I’m afraid I won’t be able to address your concerns without the specifics. Currently I’m not even sure that they are true. According to Wei Dai in one of a previous comments our current best theory claims that Everett branches are causally disconnected and I’m more than happy to stick to that until our theories change.
They are approximately disconnected according to our current best theory. Like your clones in different rooms are approximately disconnected, but still gravitationally influence each other.
You can participate in a thousand fissure experiment in a row and accumulate a list of rooms and coin outcomes corresponding to your experience and I expect them to fit Lewis’s model. 75% of time you find yourself in room 1, 50% of time the coin is Heads.
Still don’t get how it’s consistent with your argument about statistical test. It’s not about multiple experiments starting from each copy, right? You still would object to simulating multiple Beauties started from each awakening as random? And would be ok with simulating multiple Fissures from one original as random?
Because coexistence in space happens separately to different people who are not causally connected, while coexistence in one timeline happen to the same person, whose past and future are causally connected. I really don’t understand why everyone seem to have so much trouble with such an obvious point.
I understand that there is a difference. The trouble is with justification for why this difference is relevant. Like, you based your modelling of Monday and Tuesday as both happening on how we usually treat events when we use probability theory. But the same justification is even more obvious, when both the awakening in Room 1 and the awakening in Room 2 happen simultaneously. Or you say that the Beauty knows that she will be awake both times so she can’t ignore this information. But both copies also know that they both will be awake, so why they can ignore it?
If you participate in a Fissure experiment you do not experience being at two rooms on Tails. You are in only one of the rooms in any case, and another version of you is in another room when it’s Tails.
Is this what it is all about? It depends on definition of “you”. Under some definitions the Beauty also doesn’t experience both days. Are you just saying that distinction is that no sane human would treat different moments as distinct identities?
They are approximately disconnected according to our current best theory. Like your clones in different rooms are approximately disconnected, but still gravitationally influence each other.
I think this level of accuracy is good enough for now.
Still don’t get how it’s consistent with your argument about statistical test. It’s not about multiple experiments starting from each copy, right?
It very much is. Every copy is its own person who can then participate in whatever experiments they chose to independently from the other copy.
You still would object to simulating multiple Beauties started from each awakening as random?
I don’t see how it is possible in principle. If the Beauty in the middle of experiment how can she starts participating in another experiment without breaking the setting of the current one? In what sense is she the same person anyway if you treat any waking moment as a different person?
Like, you based your modelling of Monday and Tuesday as both happening on how we usually treat events when we use probability theory. But the same justification is even more obvious, when both the awakening in Room 1 and the awakening in Room 2 happen simultaneously.
No, they are not. Events that happen to Beauty on Monday and Tuesday are not mutually exclusive because they are sequential. On Tails if an awakening happened to her on Monday it necessary means that an awakening will happen to her on Tuesday in the same experiment.
But the same argument isn’t applicable to fissure, where awakening in different Rooms are not sequential, and truly are mutually exclusive. If you are awaken in Room 1 you definetely are not awaken in Room 2 in this experiment and vice versa.
Or you say that the Beauty knows that she will be awake both times so she can’t ignore this information. But both copies also know that they both will be awake, so why they can ignore it?
Well if there was some probability theoretic reason why copies could not reason independently, then that would be the case. This is indeed an interesting situation and I’ll dedicate a separate post or even multiple of them to comprehensive analysis of it.
Is this what it is all about? It depends on definition of “you”. Under some definitions the Beauty also doesn’t experience both days.
Of course it depends on definitions. Everything does. But not all definitions are made equal. Some carve reality at its joints and some do not. Some allows to construct theories that adds up to normality and some—that lead to bizarre conclusions.
Are you just saying that distinction is that no sane human would treat different moments as distinct identities?
Well it’s a bit too late for that, because there definetely are otherwise sane people, who are eager to bite the bullet, no matter how ridiculous.
What I’m saying is that to carve reality at it’s joints we need to base our definitions on the causal graphs. And as an extra bonus it indeed seems to fit the naive intuition of personal identity and adds up to normality.
Somehow every time people talk about joints, it turns out being more about naive intuitions of personal identity, than reality^^.
I don’t see how it is possible in principle. If the Beauty in the middle of experiment how can she starts participating in another experiment without breaking the setting of the current one?
If you insist on Monday and Tuesday being on the same week, then by backing up her memory: after each awakening we save memory and schedule memory loading and new experiment to a later free week. Or we can start new experiment after each awakening and schedule Tuesdays for later. Does either of these allow you to change your model?
In what sense is she the same person anyway if you treat any waking moment as a different person?
You can treat every memory sequence as a different person.
No, they are not. Events that happen to Beauty on Monday and Tuesday are not mutually exclusive because they are sequential. On Tails if an awakening happened to her on Monday it necessary means that an awakening will happen to her on Tuesday in the same experiment.
But the same argument isn’t applicable to fissure, where awakening in different Rooms are not sequential, and truly are mutually exclusive. If you are awaken in Room 1 you definetely are not awaken in Room 2 in this experiment and vice versa.
I’m not saying the arguments are literally identical.
Your argument is:
The awakening on Tuesday happens always and only after the awakening on Monday.
They are approximately disconnected according to our current best theory. Like your clones in different rooms are approximately disconnected, but still gravitationally influence each other.
Still don’t get how it’s consistent with your argument about statistical test. It’s not about multiple experiments starting from each copy, right? You still would object to simulating multiple Beauties started from each awakening as random? And would be ok with simulating multiple Fissures from one original as random?
I understand that there is a difference. The trouble is with justification for why this difference is relevant. Like, you based your modelling of Monday and Tuesday as both happening on how we usually treat events when we use probability theory. But the same justification is even more obvious, when both the awakening in Room 1 and the awakening in Room 2 happen simultaneously. Or you say that the Beauty knows that she will be awake both times so she can’t ignore this information. But both copies also know that they both will be awake, so why they can ignore it?
Is this what it is all about? It depends on definition of “you”. Under some definitions the Beauty also doesn’t experience both days. Are you just saying that distinction is that no sane human would treat different moments as distinct identities?
I think this level of accuracy is good enough for now.
It very much is. Every copy is its own person who can then participate in whatever experiments they chose to independently from the other copy.
I don’t see how it is possible in principle. If the Beauty in the middle of experiment how can she starts participating in another experiment without breaking the setting of the current one? In what sense is she the same person anyway if you treat any waking moment as a different person?
No, they are not. Events that happen to Beauty on Monday and Tuesday are not mutually exclusive because they are sequential. On Tails if an awakening happened to her on Monday it necessary means that an awakening will happen to her on Tuesday in the same experiment.
But the same argument isn’t applicable to fissure, where awakening in different Rooms are not sequential, and truly are mutually exclusive. If you are awaken in Room 1 you definetely are not awaken in Room 2 in this experiment and vice versa.
Well if there was some probability theoretic reason why copies could not reason independently, then that would be the case. This is indeed an interesting situation and I’ll dedicate a separate post or even multiple of them to comprehensive analysis of it.
Of course it depends on definitions. Everything does. But not all definitions are made equal. Some carve reality at its joints and some do not. Some allows to construct theories that adds up to normality and some—that lead to bizarre conclusions.
Well it’s a bit too late for that, because there definetely are otherwise sane people, who are eager to bite the bullet, no matter how ridiculous.
What I’m saying is that to carve reality at it’s joints we need to base our definitions on the causal graphs. And as an extra bonus it indeed seems to fit the naive intuition of personal identity and adds up to normality.
Somehow every time people talk about joints, it turns out being more about naive intuitions of personal identity, than reality^^.
If you insist on Monday and Tuesday being on the same week, then by backing up her memory: after each awakening we save memory and schedule memory loading and new experiment to a later free week. Or we can start new experiment after each awakening and schedule Tuesdays for later. Does either of these allow you to change your model?
You can treat every memory sequence as a different person.
I’m not saying the arguments are literally identical.
Your argument is:
The awakening on Tuesday happens always and only after the awakening on Monday.
Therefore !(P(Monday) = 0 & P(Tuesday) = 1) & !(P(Monday) > 0 & P(Tuesday) < 1).
Therefore they are not exclusive.
The argument about copies is:
The awakening in Room 1 always happens and the awakening in Room 2 always happens.
Therefore !(P(Room 1) < 1) & !(P(Room 2) < 1).
Therefore they are not exclusive.
Why the second one doesn’t work?
I agree, some are more preferable. Therefore probabilities depend on preferences.