In the first example, you should just continue playing tit-for-tat, if the other player truly “slipped” and knows you are playing tit-for-tat, he won’t defect after you defect, he will continue cooperating and make you cooperate.
The whole notion of pre-commiting to a strategy is to remove the human elements like “negociation” and “excuses”. You are a machine and you play accordingly. If the other player is rational, he will cooperate even after he slipped and you defected.
Suppose you are committed to tit-for-tat, and so is your partner, then if his finger truly slipped, he will defect after you defect, because his commitment doesn’t include an exception for being punished for his own finger slipping (just like your commitment doesn’t include an exception for his finger slipping).
The outcome to the story given by Yvain does seem wrong to me, and two actual human players would probably produce the outcome you (and Dagon) give: you defect once, and your partner keeps cooperating, to “make up” for the slipped finger. But this seems to have more to do with fairness than with commitment.
But this seems to have more to do with fairness than with commitment.
Fairness? More like easy, common sense. You play tit for tat, opponent defects, you defect. If opponent keeps on defecting, you defect too. Simple winning strategy for you, to which you should absolutely precommit to.
Your opponent, knowing your precommitment, can’t really do much. Strategically speaking, he’s the one to act, as your precommitment to tit-for-tat works kinda like removing your steering wheel in a game of chicken, making you indifferent and unable to stop. He can crash you just as many times as he wants to, but the choice is always left to him.
And why it is his? Because you’re precommitted to a strategy, but he, by defecting, he either strayed from his precommitted one, or revealed that he didn’t have any to begin with. Now that he doesn’t play pure tit-for-tat, his second best choice would be co-operating twice and continuing with tit-for-tat. To him, strategy “play tit-for-tat, defect once, continue with tit-for-tat” is quite far from optimal.
because his commitment doesn’t include an exception for being punished for his own finger slipping.
If second player whose finger slips is playing tit-for-tat, and he goes on as you say, the problem is that he hasn’t planned for a situation, than its the logical outcome of being punished for a mistake.
In the first example, you should just continue playing tit-for-tat, if the other player truly “slipped” and knows you are playing tit-for-tat, he won’t defect after you defect, he will continue cooperating and make you cooperate.
The whole notion of pre-commiting to a strategy is to remove the human elements like “negociation” and “excuses”. You are a machine and you play accordingly. If the other player is rational, he will cooperate even after he slipped and you defected.
Suppose you are committed to tit-for-tat, and so is your partner, then if his finger truly slipped, he will defect after you defect, because his commitment doesn’t include an exception for being punished for his own finger slipping (just like your commitment doesn’t include an exception for his finger slipping).
The outcome to the story given by Yvain does seem wrong to me, and two actual human players would probably produce the outcome you (and Dagon) give: you defect once, and your partner keeps cooperating, to “make up” for the slipped finger. But this seems to have more to do with fairness than with commitment.
Fairness? More like easy, common sense. You play tit for tat, opponent defects, you defect. If opponent keeps on defecting, you defect too. Simple winning strategy for you, to which you should absolutely precommit to.
Your opponent, knowing your precommitment, can’t really do much. Strategically speaking, he’s the one to act, as your precommitment to tit-for-tat works kinda like removing your steering wheel in a game of chicken, making you indifferent and unable to stop. He can crash you just as many times as he wants to, but the choice is always left to him.
And why it is his? Because you’re precommitted to a strategy, but he, by defecting, he either strayed from his precommitted one, or revealed that he didn’t have any to begin with. Now that he doesn’t play pure tit-for-tat, his second best choice would be co-operating twice and continuing with tit-for-tat. To him, strategy “play tit-for-tat, defect once, continue with tit-for-tat” is quite far from optimal.
If second player whose finger slips is playing tit-for-tat, and he goes on as you say, the problem is that he hasn’t planned for a situation, than its the logical outcome of being punished for a mistake.