Consider that in the real world Tuesday always happens after Monday. Do you agree or disagree: It is incorrect to model a real world agent’s knowledge about today being Monday with probability?
I think, I talk about something like you point to here:
If I forget what is the current day of the week in my regular life, well, it’s only natural to start from a 1⁄7 prior per day and work from there. I can do it because the causal process that leads to me forgetting such information can be roughly modeled as a low probability occurrence which can happen to me at any day.
It wouldn’t be the case, if I was guaranteed to also forget the current day of the week on the next 6 days as well, after I forgot it on the first one. This would be a different causal process, with different properties—causation between forgetting—and it has to be modeled differently. But we do not actually encounter such situations in everyday life, and so our intuition is caught completely flat footed by them.
Consider that in the real world Tuesday always happens after Monday. Do you agree or disagree: It is incorrect to model a real world agent’s knowledge about today being Monday with probability?
Again, that depends.
I think, I talk about something like you point to here: