Of course it is testable. Just do some 30 quantum coin flips in a row. If any of them is a head, knock yourself down into a deep sleep (with anesthesia) for 24 hours.
If you are still awake 1 hour after the coin failed for the last time, QI is probably the fact.
Nah. QI relies on your “subjective thread” coming to an end in some worlds and continuing in others. In your experiment I’d be pretty certain to get knocked out and wake up after 24 hours.
How does the Multiverse know, I am just sleeping for 24 (or 24000) hours? How the Multiverse knows, I’ll not be rescued after the real suicide attempt after a quantum coin head popped up?
Or resurrected by some ultratech?
Where is the fine red line, that the Quantum Immortality is possible, but a Quantum Awakening described above—isn’t?
It doesn’t, not right now in the present moment. But there’s no reason why “subjective threads” and “subjective probabilities” should depend on physical laws only locally. Imagine you’re an algorithm running on a computer. If someone pauses the computer for a thousand years, afterwards you go on running like nothing happened, even though at the moment of pausing nobody “knew” when/if you’d be restarted again.
If someone pauses the computer for a thousand years, afterwards you go on running like nothing happened, even though at the moment of pausing nobody “knew” when/if you’d be restarted again.
But what if a new computer arises every time and an instance of this algorithm start there?
How does the Multiverse know, I am just sleeping for 24 (or 24000) hours? How the Multiverse knows, I’ll not be rescued after the real suicide attempt after a quantum coin head popped up?
Because you won’t be back. Universe has the whole eternity to just wait for you to come back. If you don’t, the only remaining ones that keep on experiencing from where you left off are the branches where coin didn’t come heads.
In fact, quantum immortality has little to do with the actual properties of the universe, as long as it’s probabilistic. It’s just what happens when you arbitrarily (well, anthropically) decide to stop counting certain possibilities.
No, it always splits into two everett branches. It’s just that if you do in fact wake up in the distant future, that version of you that wakes up will be a successor of the you that is awake now, as is the version of you that never went to sleep in the next microsecond (or whatever). And you should anticipate either’s experiences equally.
Or at least that’s how I think it works (this assumes timeless physics, which I think is what Jonii assumed).
First, the result of a coin flip is almost certainly determined by starting conditions. With enough knowledge of those conditions you could predict the result. Instead you should make a measurement on a quantum system, such as measuring the spin of an electron.
Second the result of this test does not distinguish between QI and not-QI. The probability of being knocked out or left awake is the same in both cases.
I suppose you could be assuming that your consciousness can jump arbitrarily between universes to follow a conscious version of you.… but no that would just be silly.
You might have missed the part where Thomas made it a “quantum coin flip”. The problem with the test is that by definition is can’t be replicated successfully by the scientific community and that even if QI is true you will get dis-confirming evidence in most Everett branches.
First, the result of a coin flip is almost certainly determined by starting conditions. With enough knowledge of those conditions you could predict the result.
If that’s a valid objection, then quantum suicide won’t work either. In fact, if that’s a valid objection, then many-worlds is impossible, since everything is deterministic with no possible alternatives.
Many-worlds is a deterministic theory, as it says that the split configurations both occur.
Quantum immortality, mind you, is a very silly idea for a variety of other reasons—foremost of which is that a googleplex of universes still doesn’t ensure that there exists one of them in which a recognizable “you” survives next week, let alone to the end of time.
Of course it is testable. Just do some 30 quantum coin flips in a row. If any of them is a head, knock yourself down into a deep sleep (with anesthesia) for 24 hours.
If you are still awake 1 hour after the coin failed for the last time, QI is probably the fact.
Nah. QI relies on your “subjective thread” coming to an end in some worlds and continuing in others. In your experiment I’d be pretty certain to get knocked out and wake up after 24 hours.
How does the Multiverse know, I am just sleeping for 24 (or 24000) hours? How the Multiverse knows, I’ll not be rescued after the real suicide attempt after a quantum coin head popped up?
Or resurrected by some ultratech?
Where is the fine red line, that the Quantum Immortality is possible, but a Quantum Awakening described above—isn’t?
It doesn’t, not right now in the present moment. But there’s no reason why “subjective threads” and “subjective probabilities” should depend on physical laws only locally. Imagine you’re an algorithm running on a computer. If someone pauses the computer for a thousand years, afterwards you go on running like nothing happened, even though at the moment of pausing nobody “knew” when/if you’d be restarted again.
But what if a new computer arises every time and an instance of this algorithm start there?
As it allegedly does in MW?
Because you won’t be back. Universe has the whole eternity to just wait for you to come back. If you don’t, the only remaining ones that keep on experiencing from where you left off are the branches where coin didn’t come heads.
I see. The MW has a book of those who will wake up and those who will not?
And acts accordingly. Splits or not.
I do not buy this, of course.
It’s a good thought to reject.
In fact, quantum immortality has little to do with the actual properties of the universe, as long as it’s probabilistic. It’s just what happens when you arbitrarily (well, anthropically) decide to stop counting certain possibilities.
No, it always splits into two everett branches. It’s just that if you do in fact wake up in the distant future, that version of you that wakes up will be a successor of the you that is awake now, as is the version of you that never went to sleep in the next microsecond (or whatever). And you should anticipate either’s experiences equally.
Or at least that’s how I think it works (this assumes timeless physics, which I think is what Jonii assumed).
There are two problems with this test.
First, the result of a coin flip is almost certainly determined by starting conditions. With enough knowledge of those conditions you could predict the result. Instead you should make a measurement on a quantum system, such as measuring the spin of an electron.
Second the result of this test does not distinguish between QI and not-QI. The probability of being knocked out or left awake is the same in both cases.
I suppose you could be assuming that your consciousness can jump arbitrarily between universes to follow a conscious version of you.… but no that would just be silly.
This is probably what Thomas meant by “quantum” coin flip.
You are right, I missed that. I probably shouldn’t post comments when I’m hungry, I’ve got a few other comments like this to account for as well. :)
I don’t postulate anything, what it is not already postulated in the so called Quantum Suicide mental experiment.
I just apply this on to the sleeping/coma case. Should work the same.
But I don’t think it works in either case.
The test you proposed does not distinguish between QI and not-QI. I don’t think that the current formulation of MWI even allows this to be tested.
Not a factor to my argument, both are untestable. You are arguing this point against other others, not me.
You might have missed the part where Thomas made it a “quantum coin flip”. The problem with the test is that by definition is can’t be replicated successfully by the scientific community and that even if QI is true you will get dis-confirming evidence in most Everett branches.
If that’s a valid objection, then quantum suicide won’t work either. In fact, if that’s a valid objection, then many-worlds is impossible, since everything is deterministic with no possible alternatives.
Many-worlds is a deterministic theory, as it says that the split configurations both occur.
Quantum immortality, mind you, is a very silly idea for a variety of other reasons—foremost of which is that a googleplex of universes still doesn’t ensure that there exists one of them in which a recognizable “you” survives next week, let alone to the end of time.