On a reflection, I’d like to clarify a thing. I do talk about it in the post by I suppose some people may still be missing it.
When I say that “we can’t use probability theory with subjective decomposition of outcomes”, I do not mean that we can never do it, or that Bayesian interpretation of probability theory is wrong.
The point is that in a general case the fact that you subjectively perceive something, doesn’t necessary mean that it can be treated as an elementary outcome in a probability theoretic model. It is often the case but not all the time and this is the sort of the confusion that leads us astray with the Sleeping Beauty problem.
On a reflection, I’d like to clarify a thing. I do talk about it in the post by I suppose some people may still be missing it.
When I say that “we can’t use probability theory with subjective decomposition of outcomes”, I do not mean that we can never do it, or that Bayesian interpretation of probability theory is wrong.
The point is that in a general case the fact that you subjectively perceive something, doesn’t necessary mean that it can be treated as an elementary outcome in a probability theoretic model. It is often the case but not all the time and this is the sort of the confusion that leads us astray with the Sleeping Beauty problem.