are.”
I am not an excellent rationalist. What I do is to look hard for the answers to important questions, and then, if after long searching I cannot find the answers and I have no hope of finding the answers, but the questions still seem important, I choose an answer that appeals to my intuition.
I spent the better part of my undergraduate years trying to understand what democracy is, what violence is, and whether the two have any systematic relation to each other. Scientifically speaking, my answer is that we do not know, and will not know, in all likelihood, for quite some time. Violence happens in places where researchers find it difficult or impossible to record it; death tolls are so biased by partisans of various stripes, by the credulity of an entertainment-based media, and by the fog of war that one can almost never tell which of two similarly-sized conflicts was more violent. Democracy is, at best, a correlation among several variables, each of which can only be specified with 2 or 3 bits of meaningful information, and each of which might have different effects on violence. Given the confusion, to scientifically state a relationship between democracy and violence would be ridiculous.
And, yet, I find that I very much want to know what the relationship is between democracy and violence. I can oppose all offensive wars designed to change another country’s regime type on the grounds that science supports no prediction that the certain deaths from war will be outweighed by bloodiness removed in an allegedly safer regime. What about defensive wars? I find that I cannot bring myself to say, “I would not fight to preserve my region’s measure of democracy against an outside autocratic invader, because I do not know, scientifically, that such a fight would reduce total bloodiness.” I would fight, believing without scientific evidence that such a war would be better than surrender.
Am I simply deluding myself? Most people on Less Wrong will think so. I do not particularly care. I am far more concerned about the danger of reasoning myself into a narcissistic, quiet-ist corner where I never take political action than I am about the danger of backing an ideal that turns out to be empty.
Using the Hansonian “far-view reference class,” the odds that an ideal chosen based on “things I believe in because I was taught to believe in them” is worth killing for are near zero. Using the same method, the odds that an ideal chosen based on “things that I believe in after carefully examining all available evidence and finding that I cannot think of a good reason to overturn my culture’s traditions, despite having actively questioned them” is worth killing for are high enough that I can sleep at night. If you believe I should be awake, I look forward to your reply.
Not at all. Rhetorical skill IS a good thing, and properly contributes to logic. Your argument seems rational to me, in the non-Spock sense that we generally encourage here. What to do? Keep on thinking AND caring!
If the search you use is as fair and unbiased as you can make it, this looking hard for answers is the core of what being a good rationalist is. Possibly, you should look harder for the causes of systematic differences between people’s intuitions, to see whether those causes are entangled with truth, but analysis has to stop at some point.
In practice, rationalists may back themselves into permanent inaction due to uncertainty, but the theory of rationality we endorse here says we should be doing what you claim to be doing. I find it extremely disturbing that we aren’t communicating this effectively, though its clearly our fault since we aren’t communicating it effectively enough to ourselves for it to motivate us to be more dynamic either.
When you say you glorify Democracy though, I think you mean something much closer to what I would call Coherent Extrapolated Volition than it is to what I would call Democracy. Something radically novel that hasn’t ever been tried, or even specified in enough detail to call it a proposal without some charity.
As a factual matter, I would suggest that the systems of government that we call Democracies in the US may typically be a bit further in the CEV direction than those we typically call dictatorships, but if they are, its a weak tendency, like the tendency of good painters to be good at basketball or something. You might detect it statistically, if you had properly operationalized it first, or vaguely suspect its there based on intuitive perception, but you couldn’t ever be very confident it was there.
It’s obviously wrong to overturn cultural traditions which have been questioned but not refuted. Such traditions have some information value, if only for anthropic reasons, and more importantly, they are somewhat correlated with your values. In this particular case, if you limit your options under consideration to ‘fight against invaders or do nothing’ I have no objections. Real life situations usually present more options, but those weren’t specified.
As an off-the-cuff example, I think its obvious that a person who fought against the NAZIs in WWII was doing something better than they would by staying home even though the NAZIs didn’t invade the US and even valuing their lives moderately more highly than those of others. OTOH, the marginal expected impact of a soldier on the expected outcome of the war was surely SO MUCH less than the marginal expected impact of an independent person who put in serious effort to be an assassin, while the risk was probably not an order of magnitude smaller, so I think its fair to say that they were still being irrational, judged as altruists, and were in most cases, well, only following orders. If they valued victory enough to be a soldier they should have done something more effective instead. (have I just refuted Yossarian or confirmed him?)
I think that they should definitely sleep at night. Should feel happy and proud even… but in their shoes I wouldn’t.
By which you mean, I suppose, that my skill as a rhetorician has exceeded my skill as a rationalist. Well, you may be right. Supposing you are, what do you suggest I do about it?
Well, yes, I am. Not our democracy, not any narrow technique for promoting democracy, but democracy as the broad principle that people should have a decisive say in the decisions that affect them strikes me as pretty awesome. I guess I might be claiming benefits for democracy in excess of what I have evidence to support, and that if I were an excellent rationalist, I would simply say, “I do not know what the effects of attempting democracy are.”
I am not an excellent rationalist. What I do is to look hard for the answers to important questions, and then, if after long searching I cannot find the answers and I have no hope of finding the answers, but the questions still seem important, I choose an answer that appeals to my intuition.
I spent the better part of my undergraduate years trying to understand what democracy is, what violence is, and whether the two have any systematic relation to each other. Scientifically speaking, my answer is that we do not know, and will not know, in all likelihood, for quite some time. Violence happens in places where researchers find it difficult or impossible to record it; death tolls are so biased by partisans of various stripes, by the credulity of an entertainment-based media, and by the fog of war that one can almost never tell which of two similarly-sized conflicts was more violent. Democracy is, at best, a correlation among several variables, each of which can only be specified with 2 or 3 bits of meaningful information, and each of which might have different effects on violence. Given the confusion, to scientifically state a relationship between democracy and violence would be ridiculous.
And, yet, I find that I very much want to know what the relationship is between democracy and violence. I can oppose all offensive wars designed to change another country’s regime type on the grounds that science supports no prediction that the certain deaths from war will be outweighed by bloodiness removed in an allegedly safer regime. What about defensive wars? I find that I cannot bring myself to say, “I would not fight to preserve my region’s measure of democracy against an outside autocratic invader, because I do not know, scientifically, that such a fight would reduce total bloodiness.” I would fight, believing without scientific evidence that such a war would be better than surrender.
Am I simply deluding myself? Most people on Less Wrong will think so. I do not particularly care. I am far more concerned about the danger of reasoning myself into a narcissistic, quiet-ist corner where I never take political action than I am about the danger of backing an ideal that turns out to be empty.
Using the Hansonian “far-view reference class,” the odds that an ideal chosen based on “things I believe in because I was taught to believe in them” is worth killing for are near zero. Using the same method, the odds that an ideal chosen based on “things that I believe in after carefully examining all available evidence and finding that I cannot think of a good reason to overturn my culture’s traditions, despite having actively questioned them” is worth killing for are high enough that I can sleep at night. If you believe I should be awake, I look forward to your reply.
Not at all. Rhetorical skill IS a good thing, and properly contributes to logic. Your argument seems rational to me, in the non-Spock sense that we generally encourage here. What to do? Keep on thinking AND caring!
If the search you use is as fair and unbiased as you can make it, this looking hard for answers is the core of what being a good rationalist is. Possibly, you should look harder for the causes of systematic differences between people’s intuitions, to see whether those causes are entangled with truth, but analysis has to stop at some point.
In practice, rationalists may back themselves into permanent inaction due to uncertainty, but the theory of rationality we endorse here says we should be doing what you claim to be doing. I find it extremely disturbing that we aren’t communicating this effectively, though its clearly our fault since we aren’t communicating it effectively enough to ourselves for it to motivate us to be more dynamic either.
When you say you glorify Democracy though, I think you mean something much closer to what I would call Coherent Extrapolated Volition than it is to what I would call Democracy. Something radically novel that hasn’t ever been tried, or even specified in enough detail to call it a proposal without some charity.
As a factual matter, I would suggest that the systems of government that we call Democracies in the US may typically be a bit further in the CEV direction than those we typically call dictatorships, but if they are, its a weak tendency, like the tendency of good painters to be good at basketball or something. You might detect it statistically, if you had properly operationalized it first, or vaguely suspect its there based on intuitive perception, but you couldn’t ever be very confident it was there.
It’s obviously wrong to overturn cultural traditions which have been questioned but not refuted. Such traditions have some information value, if only for anthropic reasons, and more importantly, they are somewhat correlated with your values. In this particular case, if you limit your options under consideration to ‘fight against invaders or do nothing’ I have no objections. Real life situations usually present more options, but those weren’t specified.
As an off-the-cuff example, I think its obvious that a person who fought against the NAZIs in WWII was doing something better than they would by staying home even though the NAZIs didn’t invade the US and even valuing their lives moderately more highly than those of others. OTOH, the marginal expected impact of a soldier on the expected outcome of the war was surely SO MUCH less than the marginal expected impact of an independent person who put in serious effort to be an assassin, while the risk was probably not an order of magnitude smaller, so I think its fair to say that they were still being irrational, judged as altruists, and were in most cases, well, only following orders. If they valued victory enough to be a soldier they should have done something more effective instead. (have I just refuted Yossarian or confirmed him?)
I think that they should definitely sleep at night. Should feel happy and proud even… but in their shoes I wouldn’t.
Whole thread voted up BTW.
Thanks! Wholeheartedly agree, btw.