we should establish that vegetarianism is a worthwhile cause before we devote LW posts to figuring out how best to promote it.
I don’t know how to establish it as a worthwhile cause to those who don’t already value nonhuman animals, so I skipped that step.
For those who do already value nonhuman animals, though, I had hoped this essay was such an evaluation, given that it is a cost-effectiveness estimate and evidence survey. It’s not a comparison of advocacy efforts, since no other advocacy efforts are considered.
-
It seems nonsensical to view advocacy for philanthropy toward vegetarianism as different from advocacy for vegetarianism itself, if you take the view (as you seem to do) that vegetarianism is a moral issue.
That’s true. I suppose one could consider advocating vegetarianism without personally becoming vegetarian, though that would be somewhat hypocritical.
I don’t know how to establish it as a worthwhile cause to those who don’t already value nonhuman animals, so I skipped that step.
I do sympathize with the difficulty of persuading someone with whom you do not share the relevant values, but I’m afraid I can’t help but object to “this part of the argument is hard, so I skipped it”.
Changing values is not impossible. I don’t think valuing nonhuman animals is a terminal value; the terminal value in question probably looks something more like “valuing the experiences of minds that are capable of conscious suffering” or something to that general effect. (That is, if we insist on tracing this preference to a value per se, rather than assuming that it’s just signaling or somesuch.) And most people here do, I think, place at least some importance on reflective equilibrium, which is a force for value change.
The problem I have with your approach (and I hope you’ll forgive me for this continued criticism of what is, to be truthful, a fairly interesting post) is that it’s a nigh-fully-general justification for advocating arbitrary things, like so:
“Here is an analysis of how to most cost-effectively promote the eating of babies. I don’t know how to establish baby-eating as a worthwhile cause for people who don’t already think that eating babies is a good idea, so I skipped that step.”
Ditto ” … saving cute kittens from rare diseases …”, ditto ” … reducing the incidence of premarital sex …”, ditto pretty much anything ever.
What I would be curious to see is whether the LW populace perhaps already thinks that vegetarianism is a settled question. If so, my objections might be misplaced. Was this covered in one of the surveys? Hmm...
SaidAchmiz, I wonder if a more revealing question would be to ask if / when in vitro meat products of equivalent taste and price hit the market, will you switch? Lesswrong readers tend not to be technophobes, so I assume the majority(?) of lesswrongers who are not already vegetarian will make the transition. However, you say above that you are “not interested in reducing the suffering of animals”. Do you mean that you are literally indifferent one way or the other to nonhuman animal suffering—in which case presumably you won’t bother changing to the cruelty-free alternative? Or do you mean merely that you don’t consider nonhuman animal suffering important?
Do you mean that you are literally indifferent one way or the other to nonhuman animal suffering—in which case presumably you won’t bother changing to the cruelty-free alternative? Or do you mean merely that you don’t consider nonhuman animal suffering important?
In (current) practice those are the same, as you realize, I’m sure. My attitude is closest to something like “no amount of animal suffering adds up to any amount of human suffering”, or more generally “no amount of utility to animals [to the extent that the concept of utility to a non-sapient being is coherent] adds up to any amount of utility to humans”. However, note that I am skeptical of the concept of consistent aggregation of utility across individuals in general (and thus of utilitarian ethical theories, though I endorse consequentialism), so adjust your appraisal of my views accordingly.
In vitro meat products could change that; that is, the existence of in vitro meat would make the two views you listed meaningfully different in practice, as you suggest. If in vitro meat cost no more than regular meat, and tasted no worse, and had no worse health consequences, and in general if there was no downside for me to switch...
… well, in that case, I would switch, with the caveat that “switch” is not exactly the right term; I simply would not care whether the meat I bought were IV or non, making my purchasing decisions based on price, taste, and all those other mundane factors by means of which people typically make their food purchasing decisions.
I guess that’s a longwinded way of saying that no, I wouldn’t switch exclusively to IV meat if doing so cost me anything.
I don’t know how to establish it as a worthwhile cause to those who don’t already value nonhuman animals, so I skipped that step.
For those who do already value nonhuman animals, though, I had hoped this essay was such an evaluation, given that it is a cost-effectiveness estimate and evidence survey. It’s not a comparison of advocacy efforts, since no other advocacy efforts are considered.
-
That’s true. I suppose one could consider advocating vegetarianism without personally becoming vegetarian, though that would be somewhat hypocritical.
I do sympathize with the difficulty of persuading someone with whom you do not share the relevant values, but I’m afraid I can’t help but object to “this part of the argument is hard, so I skipped it”.
Changing values is not impossible. I don’t think valuing nonhuman animals is a terminal value; the terminal value in question probably looks something more like “valuing the experiences of minds that are capable of conscious suffering” or something to that general effect. (That is, if we insist on tracing this preference to a value per se, rather than assuming that it’s just signaling or somesuch.) And most people here do, I think, place at least some importance on reflective equilibrium, which is a force for value change.
The problem I have with your approach (and I hope you’ll forgive me for this continued criticism of what is, to be truthful, a fairly interesting post) is that it’s a nigh-fully-general justification for advocating arbitrary things, like so:
“Here is an analysis of how to most cost-effectively promote the eating of babies. I don’t know how to establish baby-eating as a worthwhile cause for people who don’t already think that eating babies is a good idea, so I skipped that step.”
Ditto ” … saving cute kittens from rare diseases …”, ditto ” … reducing the incidence of premarital sex …”, ditto pretty much anything ever.
What I would be curious to see is whether the LW populace perhaps already thinks that vegetarianism is a settled question. If so, my objections might be misplaced. Was this covered in one of the surveys? Hmm...
Edit: Aha.
SaidAchmiz, I wonder if a more revealing question would be to ask if / when in vitro meat products of equivalent taste and price hit the market, will you switch? Lesswrong readers tend not to be technophobes, so I assume the majority(?) of lesswrongers who are not already vegetarian will make the transition. However, you say above that you are “not interested in reducing the suffering of animals”. Do you mean that you are literally indifferent one way or the other to nonhuman animal suffering—in which case presumably you won’t bother changing to the cruelty-free alternative? Or do you mean merely that you don’t consider nonhuman animal suffering important?
In (current) practice those are the same, as you realize, I’m sure. My attitude is closest to something like “no amount of animal suffering adds up to any amount of human suffering”, or more generally “no amount of utility to animals [to the extent that the concept of utility to a non-sapient being is coherent] adds up to any amount of utility to humans”. However, note that I am skeptical of the concept of consistent aggregation of utility across individuals in general (and thus of utilitarian ethical theories, though I endorse consequentialism), so adjust your appraisal of my views accordingly.
In vitro meat products could change that; that is, the existence of in vitro meat would make the two views you listed meaningfully different in practice, as you suggest. If in vitro meat cost no more than regular meat, and tasted no worse, and had no worse health consequences, and in general if there was no downside for me to switch...
… well, in that case, I would switch, with the caveat that “switch” is not exactly the right term; I simply would not care whether the meat I bought were IV or non, making my purchasing decisions based on price, taste, and all those other mundane factors by means of which people typically make their food purchasing decisions.
I guess that’s a longwinded way of saying that no, I wouldn’t switch exclusively to IV meat if doing so cost me anything.