A more interesting counterargument is “distribution shift.” My next observer-moments have some probability distribution P of properties—representing what I am most likely to do in the next moment. If I die, and MWI is false, but chaotic inflation is true, then there are many minds similar to me and to my next observer-moments everywhere in the multiverse. However, they have a distribution of properties P2 - representing what they are more likely to observe. And maybe P ≠ P2. Or may be we can prove that P=P2 based on typicality.
A more interesting counterargument is “distribution shift.” My next observer-moments have some probability distribution P of properties—representing what I am most likely to do in the next moment. If I die, and MWI is false, but chaotic inflation is true, then there are many minds similar to me and to my next observer-moments everywhere in the multiverse. However, they have a distribution of properties P2 - representing what they are more likely to observe. And maybe P ≠ P2. Or may be we can prove that P=P2 based on typicality.