There is some interesting information in amongst all the loaded language, straw men, naturalistic fallacies, and failure to think at the margin, but that piece largely comes off as a hack job, where the author started with their bottom line, and worked up.
My favourite parts:
Vegetarianism is unnatural. This is not a modern finding. The Bible gives us evidence of this, and clues that vegetarianism was not regarded with favour. In Genesis , Chapter Four, Eve bears Cain and Abel. ‘And Abel was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller of the ground.’ That ‘but’ in the middle of the sentence is the first clue to disapproval. This disapproval is confirmed by verses three to five. Abel and Cain bring offerings to God: Abel of his sheep and Cain, the fruits of the ground. God, we are told, had respect for Abel’s carnivorous offering, but He had no respect for Cain’s vegetarian one. [To be fair, the next paragraph then admits that this is not really evidence of anything; which raises the question of why it was included at all.]
Have you noticed the increasing numbers of occasions when small groups of very militant people demonstrate against all sorts of things: animal experiments, butchers’ shops, new roads, footpaths, nuclear power stations, civil rights, homosexuals’ rights or anybody else’s rights. The odds are that the majority are vegetarians… Meat is the best source of several nutrients. When our bodies are deficient in these, we become irritable and aggressive. …This is why strict vegetarians tend to be so vociferous. It is a trait that was recognised long ago; it was, after all, the vegetarian Cain who killed the carnivorous Abel, not the other way round. [I somehow missed the all the vegetarians demonstrating against people’s civil rights, but whatever.]
Vegetarianism — a form of child abuse...
There are certainly tensions between the various goals that many vegetarians have (both between health, animal welfare and environmental goals, and e.g. between different sets of environmental concerns). Many of these tensions aren’t always given the attention they deserve. But this article doesn’t really advance our understanding of them much.
OK, like I said, I didn’t read the entire thing. I’m gonna keep on eating meat though, because it’s tasty and I’m not sure killing animals is that bad. The lives of animals are certainly worth less than human lives, aren’t they?
The lives of animals are certainly worth less than human lives
Most people would agree with this. I’m not sure they would agree that vegetarianism puts your life at stake though. The relevant trade-off is animal lives vs. human well-being. (How much human well-being is up for debate.)
What do you think of this essay by Robin Hanson? Here in California we just enacted some sort of legislation that prevents people from keeping animals in cages too long, or something like that. It’s my only hope.
Disclaimer: I don’t personally think animal welfare matters, so I’m playing devil’s advocate here. The views of people who actually do care about animal welfare may differ. (I do believe there are other good reasons to reduce meat consumption, but that’s a separate matter.)
Robin’s claim that pretty much the same amount of land will be devoted to farming regardless of demand for meat seems unjustified, given (a) the massive scale of deforestation going on to make way for livestock, and (b) the generally higher yield of plant crops. (Nick’s point about animals being fed plant crops is relevant here too.) In addition to the carbon impact (the UN estimates that such deforestation accounts for 6% of global GHG emissions) this means that, contra Robin, demand for meat is likely to result in animal deaths.
That said, I think Robin is still correct to argue that the main impact of reducing meat consumption will not be to save animal lives, but rather to result in fewer animals being reared. The question then becomes whether the lives of such animals are so bad that they’re not worth living. Robin asserts that they’re not that bad, without really arguing for the conclusion. People have written books detailing how bad the lives of factory farmed animals are, and I buy their story more than Robin’s lack of story.
It nonetheless seems plausible that the lives of non-factory-farmed animals are worth living, despite their eventually being killed for food. I agree with Robin that this would make eating them OK from the perspective of animal welfare.* However, in contrast to Robin, I don’t think that we’re making the world a better place by bringing them into existence.
* Which is to say, OK if you ignore the environmental costs.
Well argued conchis! The fact that you have been so thoughtful throughout this discussion makes me quite curious why you don’t think animal welfare matters.
I think it does (somewhat) and the points you make against Robin were the same ones that jumped to my mind.
One minor additional point, I hope that reducing my consumption of animals and raising public awareness and concern about animal suffering, will result in the creation of a larger market for “humanely” raised and slaughtered animals.
I’m afraid I don’t really have a good answer. I think that where we draw our sphere of moral concern is basically arbitrary; I just happen to find the idea of sacrificing human welfare for non-human animals deeply unattractive. I might be willing to accept a lexicographic ordering that took other animals’ welfare into account only when human well-being was unaffected, but I doubt that adopting such an view would have (m)any practical consequences.
I agree with everything you said, except that I believe non-human animals deserve non-zero moral weight.
Do you believe infants, or people with dementia, or severe mental disabilities deserve non-zero moral weight? Independent, of course, of how their welfare effects the welfare of mature intelligent humans who care about them.
Lexicographic ordering is non-zero weight. (Well, sort of. You can’t represent a lexicographic ordering with a real-valued social welfare function, so nothing will have “weight” in that sense, but you get the point.)
Yes to all three limbs of your first question, with a possible reservation depending on what exactly falls within the sphere of “severe mental disability”.
Oddly enough, before actually clicking through to the link, I was quite expecting to be bothered. As it turned out, I wasn’t bothered much at all, I think largely due to the lack of gore. I’m not sure what this says about me, but it does tend to reinforce my view that “being bothered by watching something” is a weak guide to morality. My lack of bother at that video doesn’t say much about the inherent moral status of pigs, much as my distress at this video doesn’t say much about the inherent moral value of Britney Spears.
I absolutely agree that being bothered by watching something is a weak guide to morality. I wish I’d mentioned that with my first link. Sometimes such exposure can worsen moral judgments. That said, it seems better to have spent some time watching things like this rather than no time.
Given how strongly our self-interest can structure our judgments of morality, we should be quite a bit more suspicious of our moral conclusions when they justify what we wanted to do. (Yes, some vegetarians surely take some satisfaction from being part of a “morally superior” minority.)
But honestly, to create a toy problem, would you really refuse to pinch yourself or make a friend 60 seconds late for a dentist appointment if it could relieve 10/100/1000 animals in extreme pain? Do you oppose every conceivable law that regulate the treatment of animals? Note, answering “No,” to the above questions certainly doesn’t imply that vegetarianism is mandatory.
Something about animals’ minds… their ability to experience pleasure and pain, their ability to have simple ideas, etc. makes me feel that they deserve non-zero moral weight.
At this point, I think I’m going to refrain from answering your question directly, but rest assured I’m not ignoring it.
I’m in the interesting (and somewhat surprising) position that my intuitions may have shifted somewhat since last I thought about these matters in depth.
I’m not quite sure what to do about that yet. Either in terms of my general thoughts about how to respond to changes in intuitions, or in terms of how I would update if I decided to run with the new ones. I worry that trying to answer immediately could bias my response towards rationalizing my existing set of beliefs, and I don’t want to do that, so I’m going to take some more time to think through things.
Lexicographic ordering is non-zero weight. (Well, sort of. You can’t represent a lexicographic ordering with a real-valued social welfare function, so nothing will have “weight” in that sense, but you get the point.)
Lexicographic ordering is zero weight outside of toy problems, since even the smallest possibility of making a difference at the highest order will exclude even the greatest possibility of making a difference at lower orders from attention – but this may have been the point of your previous comment.
I thought I was just being evil by eating meat until I started reading this. Hat tip to PJ Eby.
AFAIK, most factory-farmed animals are grain-fed, so this actually multiplies the harm of meat-eating.
Indeed. Gaverick Matheny and Kai M. A. Chan have formalized that point in an excellent paper, “The Illogic of the Larder.”
There is some interesting information in amongst all the loaded language, straw men, naturalistic fallacies, and failure to think at the margin, but that piece largely comes off as a hack job, where the author started with their bottom line, and worked up.
My favourite parts:
There are certainly tensions between the various goals that many vegetarians have (both between health, animal welfare and environmental goals, and e.g. between different sets of environmental concerns). Many of these tensions aren’t always given the attention they deserve. But this article doesn’t really advance our understanding of them much.
OK, like I said, I didn’t read the entire thing. I’m gonna keep on eating meat though, because it’s tasty and I’m not sure killing animals is that bad. The lives of animals are certainly worth less than human lives, aren’t they?
Most people would agree with this. I’m not sure they would agree that vegetarianism puts your life at stake though. The relevant trade-off is animal lives vs. human well-being. (How much human well-being is up for debate.)
Right.
What do you think of this essay by Robin Hanson? Here in California we just enacted some sort of legislation that prevents people from keeping animals in cages too long, or something like that. It’s my only hope.
Disclaimer: I don’t personally think animal welfare matters, so I’m playing devil’s advocate here. The views of people who actually do care about animal welfare may differ. (I do believe there are other good reasons to reduce meat consumption, but that’s a separate matter.)
Robin’s claim that pretty much the same amount of land will be devoted to farming regardless of demand for meat seems unjustified, given (a) the massive scale of deforestation going on to make way for livestock, and (b) the generally higher yield of plant crops. (Nick’s point about animals being fed plant crops is relevant here too.) In addition to the carbon impact (the UN estimates that such deforestation accounts for 6% of global GHG emissions) this means that, contra Robin, demand for meat is likely to result in animal deaths.
That said, I think Robin is still correct to argue that the main impact of reducing meat consumption will not be to save animal lives, but rather to result in fewer animals being reared. The question then becomes whether the lives of such animals are so bad that they’re not worth living. Robin asserts that they’re not that bad, without really arguing for the conclusion. People have written books detailing how bad the lives of factory farmed animals are, and I buy their story more than Robin’s lack of story.
It nonetheless seems plausible that the lives of non-factory-farmed animals are worth living, despite their eventually being killed for food. I agree with Robin that this would make eating them OK from the perspective of animal welfare.* However, in contrast to Robin, I don’t think that we’re making the world a better place by bringing them into existence.
* Which is to say, OK if you ignore the environmental costs.
Well argued conchis! The fact that you have been so thoughtful throughout this discussion makes me quite curious why you don’t think animal welfare matters.
I think it does (somewhat) and the points you make against Robin were the same ones that jumped to my mind.
One minor additional point, I hope that reducing my consumption of animals and raising public awareness and concern about animal suffering, will result in the creation of a larger market for “humanely” raised and slaughtered animals.
I’m afraid I don’t really have a good answer. I think that where we draw our sphere of moral concern is basically arbitrary; I just happen to find the idea of sacrificing human welfare for non-human animals deeply unattractive. I might be willing to accept a lexicographic ordering that took other animals’ welfare into account only when human well-being was unaffected, but I doubt that adopting such an view would have (m)any practical consequences.
I agree with everything you said, except that I believe non-human animals deserve non-zero moral weight.
Do you believe infants, or people with dementia, or severe mental disabilities deserve non-zero moral weight? Independent, of course, of how their welfare effects the welfare of mature intelligent humans who care about them.
Does witnessing animal torture not bother you?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eQQQBn4dlo&feature=channel Note, I do not endorse everything PETA does.
Lexicographic ordering is non-zero weight. (Well, sort of. You can’t represent a lexicographic ordering with a real-valued social welfare function, so nothing will have “weight” in that sense, but you get the point.)
Yes to all three limbs of your first question, with a possible reservation depending on what exactly falls within the sphere of “severe mental disability”.
Oddly enough, before actually clicking through to the link, I was quite expecting to be bothered. As it turned out, I wasn’t bothered much at all, I think largely due to the lack of gore. I’m not sure what this says about me, but it does tend to reinforce my view that “being bothered by watching something” is a weak guide to morality. My lack of bother at that video doesn’t say much about the inherent moral status of pigs, much as my distress at this video doesn’t say much about the inherent moral value of Britney Spears.
I absolutely agree that being bothered by watching something is a weak guide to morality. I wish I’d mentioned that with my first link. Sometimes such exposure can worsen moral judgments. That said, it seems better to have spent some time watching things like this rather than no time.
Given how strongly our self-interest can structure our judgments of morality, we should be quite a bit more suspicious of our moral conclusions when they justify what we wanted to do. (Yes, some vegetarians surely take some satisfaction from being part of a “morally superior” minority.)
But honestly, to create a toy problem, would you really refuse to pinch yourself or make a friend 60 seconds late for a dentist appointment if it could relieve 10/100/1000 animals in extreme pain? Do you oppose every conceivable law that regulate the treatment of animals? Note, answering “No,” to the above questions certainly doesn’t imply that vegetarianism is mandatory.
Something about animals’ minds… their ability to experience pleasure and pain, their ability to have simple ideas, etc. makes me feel that they deserve non-zero moral weight.
Gore, for those who are interested and willing
Cats and dogs
At this point, I think I’m going to refrain from answering your question directly, but rest assured I’m not ignoring it.
I’m in the interesting (and somewhat surprising) position that my intuitions may have shifted somewhat since last I thought about these matters in depth.
I’m not quite sure what to do about that yet. Either in terms of my general thoughts about how to respond to changes in intuitions, or in terms of how I would update if I decided to run with the new ones. I worry that trying to answer immediately could bias my response towards rationalizing my existing set of beliefs, and I don’t want to do that, so I’m going to take some more time to think through things.
Lexicographic ordering is zero weight outside of toy problems, since even the smallest possibility of making a difference at the highest order will exclude even the greatest possibility of making a difference at lower orders from attention – but this may have been the point of your previous comment.
Agreed. (And, yes, that was the point of my earlier comment. ;))
In this case it basically allows you to be a heartless b*****d without admitting to actually being a heartless b*****d.