In the case of Transparent Newcomb’s though, if you’re actually in the problem, then you can already see either that both boxes contain money, or that one of them doesn’t. If Omega only fills the second box, which contains more money, if you would one-box, then by the time you find yourself in the problem, whether you would one-box or two-box in Transparent Newcomb’s has already had its payoff.
If I would two-box in a situation where I see two transparent boxes which both contain money, that ensures that I won’t find myself in a situation where Omega lets me pick whether to one-box or two-box, but only fills both boxes if I would one-box. On the other hand, A person who one-boxes in that situation could not find themself in a situation where they can pick one or both of two filled boxes, where Omega would only fill both boxes if they would two-box in the original scenario.
So it seems to me that if I follow the principle of solving whatever situation I’m in according to maximum expected utility, then unless the Transparent Newcomb’s Problem is more probable, I will become the sort of person who can’t end up in Transparent Newcomb’s problems with a chance to one-box for large amounts of money, but can end up in the inverted situation which rewards two-boxing, for more money. I don’t have the choice of being the sort of person who gets rewarded by both scenarios, just as I don’t have the choice of being someone who both Andy and Sandy will cooperate with.
I agree that a one-boxer comes out ahead in Transparent Newcomb’s, but I don’t think it follows that I should one-box in Transparent Newcomb’s, because I don’t think having a decision theory which results in better payouts in this particular decision theory problem results in higher utility in general. I think that I “should” be a person who one-boxes in Transparent Newcomb’s in the same sense that I “should” be someone who doesn’t type between 10:00-11:00 on a Sunday if I happen to be in a world where Omega has, unbeknownst to anyone, arranged to rob me if I do. In both cases I’ve lucked into payouts due to a decision process which I couldn’t reasonably have expected to improve my utility.
I agree that a one-boxer comes out ahead in Transparent Newcomb’s, but I don’t think it follows that I should one-box in Transparent Newcomb’s, because I don’t think having a decision theory which results in better payouts in this particular decision theory problem results in higher utility in general.
We are not discussing what to do “in general”, or the algorithms of a general “I” that should or shouldn’t have the property of behaving a certain way in certain problems, we are discussing what should be done in this particular problem, where we might as well assume that there is no other possible problem, and all utility in the world only comes from this one instance of this problem. The focus is on this problem only, and no role is played by the uncertainty about which problem we are solving, or by the possibility that there might be other problems. If you additionally want to avoid logical impossibility introduced by some of the possible decisions, permit a very low probability that either of the relevant outcomes can occur anyway.
If you allow yourself to consider alternative situations, or other applications of the same decision algorithm, you are solving a different problem, a problem that involves tradeoffs between these situations. You need to be clear on which problem you are considering, whether it’s a single isolated problem, as is usual for thought experiments, or a bigger problem. If it’s a bigger problem, that needs to be prominently stipulated somewhere, or people will assume that it’s otherwise and you’ll talk past each other.
It seems as if you currently believe that the correct solution for isolated Transparent Newcomb’s is one-boxing, but the correct solution in the context of the possibility of other problems is two-boxing. Is it so? (You seem to understand “I’m in Transparent Newcomb’s problem” incorrectly, which further motivates fighting the hypothetical, suggesting that for the general player that has other problems on its plate two-boxing is better, which is not so, but it’s a separate issue, so let’s settle the problem statement first.)
It seems as if you currently believe that the correct solution for isolated Transparent Newcomb’s is one-boxing, but the correct solution in the context of the possibility of other problems is two-boxing. Is it so?
Yes.
I don’t think that the most advantageous solution for isolated Transparent Newcomb’s is likely to be a very useful question though.
I don’t think it’s possible to have a general case decision theory which gets the best possible results for every situation (see the Andy and Sandy example, where getting good results for one prisoner’s dilemma necessitates getting bad results from the other, so any decision theory wins in at most one of the two.)
That being the case, I don’t think that a goal of winning in Transparent Newcomb’s Problem is a very meaningful one for a decision theory. The way I see it, it seems like focusing on coming out ahead in Sandy prisoner’s dilemmas, while disregarding the relative likelihoods of ending up in a dilemma with Andy or Sandy, and assuming that if you ended up in an Andy prisoner dilemma you could use the same decision process to come out ahead in that too.
In the case of Transparent Newcomb’s though, if you’re actually in the problem, then you can already see either that both boxes contain money, or that one of them doesn’t. If Omega only fills the second box, which contains more money, if you would one-box, then by the time you find yourself in the problem, whether you would one-box or two-box in Transparent Newcomb’s has already had its payoff.
If I would two-box in a situation where I see two transparent boxes which both contain money, that ensures that I won’t find myself in a situation where Omega lets me pick whether to one-box or two-box, but only fills both boxes if I would one-box. On the other hand, A person who one-boxes in that situation could not find themself in a situation where they can pick one or both of two filled boxes, where Omega would only fill both boxes if they would two-box in the original scenario.
So it seems to me that if I follow the principle of solving whatever situation I’m in according to maximum expected utility, then unless the Transparent Newcomb’s Problem is more probable, I will become the sort of person who can’t end up in Transparent Newcomb’s problems with a chance to one-box for large amounts of money, but can end up in the inverted situation which rewards two-boxing, for more money. I don’t have the choice of being the sort of person who gets rewarded by both scenarios, just as I don’t have the choice of being someone who both Andy and Sandy will cooperate with.
I agree that a one-boxer comes out ahead in Transparent Newcomb’s, but I don’t think it follows that I should one-box in Transparent Newcomb’s, because I don’t think having a decision theory which results in better payouts in this particular decision theory problem results in higher utility in general. I think that I “should” be a person who one-boxes in Transparent Newcomb’s in the same sense that I “should” be someone who doesn’t type between 10:00-11:00 on a Sunday if I happen to be in a world where Omega has, unbeknownst to anyone, arranged to rob me if I do. In both cases I’ve lucked into payouts due to a decision process which I couldn’t reasonably have expected to improve my utility.
We are not discussing what to do “in general”, or the algorithms of a general “I” that should or shouldn’t have the property of behaving a certain way in certain problems, we are discussing what should be done in this particular problem, where we might as well assume that there is no other possible problem, and all utility in the world only comes from this one instance of this problem. The focus is on this problem only, and no role is played by the uncertainty about which problem we are solving, or by the possibility that there might be other problems. If you additionally want to avoid logical impossibility introduced by some of the possible decisions, permit a very low probability that either of the relevant outcomes can occur anyway.
If you allow yourself to consider alternative situations, or other applications of the same decision algorithm, you are solving a different problem, a problem that involves tradeoffs between these situations. You need to be clear on which problem you are considering, whether it’s a single isolated problem, as is usual for thought experiments, or a bigger problem. If it’s a bigger problem, that needs to be prominently stipulated somewhere, or people will assume that it’s otherwise and you’ll talk past each other.
It seems as if you currently believe that the correct solution for isolated Transparent Newcomb’s is one-boxing, but the correct solution in the context of the possibility of other problems is two-boxing. Is it so? (You seem to understand “I’m in Transparent Newcomb’s problem” incorrectly, which further motivates fighting the hypothetical, suggesting that for the general player that has other problems on its plate two-boxing is better, which is not so, but it’s a separate issue, so let’s settle the problem statement first.)
Yes.
I don’t think that the most advantageous solution for isolated Transparent Newcomb’s is likely to be a very useful question though.
I don’t think it’s possible to have a general case decision theory which gets the best possible results for every situation (see the Andy and Sandy example, where getting good results for one prisoner’s dilemma necessitates getting bad results from the other, so any decision theory wins in at most one of the two.)
That being the case, I don’t think that a goal of winning in Transparent Newcomb’s Problem is a very meaningful one for a decision theory. The way I see it, it seems like focusing on coming out ahead in Sandy prisoner’s dilemmas, while disregarding the relative likelihoods of ending up in a dilemma with Andy or Sandy, and assuming that if you ended up in an Andy prisoner dilemma you could use the same decision process to come out ahead in that too.