I don’t believe that any concept, including the concept of reality, makes sense to you outside the context of your own epistemic framework. When one thinks that the reality exists on its own, it is a statement made from within that person’s epistemic framework. When you tell me that the reality exists on its own, I understand this statement from within my epistemic framework. When I believe that you believe that the reality exists on its own, I interpret my model of yourself as having a property of having a “belief in reality existing on its own”. Even when I think of myself as believing something, I interpret myself as having a property of believing that.
The quotation marks must be put around everything, there is no escaping above the first level of indirection. The problem of induction is a wrong question.
I don’t believe that any concept, including the concept of reality, makes sense to you outside the context of your own epistemic framework. When one thinks that the reality exists on its own, it is a statement made from within that person’s epistemic framework. [...]
I think I made a step towards resolving this confusion. The problem was in conflating the specific, real-world algorithms running in a mind and performing the interpretation of facts, with the ideal model of the world. The ideal model is what we see as objective reality, the abstraction via which the facts should be interpreted which is to say is equivalent to what the facts really mean, even when we see a mind that goes in the opposite direction. The mind does a subjectively objective computation, while the reality is the ideal counterpart of that mind, the same way there is an ideal morality counterpart of a mind, even though it’s not merely preference of specific brain, and may depend on any other aspect of reality.
Since the ideal model is global, and it’s not a mind, there is no point in telling that reality must be interpreted through a mind: there is no real dichotomy, there is no requirement for a mind, and the reality that the model describes doesn’t even need to contain any minds. The model is math.
I don’t believe that any concept, including the concept of reality, makes sense to you outside the context of your own epistemic framework. When one thinks that the reality exists on its own, it is a statement made from within that person’s epistemic framework. When you tell me that the reality exists on its own, I understand this statement from within my epistemic framework. When I believe that you believe that the reality exists on its own, I interpret my model of yourself as having a property of having a “belief in reality existing on its own”. Even when I think of myself as believing something, I interpret myself as having a property of believing that.
The quotation marks must be put around everything, there is no escaping above the first level of indirection. The problem of induction is a wrong question.
Me:
I think I made a step towards resolving this confusion. The problem was in conflating the specific, real-world algorithms running in a mind and performing the interpretation of facts, with the ideal model of the world. The ideal model is what we see as objective reality, the abstraction via which the facts should be interpreted which is to say is equivalent to what the facts really mean, even when we see a mind that goes in the opposite direction. The mind does a subjectively objective computation, while the reality is the ideal counterpart of that mind, the same way there is an ideal morality counterpart of a mind, even though it’s not merely preference of specific brain, and may depend on any other aspect of reality.
Since the ideal model is global, and it’s not a mind, there is no point in telling that reality must be interpreted through a mind: there is no real dichotomy, there is no requirement for a mind, and the reality that the model describes doesn’t even need to contain any minds. The model is math.