Do you mean that you are literally indifferent one way or the other to nonhuman animal suffering—in which case presumably you won’t bother changing to the cruelty-free alternative? Or do you mean merely that you don’t consider nonhuman animal suffering important?
In (current) practice those are the same, as you realize, I’m sure. My attitude is closest to something like “no amount of animal suffering adds up to any amount of human suffering”, or more generally “no amount of utility to animals [to the extent that the concept of utility to a non-sapient being is coherent] adds up to any amount of utility to humans”. However, note that I am skeptical of the concept of consistent aggregation of utility across individuals in general (and thus of utilitarian ethical theories, though I endorse consequentialism), so adjust your appraisal of my views accordingly.
In vitro meat products could change that; that is, the existence of in vitro meat would make the two views you listed meaningfully different in practice, as you suggest. If in vitro meat cost no more than regular meat, and tasted no worse, and had no worse health consequences, and in general if there was no downside for me to switch...
… well, in that case, I would switch, with the caveat that “switch” is not exactly the right term; I simply would not care whether the meat I bought were IV or non, making my purchasing decisions based on price, taste, and all those other mundane factors by means of which people typically make their food purchasing decisions.
I guess that’s a longwinded way of saying that no, I wouldn’t switch exclusively to IV meat if doing so cost me anything.
In (current) practice those are the same, as you realize, I’m sure. My attitude is closest to something like “no amount of animal suffering adds up to any amount of human suffering”, or more generally “no amount of utility to animals [to the extent that the concept of utility to a non-sapient being is coherent] adds up to any amount of utility to humans”. However, note that I am skeptical of the concept of consistent aggregation of utility across individuals in general (and thus of utilitarian ethical theories, though I endorse consequentialism), so adjust your appraisal of my views accordingly.
In vitro meat products could change that; that is, the existence of in vitro meat would make the two views you listed meaningfully different in practice, as you suggest. If in vitro meat cost no more than regular meat, and tasted no worse, and had no worse health consequences, and in general if there was no downside for me to switch...
… well, in that case, I would switch, with the caveat that “switch” is not exactly the right term; I simply would not care whether the meat I bought were IV or non, making my purchasing decisions based on price, taste, and all those other mundane factors by means of which people typically make their food purchasing decisions.
I guess that’s a longwinded way of saying that no, I wouldn’t switch exclusively to IV meat if doing so cost me anything.